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Abstract 
The concept of disruptive innovation has received much attention in recent years. These 
innovations can be defined as offering an initially lower performance while at the same time 
bringing some new attributes to the market. This thesis aims to develop and extend existing 
theory on disruptive innovation with an emphasis on business models and value networks. 
Previous work in this area has shown that incumbents are often toppled by entrants when 
disruptive innovations are introduced since these technologies are not initially demanded by 
the established firms’ customers. Much attention has been devoted to how disruptive 
innovations emerge in low-end segments and in new markets. However, more knowledge is 
needed about whether and how they can prosper inside an incumbent firm’s established 
market segment. Moreover, the challenges related to these innovations have increasingly 
been framed as related to the business model of firms, but little is known regarding how and 
why this is the case. 
Drawing upon data from several case studies, the empirical findings in this dissertation 
suggest that disruptive innovations may prosper in a segment where incumbents are already 
present. They do so by compensating the lower traditional performance with some new ways 
of creating value, for instance by removing labor or changing activities inside the customer’s 
organization. These findings in turn suggest that this theory needs to focus more on how 
different performance dimensions create value. Additionally, it is argued that a more nuanced 
conceptualization of customers and networks is needed. When regarding customers as a 
collection of actors with different competencies and incentives, it becomes clear that 
disruptive innovations are problematic even when a firm’s existing customers demand them. 
These innovations may be incompatible with the different activities and incentives of some 
actors, which may result in a barrier to adoption. Disruptive innovation can therefore be 
regarded as a business model challenge in the sense that the new value creation and 
distribution distorts the firm’s surrounding constellation of actors. Firms need to change their 
network, but struggle to do so since business models transcend their boundaries and they are 
therefore forced to act under conditions of interdependence. 
Keywords: Disruptive innovation, discontinuous, business model, network, value, 
Hasselblad, Facit.  
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1. Introduction 
“Individual innovations imply, by virtue of their nature, a "big" step and a "big" change. A 
railroad through new country, i.e., country not yet served by railroads, as soon as it gets into 
working order upsets all conditions of location, all cost calculations, all production functions 
within its radius of influence; and hardly any "ways of doing things" which have been 
optimal before remain so afterward.“ 
Joseph Schumpeter (1939, p. 101) 
Few people today dispute that innovation lies at the heart of economic development. Ever 
since Schumpeter wrote his book The Theory of Economic Development (1912, 1936), 
scholars have emphasized the importance of innovation as a driver of structural change and 
economic growth. Schumpeter (1942) argued that economic growth in a capitalist regime 
happens through creative destruction, a process where the old is continuously being 
destroyed and thereby freeing resources for the new.  
The process of creative destruction has often caused insurmountable problems for established 
firms (Gilfillan, 1935). This phenomenon is almost as old as capitalism itself and there are 
many historical examples of how established firms encounter problems under conditions of 
discontinuous change. Few of the typewriter manufacturers survived the shift to personal 
computers, the shift from sailing ships to steam ships put incumbent firms in great trouble 
and the companies operating in the ice industry went out of business with the rise of fridges 
(Utterback, 1994). The shift from vacuum tube radios to transistor radios entailed great 
difficulties for established firms like RCA and created an innovative opportunity for entrants 
like Sony (Henderson and Clark, 1990). When minimill technology for steel production 
emerged in Northern Italy in the 1960s the large integrated steel mill manufacturers in 
France, Germany and Belgium encountered severe difficulties (Jörnmark, 1993). 
Needless to say, there are many more examples of this pattern. Though technological 
discontinuities have had a great impact on changes in industrial leadership, discontinuities in 
general seem to cause problems for incumbents. Also, changes in the regulatory environment 
or the emergence of new business models have toppled former industry leaders (Chesbrough, 
2003; Markides, 2006). 
Many scholars have addressed this dilemma which is sometimes referred to as the 
“incumbent’s curse” (Foster, 1986). For instance, Tushman and Anderson (1986) argued that 
discontinuities which render existing competencies obsolete tend to overthrow established 
firms. Henderson and Clark (1990) pointed at organizational impediments in order to explain 
changes in the competitive landscape. 
This dissertation focuses on the phenomenon of disruptive innovation, which can be regarded 
as an important sub-set of discontinuous innovation. A disruptive innovation can be defined 
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as a technology which initially underperforms along performance dimensions that 
mainstream customers have historically valued, while at the same time bringing new 
performance attributes to the market (Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006a). Theory on 
disruptive innovation has received a lot of interest from practitioners and scholars. However, 
more knowledge is still needed regarding how these innovations emerge and why they are 
problematic to handle.  The aim of this thesis is to nuance and improve existing theory 
related to disruptive innovation, and in particular to describe and analyze the roles played by 
value networks and business models. More specifically, it seeks to answer the following 
research questions: 
Research question 1: Can a disruptive innovation emerge in an established value network and 
if so, how can this be explained? 
Research question 2: How and why is a disruptive innovation a business model challenge? 
The thesis consists of six appended articles along with this covering paper. The covering 
paper starts with a review of the literature on discontinuous innovation, disruptive innovation 
and related bodies of literature. Towards the end of this section, the two research questions 
above are derived and justified. Section 3 provides a sketch of the methods that have been 
employed and also describes the research setting more generally. The fourth section contains 
a summary of the appended papers whereas the subsequent sections analyze these findings 
and seek to develop existing theory on disruptive innovation. The conclusions are presented 
in the seventh section and eventually, some managerial implications are provided. 
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2. Theories on discontinuous and disruptive innovation 
This section contains a review of existing literature on discontinuous and disruptive 
innovation. The first part provides a more general overview of the field and the following 
sections go into more detail regarding disruptive innovation, value and networks. Some areas 
in need of further development are identified and explicated as two research questions 
towards the end. 
 
2.1 Discontinuous Innovation 
It is not the owner of stage-coaches who builds railways. 
Joseph Schumpeter (1936, p. 66) 
It is well documented today that established firms may encounter difficulties in the face of 
discontinuous innovations (Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Anderson and Tushman, 1990). A 
discontinuous innovation can be regarded as an innovation which creates a discrete and 
momentous shift related to a firm’s competence base or network.1 Such a shift can be created 
by new technologies, business models or regulatory changes.2 A technological discontinuity 
can be defined as “a major technological change resulting in the creation of a substitute 
technology for a particular industry’s products or processes” (Hamilton and Singh, 1992). 
The emergence and eventual domination of digital imaging as opposed to analog 
photography can serve as an illustrative example of a discontinuous innovation since it 
implied a momentous shift in the industry, for instance with regard to its competence base 
and the way that value is created. 
Incumbent companies are usually good at innovation under steady, stable circumstances, but 
when technologies shift or new business models are introduced they can all of a sudden 
become vulnerable. Their attempts to develop significantly new technologies are often less 
productive than when entrant firms try to do so (Henderson, 1993). Frequently, established 
                                                            
1 Steady-state innovations will throughout this thesis be thought of as the opposite of discontinuous innovations 
(Bessant, 2008). While the term continuous innovation is in some cases considered to be the opposite of 
discontinuous innovation, it has a different meaning for other scholars. For instance, Boer and Gertsen (2003) 
define continuous innovation with regard to the firm’s “ability to combine operational effectiveness and 
strategic flexibility - exploitation and exploration - capabilities that have traditionally been regarded as 
antithetical” (p. 805). This stream of literature thus considers continuous innovation to be a capability of a firm 
rather than an attribute of certain innovations. In order to avoid confusion, the term steady-state innovation is 
regarded as the opposite of discontinuous innovation in this thesis. 
2 Sometimes, the term radical innovation is used in order to describe similar phenomena. Throughout this thesis, 
a radical innovation is rather associated with a significantly enhanced performance (Leifer et al., 2001). Such an 
innovation does not necessarily have to be discontinuous or disruptive; it might create a much greater 
performance without implying any discontinuities for the firm or its surrounding network. 
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firms fail to cope with these changes, they lose market shares and the successful firms are 
found among newcomers (Utterback, 1994)3.  
Dosi (1982) introduced the concepts of technology paradigm and technology trajectories in 
an attempt to describe continuous and discontinuous change. He identified a parallel to 
Kuhnian theories of development of new science. According to Dosi, technologies tend to 
evolve along certain trajectories and occasionally, these trajectories are punctuated by a 
discontinuous change that upsets the existing paradigm. Firms which have built their 
competencies around an existing paradigm are therefore likely to encounter problems when a 
new trajectory is introduced. It has also been argued that technological change is inherently 
path dependent (e.g. Rosenberg, 1972). For example, Clark (1985) observed that the early 
decisions by engineers in the automotive industry to develop the combustion engine instead 
of steam or electrical engines affected the decisions by the following generations of 
engineers. Hence, through path dependency, established firms become increasingly reliant on 
one particular technology and therefore also more vulnerable to changes in the underlying 
technology. 
Dosi’s argument was nuanced by Abernathy and Clark (1985) who argued that the 
discontinuity’s impact can be understood in terms of to what extent it changes the existing 
competence and to what extent it disrupts established market linkages. In more general terms, 
literature on discontinuous innovation can therefore be classified as related to either the 
supply-side and a firm’s existing resources and capabilities or the demand-side and its impact 
on the market and the surrounding environment. 
Starting with the supply-side related literature, several explanations for why established firms 
struggle under conditions of discontinuous change have been presented. It has for instance 
been suggested that established firms build organizational structures, values, and processes 
over time that enable them to efficiently process information within the context of an existing 
technological paradigm. As firms grow large they tend to become more mechanistic 
organizations, i.e. more structured and hierarchical (Burns and Stalker, 1961). The same 
authors also noted that the appropriate organizational structures and management skills 
depend upon the kind of innovation that a firm aims to introduce. A shift towards a 
mechanistic organization often results in an improved efficiency, but may at the same time 
                                                            
3 While the incumbent’s curse has received a lot of attention, some scholars have argued that this dilemma may 
in fact be a bit exaggerated. Chandy and Tellis (2000) write: “Events in which the mighty are humbled and the 
little guy finishes first are likely to be more eye-catching than are those in which the mighty remain mighty… … 
Our research of innovations in the consumer durables and office product categories suggests that incumbents 
or large firms are not necessarily doomed to obsolescence by nimble outsiders” (p. 14).  
Olleros (1986) investigated another often neglected aspect of this issue, namely the burn-out of pioneers, thus 
suggesting that entrant firms might also encounter problems under conditions of discontinuous change. Other 
scholars have focused on key determinants of incumbent survival and argued that strong, visionary leadership is 
one such important capability (Rosenbloom, 2000; Tellis, 2006). Hence, while it is clear that incumbents 
sometimes fail due to discontinuities, it should be pointed out that this is not always the case and that there is 
some conflicting evidence. 
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hamper a firm’s innovative efforts and make the firm vulnerable to profound changes in the 
underlying technology. Similar patterns have been identified by other scholars. For example, 
Abernathy (1978) noted that the decreased competitiveness of some firms in the automotive 
industry was related to their striving for increased efficiency since these efforts reduced their 
ability to be innovative. He argued that in order to remain competitive over time a firm needs 
to be efficient and innovative simultaneously (Abernathy, 1978; Hayes & Abernathy, 1980) 
and referred to this challenge as the productivity dilemma.  
Firms therefore face a paradox when developing new products and processes: they need to 
take advantage of their core capabilities without letting them be turned into core rigidities 
(Leonard-Barton, 1992). This dilemma has often been described as a key challenge in 
innovation management (Magnusson and Martini, 2008). One reason for these difficulties is 
that capabilities are associated with certain values, which are difficult to change. As 
managers work together they tend to develop a common set of beliefs, a ‘dominant logic’ 
based upon their history (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). Other scholars have used the term 
‘inertia’ when describing how people within an organization tend to proceed as they always 
have (Adams et al., 1998). Argyris (1977) underlined the importance of double-loop learning, 
i.e. that firms need to learn not only by identifying errors but also by revising underlying 
values and assumptions. 
The literature on discontinuous innovation and incumbent failure has often looked at the 
firm’s resources and capabilities when trying to explain the difficulties that are encountered. 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) made a distinction between competence-enhancing and 
competence-destroying innovations. They argued that innovations which destroy the value of 
a firm’s existing competencies are very difficult to manage, because established firms are 
bound by traditions, sunk costs and internal political constraints. Henderson and Clark (1990) 
nuanced those arguments related to competence destruction by classifying innovations as 
either architectural or modular. In their study of the photolithographic alignment industry, it 
was found that incumbents were good at handling innovation on a modular level, but often 
failed to recognize and respond to architectural innovations, i.e. changes in the linkages 
between different components in a given product. The authors pointed out inertia on the 
organizational level and bounded rationality as the main reasons for this dilemma. 
Christensen (1997, p. 34) used the following quote in order to illustrate how organizational 
structures and product architectures are interlinked: “When Tom West, Data General’s 
project leader and a former long-time DEC employee, removed the cover of the DEC 
minicomputer and examined its structure, he saw ‘Digital’s organization chart in the design 
of the product’”. Hence, competence destruction seems to be easier to handle on a component 
level than on an architectural level. 
Another competence-related aspect of discontinuous innovation is the role of complementary 
assets. The term was coined by Teece (1986) who looked at how firms sustain their 
competitive advantages under different appropriability regimes. He argued that firms may 
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retain their competitiveness under a weak appropriability regime if they have access to 
complementary assets. A complementary asset can be defined as a resource or capability that 
is needed in order to retain the investments in a new technology. Those assets can include for 
example distribution channels, service organizations, relationships in the value chain, brands, 
complementary products and technologies. It has been shown that a key determinant of how 
incumbents perform under conditions of technological change is related to whether their 
complementary assets are rendered obsolete or not (Tripsas, 1997). Studying the typesetter 
industry, Tripsas found that established firms could manage a competence-destroying shift by 
relying upon their complementary assets and thereby obtain more time to renew their 
resources and capabilities. 
Scholars in organization theory have emphasized that power and politics may hamper an 
incumbent’s response to a discontinuity. An organization can be thought of as a set of 
different actors, which must cooperate to accomplish something, but at the same time 
compete for the internal pool of resources. Since organizational changes tend to imply a shift 
in the existing constellation of power, a resistance to change is created (Cyert and March, 
1963). Studying Olivetti’s response to the shift to electronic calculators, Danneels et al. 
(2009) pointed out how attempts to enter the new technology were continuously hampered by 
what the electronics engineers at the company referred to as “the mechanical establishment”. 
Similar conflicts seem to have taken place at Kodak in the 1990s (Swasy, 1997). Cooper and 
Schendel (1976) provided analogous arguments, stating that “decisions about allocating 
resources to old and new technologies within the organization are loaded with implications 
for the decision makers; not only are old product lines threatened, but also old skills and 
positions of influence” (p. 68). Drawing upon evidence from Polaroid’s efforts to manage the 
shift to digital imaging, Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) further suggested that another source of 
inertia may be related to the cognitive capabilities among senior managers. 
Neoclassical economic theory has also highlighted some explanations of incumbent failure 
under conditions of discontinuous change. Arrow (1962) claimed that firms with an existing 
strong market position have low incentives to invest in innovation initiatives. Several reasons 
for this unwillingness have been pointed out; Reinganum (1983; 1984) suggested that 
incumbents are less willing to cannibalize on their existing revenue streams and have lower 
incentives to undertake ventures which are more uncertain. 
 
2.2 Discontinuous innovation and the environment 
Over time, increased attention has been paid to the position of firms and how they interact 
with the surrounding environment. Afuah (2001) suggested that the benefits of vertical 
integration change as the industry evolves; once a new technology has displaced the former 
one, the industry enters a period of high uncertainty, as suggested by Utterback (1994). 
However, as the industry starts to stabilize, firms must obtain skills and knowledge that make 
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them competitive, which usually implies a closer interaction with suppliers and this often 
results in a higher degree of vertical integration (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Afuah (2001) 
underlined that firm boundaries are not static and called for more research into how 
technological discontinuities affect transaction costs and the industry structure. 
It has also been argued that the effects an innovation has on customers and suppliers must be 
taken into consideration (Afuah and Bahram, 1995). Innovations may be competence-
destroying or architectural not only for the firm, but also for customers and other actors. In 
line with this argument, Afuah (2000) looked at co-opetitors, defined as the “suppliers, 
customers, complementors and alliance partners with whom it must collaborate and 
compete” (p. 387), as a complementary asset. He argued that the technological shifts which 
destroy the value of those co-opetitors may create particular problems for established firms.  
In addition, more attention has been given to the role of the market and customers. It has 
been suggested that competence destruction is the least explanatory variable of discontinuous 
changes, whereas the extent to which the technology expands the market or breaks 
established linkages between manufacturing and the market are more important (Utterback, 
1994; Utterback and Kim, 1986). Mitchell (1989, 1992) made similar observations, 
suggesting that those shifts which did not change the existing linkages with existing markets 
and customers were easier to handle for incumbents. Glasmeier’s (1991) study of the Swiss 
watch industry’s response to the rise of digital watches can be regarded as a good illustration 
of this argument. She claimed that an established production network in a region tends to be 
beneficial for the involved actors if the underlying technology does not change. When the 
technology shifted, the lack of coordination in the network turned into a core rigidity. 
Additionally, the distribution model for watches was altered. The Swiss watch manufacturers 
had built a distribution network which was based on jewellery stores. These stores made a 
steady profit from repairing watches, and hence they were less willing to sell cheap 
electronic watches that did not need to be repaired. 
  
8 
 
2.3 Disruptive innovation 
As outlined in the previous section, several scholars have pointed out the importance of 
looking beyond firm boundaries and into the role of the market when trying to understand the 
difficulties that discontinuous innovations imply. These ideas were further developed by 
Clayton Christensen in a series of articles (e.g. Christensen, 1993; Christensen and Bower, 
1996; Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Christensen, 1996; Christensen et al, 1998) and 
popularized in The Innovator’s Dilemma (1997) by the same author. 
Christensen wrote his doctoral dissertation about the rigid disk drive industry (1992) and 
identified an anomaly – something that previous literature could not explain. The pattern of 
entrant-incumbent dynamics in this industry was inconsistent with the findings in e.g. 
Tushman and Anderson (1986) and Henderson and Clark (1990). Several technological shifts 
occurred in the disk drive industry during the period 1970-1990, but the discontinuities that 
toppled established firms were not competence-destroying or architectural. Instead, it was the 
emergence of smaller, simpler and cheaper disk drives with an initially lower storage 
capacity which often created insurmountable problems for established firms. Over the six 
generations of disk drives that were studied, incumbents lost market share to entrants when a 
new generation was introduced, something that previous theory could not account for. 
Christensen (1997) therefore rejected those explanations which had primarily looked at 
supply-side factors4. 
Instead, he looked at the role of the market and drew upon resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 1982) and the concept of value networks (Christensen 
and Rosenbloom, 1995) in order to explain incumbent failure.5 Given that this theory had 
hardly been used in previous literature on entrant-incumbent dynamics, it merits some further 
explanation. Resource dependence theory drew largely upon Katz and Kahn’s (1966) work 
which argued that organizations must be regarded as open systems. Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) claimed that previous studies of organizations had been too focused on the internal 
issues and overlooked the role of the environment. As indicated by their book titled The 
external control of organizations: a resource dependence perspective, the authors instead 
looked beyond the boundaries of the organization. They argued that organizations depend on 
                                                            
4 Christensen and Bower (1996) write: “We contest the conclusions of scholars such as Tushman and Anderson 
(1986), who have argued that incumbent firms are most threatened by attacking entrants when the innovation in 
question destroys, or does not build upon, the competence of the firm. We observe that established firms, though 
often at great cost, have led their industries in developing critical competence-destroying technologies, when 
the new technology was needed to meet existing customers’ demands” (p.199). 
5 It is clear from several of the publications by Christensen that he draws upon resource dependence theory. For 
instance, Christensen (1997, p. xxiii) states that: “Companies depend on customers and investors for resources”. 
After having described the events that took place in the disk drive industry, the same author (1997) wrote: “this 
observation supports a somewhat controversial theory called resource dependence, propounded by a minority 
of management scholars, which posits that companies’ freedom of action is limited to satisfying the needs of 
those entities outside the firm (customers and investors, primarily) that give it the resources it needs to survive.” 
(p. 117). For further illustrations of this point, see for instance Christensen and Bower (1996, p. 3). 
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critical resources in order to survive. When an organization does not control all factors 
required to achieve its objectives, it needs to obtain resources from its environment and 
consequently, it is to some extent controlled by those actors who supply the resources it 
needs. Hence, it is uncertain whether an organization would obtain its required resources 
given the unpredictable nature of the environment. This idea has several implications, for 
instance, that firms tend to serve those actors which provide them with resources and that 
organizations often reduce their freedom by building relations to others in order to lower the 
uncertainty. Since the customers and owners are often the key stakeholders that provide the 
firm with resources, they exercise an indirect but still significant control on what decisions 
are taken and how resources are allocated inside a firm6.  
Bower (1970) provided similar arguments when suggesting that the demands of established 
customers constrain the freedom of action for firms. This perspective is manifested in 
Christensen’s research in the concept of value networks defined as “the context within which 
the firm identifies and responds to customer’s needs, procures inputs and reacts to 
competitors” (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995, p. 234).7 
Christensen explained the pattern of incumbent failure in the disk drive industry by arguing 
that the smaller drives which offered a lower storage capacity were problematic since they 
did not fit into the firm’s established value network. The initially inferior performance 
implied that such products could only prosper in niche segments which were small and 
offered lower margins. Existing customers did not demand smaller disk drives and therefore, 
the incumbent made a seemingly rational decision when not developing such drives. Instead, 
the established firm kept launching products which eventually overshot its customers’ needs 
of storage capacity. As the storage capacity of the smaller disk drives improved, they 
eventually became good enough to displace the former generation. A firm’s existing products 
may therefore be substituted by products which initially underperform along the most 
important dimensions, but provide sufficient performance while at the same time bringing 
new attributes to the market. Consequently, the firms which listened to their most profitable 
customers and moved up-market were misled. Eventually they lost market shares to entrant 
firms who had emerged in a new value network, with new customers. Christensen (1997) 
documented similar patterns in many other areas, such as mechanical excavators, steel 
production and motorbikes. 
A key determinant of the probability of success for incumbents is therefore the extent to 
which a new technology addresses the demands of existing customers, since they seem to 
                                                            
6 The link between resource dependence and the resource allocation process is further explicated in Christensen 
(1997, p. 119): “Good resource allocation processes are designed to weed out proposals that customers don’t 
want. When these decision-making processes work well, if customers don’t want a product, it won’t get funded; 
if they do want it, it will.” 
7 Almost identical definitions can be found in Christensen (1997, p. 36) and in Christensen and Raynor (2003, p. 
44). 
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influence the firm’s resource allocation process to a great extent. A firm has good reasons to 
satisfy its existing value network since this largely defines its competitive advantage and 
supplies it with resources. But at the same time, the network hampers attempts at developing 
innovations which are not requested by existing customers. From this theoretical standpoint, 
Christensen explains the pattern of incumbent failure by making a distinction between 
sustaining and disruptive technologies. Sustaining technologies have in common that they 
improve the performance of established products along the dimensions that existing 
customers value. Disruptive technologies on the other hand, start with a lower performance 
along these dimensions and also introduce some new functions or attributes. They are 
described as typically being simpler and cheaper than the sustaining technology.8 Hence, this 
dichotomy is different from more widely used ones like “incremental” versus “radical” or 
“competence-enhancing” versus “competence-destroying”. The disruptive versus sustaining 
terminology instead addresses to what extent an innovation is demanded by existing 
customers in an established value network or not. Therefore, a radical innovation can be 
sustaining and an incremental innovation can be disruptive, depending upon their impact on 
existing customers. 
Through his studies of the disk drive industry among others, Christensen showed that 
established firms usually win sustaining battles whereas entrants often succeed in disruptive 
battles. Incumbents appear to be “held captive” by their investors and their most important 
customers. Therefore, resources are not allocated to initiatives that are initially less 
profitable.9 Christensen referred to this pattern as the innovator’s dilemma, arguing that 
disruptive technologies present a particular challenge for incumbents since they require 
managerial skills that are different from the ones needed to succeed in sustaining battles.  
Theory on disruptive innovation has often been perceived as rather pessimistic regarding the 
ability of established firms to succeed in these shifts. The main reason for this appears to be 
that firms are controlled by forces beyond their own boundaries (customers). However, 
Christensen (1997) also proposed a couple of managerial solutions to this problem. One of 
the most influential ones is that incumbent firms can develop disruptive innovations by 
nursing them in an independent organization. Such a structure can shelter the initiative from 
the forces of resource dependence that tend to allocate resources towards sustaining 
innovations. By doing so, firms avoid letting existing customers control their resource 
allocation process, which tends to drain disruptive initiative of funding. Some guidelines for 
how to commercialize such innovations have also been offered. Given that the eventual 
                                                            
8 Christensen (1997) defines disruptive technologies in the following way: “Generally, disruptive technologies 
underperform established products in mainstream markets. But they have other features that a few fringe (and 
generally new) customers value. Products based upon disruptive technologies are typically cheaper, simpler, 
smaller, and, frequently, more convenient to use” (p. xviii). 
9 Christensen (1997) writes: “The evidence is very strong that as long as the new technology was required to 
address the needs of their customers, established firms were able to muster the expertise, capital, suppliers, 
energy, and rationale to develop and implement the requisite technology both competitively and effectively” (p. 
111). 
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application of a disruptive technology is often uncertain, a trial-and-error process is 
recommended where firms should try to fail early and inexpensively. Another option could 
be to obtain the required resources and capabilities by acquiring another company. 
 
2.3.1 Extensions and improvements of the theory on disruptive innovation 
Over the last decade, the theory of disruptive innovation has received a lot of interest, in a 
wide range of different settings. For example, two renowned journals in the innovation 
management field have devoted special issues to the subject, the Journal of Product 
Innovation Management (2006) and IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 
(2002).10 
The researchers working in this field have increasingly sought to frame disruption as a 
theory.11 A number of books have been co-written by Christensen, applying the disruptive 
innovation theory to many different issues, e.g. healthcare and education.12 Scholars have 
used this notion in fields such as psychotherapy (Simon and Ludman, 2009), orthopedics 
(Hansen and Bozic, 2009) and political science (Mukunda, 2010). The concept has also had a 
profound impact on management. Christensen (2006) describes how several large companies 
such as Kodak and Intel have used his model to develop and launch disruptive innovations 
successfully.13 
The theory has also been improved in several different ways. Christensen and Raynor (2003) 
made a distinction between low-end and new market disruptions. Low-end disruptive 
innovations evolve in the lower segments of the market, typically by having a business model 
which enables the firm to offer cheaper products with a performance that is initially inferior. 
Steel minimills and discount retailing are both examples of this. New-market disruptive 
innovations prosper among customers that have not been addressed previously. The personal 
computer and the first portable transistor radios can serve as illustrative examples of new 
market disruptive innovations. Schmidt and Druehl (2008) elaborated further on these 
                                                            
10 Danneels (2004, p. 246) provided a compelling illustration of the wide impact that Christensen’s work on 
disruptive innovation has had: “It is rare that a scholarly work draws so much attention as Harvard Business 
School professor Clayton Christensen’s work on disruptive technology. His book The Innovator’s Dilemma 
(1997) has sold over 200,000 copies since its release in May 1997 and has received extensive coverage in 
business publications. Christensen was elevated by the business press to the status of ‘‘guru’’ (Scherreik, 2000). 
His work also has been cited extensively by scholars working in diverse disciplines and topic areas, including 
new product development (NPD), marketing, strategy, management, technology management, and so forth.” 
11 Christensen and Raynor (2003, p. 55) state that: “Disruption is a theory: a conceptual model of cause and 
effect that makes it possible to better predict the outcomes of competitive battles in different circumstances.” 
12 See e.g. Christensen et al. (2009), Christensen et al. (2004) and Christensen et al. (2008). 
13 There are other examples of less successful attempts to apply these theories. For instance, Christensen 
founded the Disruptive Growth Fund together with Neil A. Eisner in 2000. The fund made investments based 
on the theory of disruptive innovation. It was closed a year later, after having lost 64 percent of its value 
(Nasdaq lost about 50 percent in this period). For more information, see Scherreik (2001).  
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concepts, arguing that new market disruptions can be categorized as emerging either in fringe 
markets or in more detached markets. 
Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006a) also sought to improve existing classifications, claiming 
that Christensen’s original definition was too narrow since it only took cheaper, simpler and 
initially lower performance products into consideration. They instead proposed that a 
disruptive innovation can be defined as: “an innovation which introduces a different set of 
features, performance, and price attributes relative to the existing product, an unattractive 
combination for mainstream customers at the time of product introduction because of 
inferior performance on the attributes these customers value and/or a high price—although a 
different customer segment may value the new attributes.” (Govindarajan and Kopalle, 
2006a, p. 15). Christensen (2006) acknowledged that this definition is better than his original 
1997 definition since it captures a wider range of similar phenomena. Therefore, it makes 
sense to relate to Govindarajan and Kopalle’s definition throughout this dissertation.14  
Other scholars have developed Christensen’s theories, for instance by addressing the 
competitive dynamics (Adner and Zemsky, 2005) and by developing ways to measure and 
assess the disruptiveness of an innovation (Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006b). Further 
contributions have been made by drawing upon diffusion theory and by looking at various 
aspects of the market and the customer. Christensen (1997) essentially explains the pattern of 
disruption by looking at different customer segments, suggesting that a disruptive technology 
prospers in low-end segments or in new markets and later on invade the mainstream market. 
Hence, existing literature has to a large extent maintained a diffusion-oriented view on 
customer attributes such as the perspective developed by Rogers (1995) and used by Moore 
(2002). Slater and Mohr (2006) identified parallels between the work by Christensen (1997) 
and Gordon Moore’s book Crossing the chasm (2002). Moore (2002) drew upon diffusion 
theories which suggest that an innovation penetrates a market according to an S-shaped, 
epidemic pattern. He claimed that many innovations do not reach the mass markets and 
presented several ways of approaching the early majority of the market. Slater and Mohr 
(2006) argued that the challenges related to disruptive innovation are similar in many ways.  
The diffusion perspective on disruptive innovation has been further developed by several 
other scholars. Linton (2002) explained how the diffusion of disruptive innovations can be 
forecasted and Kassiech et al. (2002) presented several differentiating market strategies. 
Adner (2002) also maintained a diffusion oriented perspective, stating that the structure of 
demand needs to be addressed in order to understand the impact of disruptive innovations. 
He looked at different performance thresholds, i.e. critical performance levels that must be 
                                                            
14 Disruptive innovation is a notion that has become very popular. It is often used in many different ways and 
the original meaning of the term is therefore sometimes lost (Lindsay and Hopkins, 2010; Linton, 2009). 
Frequently, such terms as discontinuous, disruptive and radical are used interchangeably (e.g. Assink, 2006). 
Govindarajan and Kopalle’s definition is useful as it is similar to the original work on the topic, albeit a bit 
extended. 
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met. The functional threshold can be thought of as the minimum performance that the 
customer can tolerate and the net utility threshold also takes price into consideration. Adner 
further argued that an important reason for displacement of one technology was the 
decreasing marginal utility associated with further improvements of the sustaining 
technology. Hence, several extensions and improvements have been made over time, 
primarily by drawing upon diffusion theory and by developing a more detailed understanding 
of the market. 
The managerial recommendations related to disruptive innovation have also been improved 
over time. As stated previously, the resource allocation process can be managed by creating a 
separate organization. Another way of managing it is to make use of strategic buckets, i.e. 
specifying which resources should be used for disruptive and sustaining initiatives (Chao and 
Kavadias, 2007; Hogan, 2005). 
When it comes to the actual commercialization, other scholars have provided some 
guidelines. Some of the recent work in this area has focused increasingly on the role of the 
market and the customer. For instance, Danneels (2004) and Henderson (2006) underlined 
the importance of developing a “customer competence” in order to succeed with disruptive 
innovation. In line with these suggestions, King and Tucci (2002) claimed that those firms 
which had “transformational experience”, i.e. a history of experimenting with new markets 
and value propositions were more likely to handle these innovations in a better way. Similar 
arguments were brought forward by Dew et al. (2008) who argued that effectual reasoning 
was probably a better alternative than causational reasoning when handling disruptive 
initiatives. Causation refers to the process of creating and prioritizing means to achieve a pre-
specified goal whereas effectuation concerns the opposite – how to use existing means to 
achieve an unknown goal. The arguments presented by Kassiech et al. (2002) resemble the 
ideas postulated by other scholars. Drawing upon Prahalad and Hamel’s (1994) notion of 
expeditionary marketing they suggested that a more open-ended approach was needed when 
dealing with disruptive innovation, since its placement in the value network may not be clear 
from the beginning. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2004) provided an analogous argument, 
stating that firms must be aware of what is happening to the needs of their customers. 
Christensen and Raynor (2003) argued that one way of doing so would be to focus on the job 
that customers try to get done, rather than looking at different performance dimensions. 
Hence, many scholars have pointed out the importance of a more experimental approach. 
They use different terms and draw upon slightly different bodies of literature, but remain 
vague regarding what actually constitutes a “customer competence” or “expeditionary 
marketing” and how firms can develop such capabilities. 
Over time, the literature on disruptive innovation has also paid more attention to the business 
model concept. Some authors have tried to extend the theory to incorporate disruptive 
services and business models, i.e. innovations which are not technological but are business 
models which possess characteristics similar to those of disruptive technologies (Christensen 
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and Raynor, 2003; Charitou, 2001; Charitou and Markides, 2003). Markides (2006) contested 
this notion and argued that business model innovation was a significantly different 
phenomenon than the one originally described by Christensen (1997). Christensen provided a 
nuanced and extended argument when he reframed the fundamental challenge of disruptive 
technologies as “a business model problem, not a technology problem” (2006, p. 48). As an 
illustration, he quoted Andy Grove of Intel who explained why Digital Equipment 
Corporation (DEC) declined in the shift to computers that are based on microprocessors: “It 
wasn’t a technology problem. Digital’s engineers could design a PC with their eyes shut. It 
was a business model problem, and that’s what made the PC so difficult for DEC” 
(Christensen, 2006, p. 49). This is the main reason why Christensen used the term innovation 
instead of technology in his more recent work (e.g. Christensen and Raynor, 2003; 
Christensen, 2006). Hence, a disruptive technology now seems to be thought of as a 
technology that is incompatible with an incumbent firm’s existing business model. However, 
it is still a bit unclear what is actually meant by this and what the implications of such an 
expanded conceptualization are, both for theory and for management. This statement 
therefore necessitates a review of the literature on business models and related theory on 
value and networks. 
 
2.4 Business models, value and networks 
While traditional theory in strategic management has addressed the fit between resources and 
markets, the business model literature has provided a more holistic and systemic perspective 
upon this issue. Existing literature is still somewhat ambiguous regarding what actually 
constitutes a business model, but generally, the business model concept is concerned with 
how a firm creates and captures value (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). 
Some scholars have defined it in terms of a set of answers to certain questions (e.g. Yip, 
2004; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005;). The definitions that focus on a set of questions or 
parameters are problematic for several reasons. Firstly, the theoretical foundations are often 
lost when stating that a business model is an answer to some questions. Secondly, these 
definitions become arbitrary since there is no obvious delimitation regarding which factors 
should be excluded, and consequently the concept becomes a blurred. The fact that Shafer et 
al. (2005) identified 12 different definitions during the period 1998-2002, which in turn 
generated 42 different business model components, can be regarded as one indication of this 
confusion. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, when thinking of business models as 
frameworks or answers to a set of questions, it becomes difficult to point out in what ways 
and why established firms often struggle to renew their business models. 
Another stream of research has focused more explicitly on the interactive and holistic nature 
of business models. For instance, Zott and Amit (2009) regard the business model as “a 
system of interdependent activities that transcends the focal firm and spans its boundaries”. 
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Similar interpretations have been provided by e.g.  Itami and Nishino (2009), who stated that 
a business model contains two components – a business system and a profit model. They also 
underline that such a system exists beyond firm boundaries. Weill and Vitale (2001) argued 
that there are three important dimensions of a business model: the participants, the 
relationships and the flows that connect these participants. Other scholars have also pointed 
out the boundary spanning nature of business models and that this concept addresses how and 
why value is created and distributed in a network (Akkermans, 2001). 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that business models are generally concerned with 
how firms create and appropriate value by interacting with their environment. Hence, value 
and networks can be thought of as two important components of the business model concept. 
These two notions are therefore briefly described in the coming two sub-sections.  
 
2.4.1 Value and utility 
There are many different definitions of value and utility. Given the importance of the 
concepts with regard to disruptive innovation and business models, they merit some further 
elaboration here. 
Economists have often referred to utility theory and marginal utility when trying to 
understand value. Total utility refers to the satisfaction that comes from the possession of a 
good (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000). A basic assumption is that consumers use their 
income in a way that optimizes their utility. Marginal utility is usually defined as the utility 
someone gets from obtaining or losing one unit. 
In economics, value is often considered to be subjective. This means that a good or service 
can be valued by one actor but considered useless by someone else (von Mises, 1963). From 
this standpoint, Menger (1950) developed the notions of use value and exchange value. The 
use value is the actual value a user retrieves from a good or service, and the exchange value 
is normally the price that is paid for it. If the use value is larger than the exchange value, a 
consumer surplus has occurred. Buyers may have different objectives when they acquire a 
product, and therefore they are also willing to pay different prices. Since the value of a 
product is normally not realized until it is used, which often happens at a different point in 
time than the purchase, there is usually an inherent uncertainty or degree of speculation in 
most transactions. 
The distinction between value and price is also common in the marketing literature. Value is 
sometimes considered to be a financial expression of what a customer obtains for what is 
paid. Anderson and Narus (1998) argue that the customer’s incentive to buy can be thought 
of as the difference between the value and the price. Hence, a price reduction does not 
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change the obtained value according to this definition; it would merely increase the 
customer’s willingness to buy. 
Other scholars have pointed further at the subjectivity of value and argued that it can be 
defined as the perceived benefits in relation to the perceived sacrifices (Monroe, 1991; Flint 
et al., 1997; Christopher et al., 1991). Interestingly, such definitions do not aim to quantify 
value in monetary terms. While the paid price can be thought of as one out of many potential 
sacrifices, this definition would suggest that value is subjective in the sense that different 
actors obtain different benefits and make different sacrifices. These include for instance the 
costs related to the transaction, installation and maintenance (Walters and Lancaster, 1999). 
From this perspective, it has been argued that value is something context dependent and that 
it can be created in many different ways. Normann and Ramirez (1994) refer to the relation 
between customers and suppliers as offerings, which are valuable if they create either 
relieving value or enabling value. Relieving value is thought of as the labor that is removed, 
and enabling value is created by helping the purchasers to do things differently or enable 
them to do what was not possible before. According to the authors, offerings do not 
necessarily have to be products or services, but can also consist of e.g. risk distribution and 
access to information. 
Value can therefore be thought of as being created in a certain context, and hence the value 
of an offering is dependent upon its surrounding environment (Håkansson and Waluszewski, 
2001). Consequently, actors may have diverging preferences since they are exposed to 
different tradeoffs between benefits and sacrifices. Additionally, it should be pointed out that 
value creation does not equal value appropriation since a new creation of value can result in 
an undesired distribution of value (Björkdahl, 2007). 
Summing up this section, it can be concluded that value is something subjective, since 
tradeoffs between benefits and sacrifices are both perceived and context-dependent. What is 
considered to be valuable is determined by who makes the assessment and on what level it is 
done. Value can be created on many different levels and be distributed on several levels, both 
inside a firm and in a network. 
 
2.4.2 Networks 
The amount of management research that maintains a network approach has increased 
significantly over the last decades. This trend marks a shift from research that centers around 
individuals or single firms towards a more systemic and contextual way of addressing social 
phenomenon (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). Generally, networks can be defined by a set of ties 
(relations) among nodes (actors). Nodes can be different types of organizations as well as 
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individuals or groups (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Hence, networks exist and can be 
analyzed on many different levels (Ford et al, 2002).  
Networks can be thought of as a view alternative to the market-and-hierarchy argument 
developed in transaction-cost reasoning (Williamson, 1975). Transaction-cost scholars 
suggest that firms exist in order to handle transaction costs. To search, specify and implement 
a purchase on the market is sometimes very expensive and under these circumstances, firms 
may decide to internalize an activity instead. This way of reasoning therefore suggests that 
the boundaries of the firm are determined by the transaction costs. A low transaction cost 
implies that firms are more willing to use the market in order to acquire a certain good or 
service. Networks, on the other hand, can be regarded of as a hybrid form of firms and 
markets. It is an alternative to organizing with distance to customers or through vertical 
integration.  
Over the last decades, network theories have become increasingly prevalent in a wide range 
of literature streams related to e.g. leadership, supply chain management, power, stakeholder 
relations and innovation. Moreover, social network analysis has emerged as a method for 
describing networks and how they evolve. This dissertation will primarily draw upon 
industrial network theory (e.g. Håkansson, 1989), and partly upon actor network theory, 
which is often referred to as ANT (e.g. Latour, 1987). 
The industrial network approach offers some different dimensions for analyzing interaction 
among actors in an industrial network (Håkansson, 1987), which makes it suitable for the 
purpose of this dissertation. This stream of literature differs from more diffusion-based 
theories of innovation in that a much more nuanced view of the network is maintained. While 
diffusion theory tends to look primarily at customers (or adopters) the network approach 
maintains a more complex and systemic view of adopters and looks at other actors as well. 
Scholars who draw upon this perspective often analyze networks by looking at actors, the 
resources they control and the activities that they perform. 
The resources that actors possess and transform have a value in a network and thus, firms 
depend upon their context. The outcome for an individual company is not solely based upon 
its own decisions. Rather, it is the result of all interactions taking place in a network and 
companies have to adapt to their environment continuously. In this sense, networks are based 
upon restricted freedom (Ford et al., 2002) and actors are thus thought of as interdependent in 
the sense that the outcome is not entirely controlled by one single actor (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). 
Actor Network Theory (ANT), has some commonalities with the industrial network 
approach. This network perspective emerged in the field of Science and Technology Studies 
(STS). One noteworthy difference from other theories in social science is the idea that non-
human artefacts such as technology are also regarded as actors in a network. Proponents of 
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ANT often argue that the interplay between human and non-human agents is often missed by 
other perspectives. Latour (1993) claimed that while a separation is often made between 
human and non-human, there is always an interplay between them, and that this interaction 
needs to be better understood. Networks are therefore assumed not only to contain firms or 
individuals, but also machines, culture, nature etc. – actors which in turn have their own 
impact on the network. An ANT scholar is therefore interested in studying and describing 
how networks result in organizations, how hierarchies prevail and collapse. In this sense, 
ANT is different in focusing more explicitly on issues like power and politics. This theory 
has often been used in order to describe and explain how networks or power structures are 
created and how they evolve over time. Such processes are considered to be highly uncertain 
and a matter of continuous negotiation and conflict (Law, 1992). Changing or building an 
actor network is largely a matter of handling controversies and overcoming resistance. 
ANT’s more explicit focus on power and conflict makes it a good complementary 
perspective to industrial network theory (Mattsson, 2003) when looking at disruptive 
innovation from a network point of view. 
 
2.5 Disruptive innovation − some areas in need of development 
Clearly, the concept of value networks and the work by Christensen among others have 
contributed to an increased understanding of the challenges related to discontinuities, but 
there are still several questions that have been insufficiently attended to, especially with 
regard to business models and value networks. However, few studies have addressed them in 
a more focused manner. The preceding sections have described existing theory on disruptive 
innovation, its foundations and how it has evolved over time. This section seeks to identify 
areas that need to be developed further. Towards the end of each sub-section, a research 
question (RQ) is formulated. 
 
2.5.1 Disruptive innovations in established value networks 
The literature on disruptive innovation now distinguishes between low-end and new market 
disruptive innovations. Additional work has been conducted regarding in what segments 
these innovations actually emerge. Utterback and Acee (2005) argued that too much 
emphasis had been put on “attack from below”. They noted that many technologies such as 
fuel injectors and wafer boards were not initially cheaper or simpler than the technology that 
they later on replaced. By explicating a third dimension of technological innovation called 
ancillary performance, they noted that Christensen’s original definition (lower price, lower 
traditional performance and ancillary performance) was only one out of eight possible 
situations. In doing so, they called for an expanded view of the phenomenon. Carr (2005) 
also argued that too much attention had been given to disruption from the low-end and 
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suggested that many disruptive innovations in fact start to prosper in high-end segments and 
later on take over the mainstream market. 
As stated previously, Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006a) suggested a broader definition 
which also included high-end and mainstream products with a lower traditional performance 
and new attributes. The authors claim that there are several reasons why such innovations are 
problematic for established firms. Mainstream customers may not demand the new 
performance attributes, the product can have an insufficient initial traditional performance, 
the market niche may be too small and therefore it may not offer any significant profits. They 
use the cellular phone as an illustrative example. It emerged in the 1980s among executives 
who were willing to pay a high price for a phone which offered worse sound quality but was 
portable. At this point, the mainstream customers still demanded regular phones since they 
did not appreciate the value proposition that mobile phones offered then. As the performance 
improved and the prices declined, cellular phones eventually penetrated the mainstream 
customer segments. 
In his review and critique of the disruptive innovation framework, Danneels (2004) asked 
whether disruptive innovations never emerge in high-end or mainstream segments of the 
market. Apart from this paper which raised the question, little attention has been paid to 
disruptive innovations which flourish in established value networks. Christensen (1997) 
argued that the characteristics of disruptive innovations made them prosper in new value 
networks since the established customers do not demand a technology with these properties. 
While his empirical work on disk drives, mechanical excavators and steel production 
illustrated such a pattern, this may however not always be the case.  
One reason why this issue has been neglected could be that existing literature on the topic has 
maintained a diffusion-oriented view of the market. As was mentioned before, several 
contributions to the disruptive innovation literature have been made by drawing upon 
traditional diffusion theories (e.g. Slater and Mohr, 2006; Linton, 2002; Adner, 2002). While 
these improvements are important, this stream of literature has primarily sought to 
understand the role of the market in terms of different segments, not the customer or the 
surrounding value network. The role of the customer is often highlighted, but rarely 
addressed in further detail. Such a simplification may be valid for consumer products or in 
other cases when the buyer is one homogeneous actor, with one specified utility function. But 
it may be overly simplistic and conceal some important issues when a disruptive innovation 
is introduced in a more complex business-to-business setting. Thus, previous literature has 
maintained a somewhat binary view of the market and assumed that an innovation is either 
demanded by a firm’s existing customers and becomes easy to handle, or prospers elsewhere 
and thereby becomes problematic to commercialize due to the forces of resource dependence. 
Another reason why disruptive innovation in existing value networks has been overlooked 
could be that it may be thought of as a contradiction in terms. Why would a technology with 
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an inferior performance and some new properties be in demand from an established customer 
base? But since mobile phones and many other products with disruptive characteristics have 
initially prospered in a high-end segment, it should arguably be possible that they can also 
emerge in established customer segments15. Given that previous literature has stated that 
disruptive innovations may prosper in low-end segments, in new markets and in high-end 
segments, it would be strange if they could not also emerge in an established customer 
segment. Moreover, as firms operate in different segments of the market, a disruptive 
innovation is likely to be introduced in the value network of some firm. However, it is 
unclear how and why this would happen and therefore, more empirical evidence is needed on 
this issue along with further theoretical development. Hence, the first research question 
concerns the phenomenon of disruptive innovations in existing value networks: 
Research question 1: Can a disruptive innovation emerge in an established value network and 
if so, how can this be explained? 
 
2.5.2 Disruptive innovation as a business model challenge 
As stated above, if disruption is a relative phenomenon, happening to different firms at 
different points in time16 (Christensen and Raynor, 2003), virtually all disruptive innovations 
should prosper in the value network of some firms, unless they create a completely new 
market. This observation raises the question of what challenges firms encounter when trying 
to introduce a disruptive innovation in an existing value network. Would those firms which 
are operating in a segment where the disruptive innovation emerges be better off than others? 
And if not, what challenges would they encounter when trying to bring a disruptive 
innovation to an established customer? 
Existing theory on disruptive innovation is somewhat ambiguous on this matter. The early 
work by Christensen would arguably suggest that this issue is not very problematic for 
established firms. Christensen (1997) showed that incumbent firms failed to introduce such 
technologies since they could not find any financial logic in doing so. Drawing upon resource 
dependence theory, he argued that these forces controlled the resource allocation process of 
the firm and therefore, firms failed to invest in such initiatives and were displaced later on. 
Hence, it seems that previous literature would not regard disruptive innovations in a firm’s 
                                                            
15 Mobile internet connections can serve as an illustrative example – while the traditional performance in terms 
of speed was lower than for broadband, it introduced portability as a new performance dimension. Despite these 
disruptive properties, regular broadband users were willing to trade off some speed in order to have a portable 
internet connection. 
16 Christensen and Raynor (2003, p. 50) points out that a key determinant of success for an entrant firm is 
whether the innovation is disruptive to all incumbents: “If it appears to be sustaining to one or more significant 
players in the industry, then the odds will be stacked in that firm’s favor, and the entrant is unlikely to win.” 
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established value network as problematic since such an initiative would be aligned with the 
existing forces of resource dependence. 
On the other hand, the statement that disruptive innovation is a business model problem 
(Christensen, 2006) indicates that it might actually be rather problematic to introduce these 
innovations in an established value network. Business models are largely concerned with 
how value is created and appropriated from a firm’s surrounding network. Hence, the term 
has a lot in common with Christensen’s work, which introduced value networks as a key 
determinant of incumbent failure. Though new business models can be developed in a new 
value network, this is arguably not necessarily the case. A new business model can be 
introduced while still targeting existing customers. It is clear from the section on business 
models above that there are many other aspects of a business model than just the customer, 
for instance the value proposition, the revenue model, the way to reach the customer etc. But 
these dimensions have not been further investigated in the disruptive innovation literature, 
which has addressed one element of a business model, namely whether existing customers 
demand an innovation or not17.  
An additional reason for studying in what ways a disruptive innovation is a business model 
challenge is that insights into this matter can generate important managerial implications. 
While the work on disruptive innovation pointed out that the environment imposes 
constraints on incumbent firms, the managerial solutions have been surprisingly focused on 
how firms should organize themselves and not on how they can manage the environment. 
Thus, the main managerial recommendations related to disruptive innovation have either 
focused on issues related to the firm itself, or pointed out the importance of experimenting 
and understanding customers, but remained vague regarding how this can actually be done. 
This could be one reason why practitioners have often found the work on disruptive 
innovation to be good at predicting and describing difficulties, but weaker in terms of 
solutions18. 
If a disruptive innovation is viewed as a business model challenge, it should arguably be 
possible to develop new managerial solutions to the innovator’s dilemma that do not concern 
how the internal resource allocation process should be handled. In the case when a firm is 
highly vertically integrated and controls the entire supply chain, this solution may suffice. 
But when a firm interacts with an external network of actors, the launch of an independent 
venture can be thought of as a prerequisite for succeeding with disruptive innovation. This is 
                                                            
17 Christensen and Bower (1996, p. 212) write “Our findings support many of the conclusions of the resource 
dependence theorists, who contend that a firm's scope for strategic change is strongly bounded by the interests 
of external entities (customers, in this study) who provide the resources the firm needs to survive.” This quote 
can be regarded as an important illustration of the fact that previous literature has primarily looked at customers, 
but paid little attention to other elements of the business model or the surrounding environment. 
18 For instance, Simon Waldman, Director of Digital Strategy & Development at The Guardian, wrote in an 
email conversation that he found Christensen to be brilliant at diagnosis but quite one-dimensional in terms of a 
cure. 
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an internal, organizational issue and has in fact little to do with business models. Though the 
main problem has been described as related to the firm’s external environment, the 
managerial solutions have thus far focused mainly on internal organizational issues rather 
than business models and the interaction with other actors. As noted by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978), a firm which depends on the environment for resources, can either adapt its internal 
activities or try to change the environment. Previous literature on disruptive innovation has 
primarily focused on the first option, but at the same time, Christensen’s (2006) statement 
that disruptive innovation is a business model problem suggests that more work can be done 
on how firms interact with their environments.19 Hence, the issue of how a disruptive 
innovation is a business model challenge needs to be studied, partly since it may generate 
some important managerial implications. The second research question can be formulated as 
follows: 
Research question 2: How and why is a disruptive innovation a business model challenge? 
  
                                                            
19 Interestingly, Christensen has also written extensively about business model innovation (see e.g. Johnson et 
al, 2008), but has not really integrated this with his work on disruptive innovation or explained further in what 
way this is a business model problem. Moreover, it is clear that Christensen and many other scholars writing on 
disruptive innovation acknowledge that there are other aspects of a business model than whether a customer 
demands an innovation or not (see e.g. Hwang and Christensen, 2007). However, within the theory on 
disruptive innovation these aspects are hardly attended to. 
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3. Methodology 
This chapter provides a description of the research design and methods that have been used 
in order to answer the aforementioned research questions. The first section contains a 
motivation of the methods employed in this dissertation and the following section covers data 
collection, sample selection and analysis. This section also provides some brief information 
about the different industrial contexts where the studies have been conducted. The last 
sections discuss the validity and reliability of the employed method and also contain some 
reflections on the research process. 
 
3.1 Choice of method 
The literature review in the preceding section found that there are certain phenomena related 
to disruptive innovations which need to be better understood, for instance if these innovations 
can prosper in established value networks. Given that detailed illustrations are needed in 
order both to address these issues and to outline more particular challenges and managerial 
implications, a qualitative method would enable the kind of descriptions that are needed 
when addressing these research questions as it enables “richness and holism, with strong 
potential for revealing complexity” (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). Moreover, a 
qualitative approach is often preferred when the research aims to develop new theory (Flick, 
2006). 
Moving on from the choice of method to the choice of a research design, it was decided to 
use a case study approach. A case study concerns the detailed and intensive analysis of one 
phenomenon, for instance an organization, a technology, or an individual. Such a study often 
seeks to highlight the complex, dynamic and specific nature of a case rather than overlooking 
it. Hence, this approach is significantly different from a deductive, quantitative approach 
which rather aims to downplay the particularities of the context and the specifics of the data.  
Case studies often impose constraints upon the generalizability of the findings. But this 
research design is still to be preferred here since the thesis is of an exploratory character 
seeking to understand some specific issues related to disruptive innovation. It is often useful 
to conduct case studies when trying to develop new theory rather than testing existing theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). A case study approach is therefore chosen since it enables the kind of 
nuanced documentations that are required in order to address the above formulated research 
questions. 
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3.2 Data collection and analysis 
The research questions explicated above have been addressed by conducting five empirical 
studies (see Table 1). The data collection and analysis related to each study are described in 
the following sub-sections.  
 
3.2.1 Study 1 − Surviving Disruptive Innovation 
The first study that was performed within the scope of this PhD research concerned the 
problems incumbent firms face under conditions of disruptive technological change. The 
main purpose of this study was to gain practical and detailed insight into the challenges 
related to this kind of shifts. Additionally, the study aimed to address how and why 
disruptive innovations prosper in an established value network and what challenges 
incumbent firms encounter in these situations. 
In order to explore this further, a camera manufacturer named Hasselblad was targeted. The 
firm was approached since it had gone through a technological shift recently and encountered 
significant difficulties when doing so. The change from analog to digital imaging implied 
that the company went from stable profits to collapsing revenues within only a couple of 
years. An additional reason for studying a firm that had experienced the shift to digital 
imaging is that Christensen (1997) stated that this was a disruptive technology vis-à-vis 
analog photography. 20 
While many articles had been written in the popular press about how Hasselblad had 
‘overslept’ the digital revolution, no one had really performed a detailed investigation of 
what actually happened to the company. This fact created further reason to study the fate of 
Hasselblad. An additional reason for targeting this company was its geographical proximity 
and the opportunity to approach key persons who had been working at the company. It turned 
out that the firm had explored digital imaging in various applications since the late 1970s. In 
order to fully understand the problems that were encountered, a historical study of the 
company was deemed to be the right method. By doing so, insights could be gained 
regarding how a disruptive innovation emerges and what challenges a firm encounters when 
trying to commercialize it. Given that disruption is a relative phenomenon and that these 
events take place during a long period of time, a study of this firm provided an opportunity to 
study the dynamics of the process in a comprehensive way.  
 
                                                            
20 Christensen (1997, p. xxix) stated that digital imaging was a disruptive technology that would displace silver 
halide photographic film. While it is clear that a technological shift has occurred and that it has caused a lot of 
industrial turbulence, it is still interesting to look at this shift in retrospective and see how the transition took 
place and why some established firms encountered problems. 
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Though no formal relationship with Hasselblad has been maintained, extensive amounts of 
information have been accessed. After having performed a couple of open-ended interviews 
with people who have been in top management positions at Hasselblad over the years, plenty 
of internal documents such as annual reports, strategy documents, business plans and mail 
conversations were reviewed (see Table 2 and 3 on the following pages). Archival sources 
can be regarded as a good complement to other sources of data. Such data can help the 
researcher to comprehend how certain events unfolded over time and to understand what 
certain actors did at a certain point in time. But when only using such sources, it may lead to 
a fragmented view with a lack of contextual understanding (Flick, 2006). 
In this study, archival data were mainly used in order to ensure the accuracy of the 
information obtained from the conducted interviews. Former CEOs and managers of R&D 
and business development have been accessed in order to understand the specific challenges 
they faced when shifting from analog to digital imaging. The field research interviews began 
with general open-ended questions, asking the interviewees how they perceived the 
challenges posed by the disruptive technology and how they tried to deal with them. Follow-
up interviews and discussions also took place in order to confirm that the gathered 
information had been interpreted correctly. This interaction has taken place over more than 
two years, and often the follow-up discussions have been held by phone. It is difficult to 
estimate how much time this work sums up to, but it is clear that these sessions have helped 
to verify and sometimes nuance certain findings. Additionally, some email correspondence 
with photographers who had experienced the technological shift has taken place, mainly in 
order to confirm the firm-internal sources. 
The data collection and analysis have largely been conducted in parallel, thus following an 
abductive approach to research (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). After the first round of data 
collection in 2007, the data were discussed and analyzed during several sessions together 
with the other authors of the first appended article. Based on these interactions, a first write-
up and within-case analysis was performed, which eventually resulted in the first paper. One 
way of structuring such an analysis is to put information in chronological order and to 
identify certain key events (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This approach was employed and a 
couple of critical events were identified by observing that many interviewees referred to 
certain incidents. These include for instance when Sony launched one of the first cameras not 
using film in 1981, the founding of Hasselblad Electronic Imaging in 1985, the attempts at 
developing a digital camera in the 1990s, the ownership changes that took place and the 
development of a new camera system in the late 1990s. 
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Type of document Time 
Hasselblad annual reports, Hasselblad Electronic Imaging Annual reports 1984-1994, 1985-1992  
Minutes from board meetings 1989-1995 
2 Internal company presentations regarding digital imaging 1997, 1997 
Mail conversation between the R&D manager and the CEO 1995; 14/2, 1996; 
8/10,1995 
Internal memorandums regarding digital imaging 27/10, 1992; 14/6, 
1997; 14/8, 1995; 
1996*21; 13/1, 1997; 
1994-95; 16/6, 1996; 
6/1, 1997; 9/10, 1996 
Report concerning Hasselblad Electronic Imaging June, 1993 
Minutes from meetings at the division for digital photography 24-25/3, 1994, 18/8, 
1995 
The Tokyo Meeting (on product strategies for the future) Short summary 1996 
New Camera – Market Research and Concept Studies 7/4, 1997 
Minutes from 14 product board meetings 1996-1998 
A proposal for a new analog camera system 4/7, 1997 
Product Proposal – Wedding photographer’s digital camera system 13/5, 1996 
Mail conversations between the digital and analog R&D managers 19/2, 1998; 3/4, 1997 
Business plans − technical photography and digital imaging 14/5, 1998; 27/2, 1998 
Mail conversation between Hasselblad and Philips 4/9 – 22/11 1997 
Requirements and preferences in the Project Crystal Ball 30/8, 1995 
The “Facit” crisis of Hasselblad, internal PM 1/1, 1994 
A proposal regarding tasks for the division of digital photography 27/2, 1997 
Mail conversation between an R&D manager and UBS 16/1, 1997 
Agreement for a CCD sensor component between Hasselblad and Philips 3/11, 1994 
PM “The exclusivity issue of the Philips FT19 CCD-sensor” 2/9, 1996 
Hasselblad product development process 6/6, 1995 
Summary of the Hasselblad International Marketing Conference 19/4, 1991 
Report to the Hasselblad foundation about the future of digital imaging November, 1997 
PM regarding corporate culture at HEIAB 10/9, 1990 
Meeting notes: Distribution Strategy & Hasselblad Customer Care 23,4, 1996 
Interaction with Leaf Systems 9/4, 1996; 29/3, 1996 
Hasselblad “Works” − Digital Photography Business Concept 22/4, 1996 
Area sensors for High Quality Digital Cameras 1996* 
Minutes from meeting regarding Digital Photography Strategy 24/4, 1996 
Concept study of digital flexbody and an internal PM on the subject 1997*; 19/6, 1996 
Definition and positioning of products for digital imaging 11/5, 1993 
The mK*nK image sensor, by Philips Imaging Technology 1995 
Table 2 provides an overview of some of the most important archival sources that have been 
accessed in this study.  
                                                            
21 The documents which are marked with a * in the right hand column do not have a date on them, they have 
been dated according to where in the archives they have been found. 
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Respondent title Respondent function Interaction 
Three CEOs from the 
period 1976-2004 
 
In charge of creating and enacting 
the corporate strategy. 
Four interviews, totaling 
approximately twelve 
hours. 
 
CFO, 1978-2004 Responsible for financial issues. Three interviews, totaling 
more than ten hours, 
extensive discussions and 
follow-up interaction. 
Board member, 1990-2006 Labour union representative Two interviews, totaling 
about five hours, 
discussions by phone. 
R&D Manager, 1979-1998 Founder and CEO of the subsidiary 
Hasselblad Electronic Imaging 
(HEIAB), 1985-1992, responsible 
for digital photography, 1992-
1996. 
Three interviews, in total 
more than ten hours. 
Several follow-up 
discussions both by 
phone, mail and in 
person. 
Market Manager and 
developer of digital 
business strategy, 1996-
2004 
Area manager in South America 
during the 1990s, in charge of 
digital business development for 
several years. 
Three interviews of about 
10 hours in total. Several 
mail conversations and 
discussions by phone. 
Three electronics 
engineers 
 
Worked at HEIAB and then on 
digital imaging in the 1990s. 
 
Three interviews, in total 
about five hours. 
 
Hasselblad manager In charge of the Swedish 
operations for several recent years. 
One interview, about one 
hour. 
Table 3 contains information about some of the people who were interviewed within the 
scope of this study as well as their functions and the kinds of interactions that have taken 
place. 
After this first round of data collection and analysis, theory on disruptive innovation was 
revisited and it became clear that this case exhibited some characteristics that made it 
theoretically interesting. Digital imaging had unlike many historical examples emerged in the 
established value network of the incumbent firm Hasselblad. Hence, the case presented an 
interesting contrast to the typical pattern of low-end disruption as described by Christensen 
(1997), and therefore offered an opportunity to explore how a disruptive technology prospers 
in an established value network. Moreover, the fact that Hasselblad’s customers demanded 
digital photography at a rather early point as a complement to analog photography made it 
possible to study other parameters than the customer, and thereby to address in what ways a 
disruptive innovation is a business model problem. These observations triggered additional 
research into the case. The study therefore went into further detail regarding how and why 
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digital imaging prospered in this value network and what challenges the studied firm 
encountered. Questions related to these issues were asked to at least two senior managers 
from one era and compared to the internal documents that had been accessed.  
The case descriptions about Hasselblad emerged once similarities had been observed 
between the archival data and the interview data, thereby triangulating the findings. The large 
amounts of primary and secondary sources of evidence along with the follow-up sessions 
should most likely have resulted in an accurate interpretation of the studied events. A 
detailed case description of approximately 50 pages was written based upon these data and 
another within-case analysis was performed. The second appended paper and the description 
of the Hasselblad case in the third paper emerged from this analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Study 2 – Managing discontinuous innovation 
This study has been performed as one part of a research project called the Discontinuous 
Innovation Project (DIP). Within the scope of this work, empirical data have been gathered 
from three Swedish firms. They come from the personal care industry (more on this in study 
3), the mechanical engineering industry and video surveillance. 
Initially, the study was quite broad and exploratory in order to look for interesting empirical 
observations that could be further investigated. The main purpose was to explore how firms 
are working with challenges related to discontinuous innovation and more specifically to 
disruptive innovation. Open-ended, semi-structured interviews were conducted at these firms, 
in several cases together with one or two other researchers22. The questions concerned such 
issues as idea management and discontinuous innovation, selection mechanisms and business 
development. This broad scope enabled the researchers to obtain insights which helped them 
to identify issues of further interest. Hence, the study was largely abductive, where the initial 
round of interviews generated knowledge that could be followed up with more detailed 
investigations later on. The interviewees all had in common that they had been working on 
some projects which were of a more discontinuous nature compared to the established 
business. Additionally, some technology-specific documents were obtained under secrecy. In 
total, three workshops were also held together with these and other firms where key findings 
were reported, validated and discussed in further detail. 
A formal relationship has been maintained with two of these companies during 2007-2009. 
These relationships enabled extensive access to information that it would have been difficult 
to access otherwise. Moreover, innovation audits were performed at these two firms during 
2007 by the Center for Business Innovation, which the author belongs to. Within the scope of 
these two audits, interviews were conducted with managers and directors who had positions 
that were related to the innovation process. The interviews were semi-structured, asking the 
                                                            
22 Jennie Björk and Mats Magnusson. 
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respondents about such issues as the company’s current processes, its organization, its idea 
management system and innovation strategy. In addition to this, scorecards regarding the 
creative climate and the innovation work in general were sent out on a broader scale. While 
this work was performed by a team of researchers and industry partners and did not directly 
generate any data that were used in the papers, it still served as vital background information. 
Furthermore, it helped the author to gain more practical insights into innovation work at 
companies, which in turn made it easier to understand what kinds of challenges were both 
industrially and theoretically relevant. This partnership also enabled access to databases, 
internal presentations, follow-up discussions and key employees. Working together with 
firms over a longer period of time also creates an important contextual understanding of 
present challenges and ways of working. 
During this first round of data collection, four interviews were conducted at each firm. At the 
firm in the mechanical engineering industry, the respondents came primarily from the 
concept development department. The main task for these people is to test and develop ideas 
into concepts, which in turn can result in new products. The interviews lasted for about one 
hour. Each interview concerned one discontinuous product innovation, how it had been 
developed and the main problems which had been encountered. 
Similar issues were addressed at the second firm, where four interviews of approximately 90 
minutes were performed. The company is present in the video surveillance industry and is 
driving the ongoing shift from analog CCTV to digital, IP-based video surveillance. Some of 
the interviewees were working on technological issues, others were managers of R&D and 
one of the co-founders of the company was also interviewed. The questions concerned how 
the firm is working with new ideas which lie beyond the scope of its current business. The 
fact that this technological shift was disruptive in many respects triggered further interest in 
the company and the industry and it was therefore revisited in the fifth study.  
Case descriptions were written based upon this information after a round of discussions with 
the other two researchers participating in the study. The descriptions were related to existing 
literature on discontinuous innovation and it was concluded that this stream had largely 
overlooked the difficulties encountered by firms which try to launch innovations that are 
discontinuous for the customer, i.e. incompatible with existing processes and practices or 
require a significant change in firm behavior.  
The study went into further detail at the firm operating in the personal care industry, looking 
at how idea management systems can be designed in order to capture, generate and develop 
both discontinuous and steady-state innovation ideas. This issue was considered of particular 
interest at that time since it has been stated in the literature that discontinuous and disruptive 
innovations need to be treated differently, but that knowledge is needed regarding how such 
systems can be designed. The studied firm was targeted since it had a long experience of idea 
management and had tried to change its system in order to handle both minor and more 
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discontinuous initiatives. In total, more than 30 interviews were performed. Many of these 
interviews were conducted together with other researchers within the scope of the previously 
mentioned innovation audit. This work provided important background information but also 
offered an opportunity to ask different people at the firm how the idea management system 
worked in practice. People who had a relation to the idea management system were targeted, 
for instance R&D managers, contributors to the system and the persons who were in charge 
of it and had designed the system. The interviews were semi-structured and focused 
explicitly on the idea management system, how it works, its advantages and drawbacks and 
how it has changed over time. Follow-up interviews were also conducted in order to make 
sure that the results were correct. These, in combination with key statistics from the firm’s 
idea database where descriptions of ideas within the company are stored, have increased the 
validity of the findings. 
One consequence of a broad and exploratory approach when undertaking a study is that its 
final results are beyond the original objective. This was the case with some parts of the 
described study and therefore, it did not directly lead to any corresponding paper in this 
dissertation. However, it still helped to identify some areas of interest which have been 
further addressed in other studies like the third and fifth ones. The aforementioned idea 
management case resulted in a paper; see Sandström and Björk (2010) for further 
information. This article was not included since in the end, it did not really fit into the overall 
research objectives of the dissertation. 
 
3.2.3 Study 3 – Inhibitors and triggers of discontinuous innovation 
The third study was performed at the previously mentioned established firm which has been a 
global player in the personal care industry for many decades. The company is developing and 
manufacturing diapers, feminine pads and incontinence products. These products have in 
common that they are mainly based upon absorption technology. The industry can be 
regarded as technologically mature and well consolidated. There are a couple of large 
companies such as Kimberley-Clark and Proctor & Gamble which dominate the industry on a 
global level. 
From the 1980s onward, the studied company lost market shares in Europe within the diaper 
and feminine pad categories due to increased competition. The firm pioneered the 
incontinence market in the 1970s and is a dominant actor in this business today. Over the 
years, the company has sought to sustain its leading position by launching innovative 
incontinence products, but it has remained a follower in the diaper and feminine pad markets. 
Incontinence products are sold to end-consumers, retirement homes and hospitals. The 
performance of these products in terms of absorption capacity has increased steadily over 
time, and thus the company has focused increasingly on new attributes over the last decade. 
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The study at this company was initiated after the aforementioned innovation audit had been 
performed by the Center for Business Innovation in November 2007.  One outcome of the 
audit was that the company needed to better understand how discontinuous innovations could 
be selected and developed. A five-month research project was started which aimed to 
understand how discontinuous innovations had been both rejected and developed in the past. 
This input would in turn generate recommendations regarding how the firm could design its 
development process related to the recently launched New Business Development unit.  
Though it was not obvious that the study would ultimately fit into this thesis, it resulted in an 
article that met the overall purpose of the thesis, and therefore it was included. The project 
was performed together with Ralf-Geert Osborne, master thesis student from Delft 
University. In total, the evolution and fate of eight discontinuous innovation projects were 
studied and documented through semi-structured interviews with both current and former 
employees at the company.  
Two rounds of interviews were conducted within the scope of this study. The interviews 
were carried out by two researchers, thereby eliminating any potential personal bias. All 
interviews were recorded, transcribed and listened to afterwards. This work has been 
documented in Osborne (2008) and should be regarded as important background information 
about innovation activities at the studied company. In the first round of interviews, the 
questions were more general and open-ended. The respondents were asked to identify 
innovation projects which had been discontinuous to the firm as well as the main inhibitors 
and triggers of them. All the respondents had worked at the company for a long time and 
were able to explain how different innovation initiatives had evolved. A majority of the 
respondents were working in the R&D department and others were more involved in market-
related activities (see Table 4); thereby insights were gained regarding both technological and 
more commercial issues. 
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Respondent title Respondent function Interaction 
Manager of Innovation and 
Knowledge 
Responsible for the 
development of the screening 
process. Primary contact 
person during the course of the 
study. 
Two interviews, about 
one hour each. Extensive 
interaction by phone. The 
respondent read and 
validated the paper 
emerging from the study. 
Research Director In charge of research at the 
studied firm. 
Two one hour interviews. 
Two fellow scientists and one 
former fellow scientist 
The most senior position for 
scientists. 
Two one hour interviews 
per person in all but one 
case. 
Two senior scientists The second most senior 
position for scientists 
Two interviews per 
person, approximately 
one for each session. 
Three persons in charge of 
product portfolio management 
Responsible for the 
development of the resource 
allocation process for more 
incremental product 
development projects. 
One 90 minute interview 
with all three respondents 
and to individual 60 
minute follow-up 
interviews with two of the 
respondents. 
One sales manager In charge of supporting and 
developing the sales of heavy 
incontinence products. 
One interview which 
lasted about 90 minutes, 
discussions by phone. 
The respondent also 
proofread the resulting 
article. 
One manager of the idea 
system 
Responsible for the idea 
management system and had 
been working previously on 
developing a discontinuous 
product innovation. 
One interview by phone 
which lasted for about 
one hour. 
Table 4 provides information about the people who were interviewed within the scope of this 
study (adopted from Osborne, 2008). 
The gathered data were compared and contrasted to existing literature on discontinuous 
innovation and business model renewal through a cross-case analysis. Some of the cases 
were discontinuous with regard to the firm’s established competence base whereas other 
cases were more related to the customer and the surrounding value network. After this 
analysis it became clear that one of those eight projects had some disruptive characteristics 
and was therefore deemed to be particularly interesting for this dissertation.  It was identified 
as more relevant in relation to the other ones since value networks and business models 
seemed to play important roles in determining the success or failure of this product launch. In 
addition to this, the case provided an opportunity to understand how challenges related to the 
value network can be managed since the studied product started as a commercial failure but 
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eventually took off after a couple of business model changes had been made. In this sense, 
the case was interesting since it was largely related to the second research question that is 
dealt with in this thesis.  
More emphasis was put on this case in the second round of interviews. As the challenges of 
particular interest were related to the commercialization aspects, people in charge of those 
issues were specifically targeted. All of the interviews were recorded and transcribed except 
the two interviews which were performed by phone. The case description that emerged from 
this research was later on read and validated by the person who had been working with the 
main business model changes that this product had implied, and by the innovation manager. 
A within-case analysis was now conducted where the gathered data were compared to 
existing challenges related to business model renewal. This analysis resulted in the fifth 
appended paper. After the termination of the project, a final presentation was given to the 
company where the main findings and conclusions were communicated. During this session, 
the general interpretation of the collected data could be validated one more time. 
Hence, this study was in many ways a collaborative one in the sense that it involved an 
interaction with a firm which in turn had specified a couple of deliverables from the project. 
Collaborative research is often criticized for reducing the reliability and replicability of the 
undertaken research. However, this should not be regarded as a major concern for the study 
above. The main reason is that while some of the research has created recommendations that 
have in some cases been enacted by the company, this was not the case for the parts of the 
studies that the related paper and its conclusions were based upon. These recommendations 
were concerned with the evaluation of business ideas within the scope of the new business 
development unit. The paper that emerged from this study is based on a case that the authors 
have not been influencing during the course of the study. 
As can be seen above, an abductive approach has been employed in this research project. It 
started as a general exploration of inhibitors and triggers of discontinuous innovation; several 
different cases were identified, and after a cross-case analysis one seemed to be of particular 
interest, which in turn triggered further research into this case. As can be seen in this study 
and the previous one, a broad approach results in a lot of freedom, which in turn may imply 
that some of the gathered data are eventually not of direct use for the dissertation. 
Nevertheless, they have generated important insights which have been further developed in 
other studies and corresponding papers.  
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3.2.4 Study 4 – Facit and the displacement of mechanical calculators 
Facit was a Swedish manufacturer of typewriters, mechanical calculators and office 
machines. In 1971-1972, the company went from almost 50 years of expansion and 
continued profitability to being close to bankruptcy. The shift from mechanical to electronic 
calculators was the main reason why Facit encountered problems. Prior to the transition, the 
industry was characterized by high entry barriers and extensive vertical integration, both up-
stream and downstream. A few large companies which controlled specialized machinery for 
the manufacturing of components dominated the industry (Majumdar, 1982). These firms 
also had large sales organizations and maintained close relationships to their industrial 
customers. The shift to electronics created insurmountable challenges for many of these 
companies, and Japanese firms like Sharp, Casio, Canon and Busicom entered the scene in 
the mid-1960s. By the early 1970s, some Western semiconductor firms like Texas 
Instruments and Rockwell entered the industry, which was now subject to rapid incremental 
development and a sharp decline in prices. 
While some work has been done regarding Facit and the shift to electronics (e.g. Starbuck 
and Hedberg, 1977; Starbuck et al., 1978), this case has not yet been addressed from a 
disruptive innovation perspective. Other scholars have focused on such aspects as leadership 
and organizational impediments (Pettersson, 2003), but the value network dimension of this 
incumbent failure has not been investigated before. Moreover, the fate of Facit is often 
mentioned by scholars, but rarely treated in detail. 
The fact that the initial diffusion of digital technology happened in very advanced segments 
such as military or scientific applications (Utterback, 1994), then entered Facit’s segment of 
office machines, and later on yielded consumer products triggered the author’s interest in the 
industry and the company. While it was clear that electronic calculators had disruptive 
properties, the initial investigation made it plain that electronic calculators did not emerge in 
the way that Christensen’s framework would suggest. Nevertheless, it was evident from an 
early point that value networks and the environment played an important role in the transition 
from mechanical to electronic calculators. Additionally, the fact that electronic calculators 
prospered in Facit’s market segment in the late 1960s and early 1970s made it an interesting 
case to study within the scope of this dissertation. A historical case like this was also deemed 
to be suitable since the dynamics of the shift could be followed and analyzed in retrospect. 
An additional reason for studying these companies was that extensive information could be 
accessed at the Facit archives in Åtvidaberg, Sweden. 
A study of Facit would therefore be suitable for exploring where and how a disruptive 
innovation actually prospers and what challenges a firm encounters. The books and texts that 
had been published regarding the company’s fate (Pettersson, 2003; Torekull et al., 1982; 
von Kantzow, 1991) were read and then an extensive amount of historical documents were 
reviewed. In total, two weeks were spent going through the Facit archives in Åtvidaberg, 
Sweden, where the company used to be headquartered. Two weeks were not enough to allow 
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a complete investigation of the abundant sources available. The author therefore decided to 
focus on documents which concerned strategic decisions related to the transition from 
mechanical to electronic calculators. The following documents were reviewed: 
• Annual reports from the period 1959-1974 
• Minutes from board meetings, 1964-70, 1972 
• Minutes from top management meetings, 1961-72 
• Forecast of future sales of electronic calculators 1970-72, 1970 
• Statistics regarding prices on electronic calculators 1967-1970, 1970 
• Data on Facit’s profitability 1960-1970, 1970 
• Consulting report on cost savings by H. Bohlin et al., 1962 
• Ciceronen, company magazine, 1960-72 
• Internal documents related to the collaboration with Sharp 
In addition to the archival sources, interviews have been conducted with former directors of 
the company, e.g. the CEO of Facit from 1957 to 1968, one member of the top management 
team and one person who worked with the market-related aspects of electronic calculators. In 
total, six interviews were performed, totaling approximately 20 hours. The interviewees were 
centered around open-ended questions regarding the emergence of electronic calculators, its 
impact on the company’s capabilities and the established business model. Moreover, those 
issues which were identified as particularly interesting from the archival studies were further 
addressed during the interview sessions. One potential weakness of this study is that some 
people whom it would have been interesting to interview have passed away. However, the 
combination of interaction with key individuals and access to rich archival sources has still 
generated a sufficiently good understanding of this case to address the issue of value 
networks and disruptive innovation. 
The collection and analysis of the data were guided by existing theory on disruptive 
innovation. After the first week of studies in the archives, it became clearer in what ways the 
introduction of electronic calculators illustrated several important challenges that existing 
theory had largely overlooked. This interpretation of the gathered data was presented to other 
researchers who had been interested in the case.23 A case write-up and a within-case analysis 
were conducted. These data were in turn compared with the data from the first study 
regarding Hasselblad and the gathered data about IP video surveillance. The third appended 
article is based upon this analysis. 
  
                                                            
23 Mats Magnusson and Jan Jörnmark. 
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3.2.5 Study 5 – Disruptive innovation and business model renewal 
Previous studies and existing literature have identified the importance of changing the 
business model in order to succeed with innovations which have more disruptive properties 
(e.g. Christensen, 2006). However, little is known regarding the specific challenges and 
managerial solutions in terms of business model renewal in relation to these innovations. The 
study was arranged in order to fill this gap and sought to investigate what challenges firms 
encounter when trying to renew their business models in relation to innovations of a more 
disruptive nature. 
In order to understand why incumbent firms seem to struggle under conditions of disruptive 
change, both established firms and entrants were targeted. By doing so, these groups can also 
be contrasted to one another. The companies come from a wide range of different industrial 
settings such as video surveillance, floor finishes and healthcare products. The video 
surveillance case had been identified as interesting within the scope of the second study and 
was revisited. The other case companies were targeted because they had experience of 
launching product innovations which required changes in the business model. An additional 
reason for studying these firms was that they could be accessed. By approaching these 
companies, insights could be gained into what factors influence the success or failure of these 
innovations. 
Having looked at the phenomenon of disruptive innovation in great detail in several of the 
previously described studies, this study broadened the sample a bit and went into less detail. 
Since the study aimed to point out how firms actually try to handle these challenges and since 
one can expect some variety here, a lower level of detail and a larger sample were deemed to 
be appropriate. Hopefully, this research strategy could also help to improve the 
generalizability of the findings. As has been stated by Christensen (2006), disruptive 
innovation is primarily a business model problem. Hence, a special emphasis was put in the 
interviews on how and why the innovation required a new business model, how the firms 
went about undertaking such a change and what challenges they encountered. On average, 2-
3 interviews were conducted at each company. The respondents all had in common that they 
had tried to align the business model with the value creation associated with the disruptive 
innovation (see Table 5). They were targeted with specific questions regarding how the 
innovation created value, for whom and in what ways this creation and distribution of value 
required changes in the business model. Thus, as stated previously, this data collection did 
not go into as much detail as the other ones, but instead drew upon a slightly wider sample. 
By carefully targeting interviewees with well-specified questions, the relatively low number 
of interviewees per case was partly offset. All interviews were recorded and listened to 
afterwards. In addition to this material, official documents such as annual reports, press 
releases and marketing material were reviewed. 
Case write-ups were made afterwards, the respondents proofread the case descriptions and 
were offered the opportunity to make the cases more anonymous if needed. The different 
38 
 
cases were compared and contrasted to each other in a cross-case analysis in order to look for 
patterns across them. 
 
Company and cases Respondent Interaction 
A European company in the 
healthcare industry 
The director of marketing One interview which 
lasted for about two 
hours, some discussion by 
phone 
The engineer who developed 
the product and worked with it 
for 25 years 
One phone interview for 
about one hour. 
An entrant firm in the floor 
finishes industry 
The founder and CEO of the 
company. 
One two hour interview 
A European entrant firm into 
the video surveillance industry 
The technology manager One interview, which 
lasted for about two 
hours. 
Two people in Business 
development 
One two-hour interview 
session. 
Two PhD students working on 
technological convergence and 
industrial transformation in the 
security industry 
One discussion section 
which lasted for about 90 
minutes. 
An established firm in the 
floor finishes industry, two 
different cases. 
R&D manager An interview and 
discussion session of 
about two hours. 
Senior engineer Extensive contact by 
phone on several 
occasions. 
Division manager One interview which 
lasted for about two 
hours. 
Former director of the market 
organization 
Two interviews, about 
two hours each. 
Table 5 provides information about the people who were interviewed within the scope of the 
fifth study. 
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3.3 Validity and reliability 
When assessing the employed methodologies, reliability and validity are two important 
criteria. Reliability can be defined as the possibility to replicate the study. Given that several 
of the conducted case studies are based upon historical events which have been described 
through both accessing key interviewees and internal documents, it should be possible to 
replicate these studies. This kind of formal documentation is often considered to be stable, 
unobtrusive and exact (Yin, 1994). It can be reviewed by another person who would most 
likely draw similar conclusions. The reliability of the three studies which do not rely upon 
archival sources is admittedly weaker. However, the documentations and explanations of the 
explained methods above should still make it possible to repeat the studies. 
Validity can be thought of as either internal or external. Internal validity refers to how well 
the collected data match the reality that they seek to represent. There are several ways to 
improve the internal validity. One way of doing so is to use different sources of data and then 
triangulate (Yin, 1994). In the abovementioned studies, the internal validity was enhanced by 
using several different sources such as interviews and access to a vast amount of archival 
data. Since the case studies emerged from similarities in those different sources and were 
often subsequently confirmed by conducting follow-up interviews, the internal validity could 
be increased. Another way of improving it is to compare data with existing literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Such comparisons and contrasts have to some extent been made in the 
articles that emerged from the different studies. 
Interviews are subject to selection and respondent bias, as these data by necessity mirror an 
individual’s beliefs, values and experiences (Flick, 2006). As was stated in the descriptions 
above, this issue has been handled by interacting with the respondents throughout the studies. 
Key respondents have been asked to proofread and comment on case descriptions and 
moreover, the follow-up sessions, seminars, workshops and company presentations that have 
been held have contributed to ensuring a correct documentation. Furthermore, interviews 
have often been recorded and transcribed and in many cases performed together with another 
person, which also contributed to increasing the reliability of the studies. 
A couple of other measures have been taken throughout the course of this research in order to 
offset the abovementioned problems. It is important to make sure that the interviewee can 
express opinions without being subject to undesired repercussions. When required, the author 
has therefore on several occasions signed Non-Disclosure Agreements. However, as the 
presented work is more concerned with innovation processes and networks than with 
innovation content, this was often not necessary. In those cases when an interviewee wished 
to be anonymous this was also arranged.  
While this dissertation addresses the role of value networks and business models with regard 
to disruptive innovation, it has primarily relied upon sources from focal firms rather than 
their surrounding networks. There are several reasons why this approach has been employed. 
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Firstly, the thesis is primarily concerned with the challenges that these firms encounter, how 
they introduce disruptive innovations and try to change their business models. Secondly, 
while the firm’s environment is of great interest, it can still be studied and understood by 
approaching the firm. After all, the focal firm is the one actor that is subject to the external 
control and is the one that encounters the difficulties which need to be studied with regard to 
disruptive innovation. As the conducted research is concerned with the challenges a firm 
encounters and how the innovations emerge, the focal firm is arguably the actor that it is 
most suitable to address. Thirdly, it would be interesting to study a network in its entirety, 
but such an approach is by necessity more time consuming and would thus have drawn upon 
fewer, more detailed studies which in turn would have resulted in a reduced generalizability. 
Within the scope of this doctoral research project it has therefore not been possible to collect 
data from entire networks. 
The external validity can be defined as the possibility to draw general conclusions from the 
conducted research. It is often argued that case studies impose constraints upon the external 
validity of the findings, given the explicit focus on a certain event (Yin, 1994). It should be 
pointed out here that the presented work aims to develop new theory rather than testing 
existing theory. According to Eisenhardt (1989) a case study is the appropriate research 
strategy when little is known about a phenomenon and existing theories seem inadequate or 
insufficient. This dissertation does not aim to provide an exhaustive set of answers. The 
purpose is rather to improve existing theory related to disruptive innovation. 
The potential weakness in terms of external validity has been handled in a couple of different 
ways. Some generalizations can be made by carefully choosing which cases to investigate. 
An attempt to do so is made in the first study and the resulting paper about Hasselblad and 
the shift to digital imaging. The second appended article draws upon this study of one firm in 
the camera industry, and then discusses on a more general level whether this pattern is 
applicable to other industries where microelectronics has displaced other technologies. While 
such generalizations are partly speculative, they may still inform the reader and trigger 
further research into the same area. 
The external validity can be increased analytically, i.e. by relating cases to theory and 
thereby reaching conclusions which are more general. The cases have helped to illustrate and 
point out issues which need to be better understood theoretically. Such an empirically 
informed perspective can hopefully in turn result in conclusions which are still valid. The 
fourth appended article and this covering paper focus explicitly on doing so. These 
documents seek to develop theory by synthesizing theory and the observations that have been 
made in other articles and studies.  
The fact that some studies draw on a wider set of cases should hopefully also result in a 
higher external validity since they can be compared and contrasted to each other. In this 
dissertation the studies and corresponding papers differ in terms of how detailed the cases 
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are. Some of the articles are written with a high level of detail whereas other studies draw 
upon a wider range of cases. The articles which draw upon a wider sample should hopefully 
result in a broader and more comprehensive understanding of the studied questions. 
 
3.4 Reflections on the research process 
As can be seen in the descriptions of study 2 and study 3, the undertaken work has not 
always been as structured and linear as its eventual outcome in the form of this dissertation. 
Therefore, a couple of remarks on the research process need to be made. 
Throughout this research process, the issue of discontinuous innovation has been addressed 
more generally in some studies and thus, not all of the gathered data made a direct 
contribution to the dissertation. Though the final outcome of this doctoral work follows an 
overall research objective, the underlying research has in many ways been less 
straightforward. 
During the course of this doctoral work, a couple of critical incidents have driven the 
dissertation towards its outcome. One such event was when the author realized that the 
emergence of digital imaging in Hasselblad’s high-end segment of the market and the 
resulting challenges were in many ways inconsistent with what existing theory on disruptive 
innovation would predict. In 2007, discussions took place with Jan Jörnmark24 regarding 
whether the displacement of Facit’s mechanical calculators was a disruptive event or not. The 
argument was never really settled, which in turn compelled the author to take a closer look at 
what actually happened to the company. The third study helped generated the important 
insight that existing literature on discontinuous innovation had maintained a somewhat 
simplistic view on customers and value creation. This observation also shed some light on 
the IP video case and the fate of Hasselblad. A conference paper was written based on these 
thoughts but was eventually excluded from the dissertation (Sandström, 2008). In order to 
better explain the theoretical inconsistencies that had been observed, the author then revisited 
existing work on disruptive innovation and started to read more literature on value, networks 
and business models. This work in turn resulted in the fourth appended article, which is a 
purely theoretical article. The last two articles are largely based upon these insights, but are 
more empirically oriented. 
The performed research has therefore been iterative; empirical studies have shed new light on 
existing theory and previous studies, which in turn has had an impact on the design of the 
following studies and articles. One of the main challenges related to case study research is to 
find and construct a study that is so detailed and specific that it addresses the formulated 
research questions (Yin, 1994). Hence, the method used implies a high demand on the 
                                                            
24 Associate professor in economic history at Chalmers University of Technology. 
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sampling of cases and the collection of data. The sampling procedure employed in this 
dissertation has been largely driven by theory (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Cases which 
have been relevant for the literature on disruptive innovation, value networks and business 
models have been identified. Those cases which have exhibited theoretically interesting 
characteristics have been revisited and studied in further depth. Thus, the sampling procedure 
has been based upon theory, but the process has also been largely iterative. 
The obvious drawback of this approach is that some studies have been of little direct 
importance for the dissertation. However, this process has enabled the kind of flexibility and 
continuous learning that is often necessary, since the eventual outcome was unclear when the 
work was initiated. 
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4. Summary of appended papers 
This thesis is based on six papers, which are appended in full versions at the end. In this 
chapter, the main findings from each paper are briefly presented. These results are developed 
further in the coming two chapters, which contain an analysis and discussion. 
The first article was also the first publication that emerged from this doctoral research. It was 
written in mid 2007 after the first round of interviews and data collection had been conducted 
regarding Hasselblad and the transition to digital imaging. It is therefore less detailed than 
the following articles on the firm. One key finding that emerged in the article was that 
existing theory had not really dealt with the specific challenges that different firms face. This 
finding helped the author to realize that theory on disruptive innovation needs to be 
improved, which in turn triggered a more detailed investigation of Hasselblad as well as 
further theoretical and empirical work on the subject. Hence, this paper has played an 
important role in the development of this thesis, but primarily by identifying issues that could 
be further explored. Therefore, it has been included in the dissertation. 
The following two papers essentially provide empirical illustrations of how disruptive 
innovations arise in established value networks and in what way they are business model 
challenges. These observations in turn called for further theoretical development and 
therefore, the third paper aims to develop the theory on disruptive innovation, partly by 
introducing new theoretical perspectives on the subject. 
The fifth and sixth articles to some extent give further case evidence of the challenges related 
to disruptive innovation and business models, but they are also more managerially oriented 
and have thus contributed to the managerial implications described in section 8. 
 
4.1 Paper I: Exploring factors influencing incumbents’ response to 
disruptive innovation 
This paper looks at how the characteristics of an incumbent firm affect its response to 
disruptive innovation. Studying a high-end, niche player in the camera industry like 
Hasselblad, it is argued that previous literature has maintained a somewhat simplified view of 
established firms. Frequently, these firms are treated as one population vis-à-vis entrants and 
little attention is paid to the different challenges that they face. 
The paper shows that Hasselblad’s niche strategy and its limited resources created specific 
problems. The initially lower image quality associated with digital technology made it 
difficult for the firm to experiment with it, despite the fact that many studio and catalog 
photographers benefited largely from digital imaging at an early point. Having focused on the 
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high-end segment for decades and built up a reputation for delivering supreme image quality, 
it became difficult to experiment with the technology. Additionally, the limited resources 
available implied that Hasselblad had to collaborate extensively in order to meet the digital 
challenge. The paper also illustrates how various changes in ownership over the years created 
a strategic inconsistency which further augmented the difficulties. In conclusion, this paper 
suggests that both challenges and managerial solutions to the innovator’s dilemma are largely 
dependent upon the particular characteristics of firms. 
 
4.2 Paper II: Hasselblad and the shift to digital imaging 
As stated in the literature review, previous research has suggested that disruptive innovations 
emerge either in low-end segments or in new markets. However, it is unclear whether and 
why they also can prosper in mainstream or high-end segments, and what the challenges 
would be under these circumstances. 
It is clear from the descriptions in the paper that it is problematic to illustrate this emergence 
by using Christensen’s (1997) graphs of how disruptive innovations prosper. These graphs 
essentially suggest that technologies with an initially lower traditional performance start to 
prosper in lower segments where the ancillary attributes are valued. Digital imaging, on the 
other hand, grew in a high-end segment despite its lower image quality and thanks to its other 
properties. Hence, it attacked from below in terms of performance, but emerged in a high-end 
segment, i.e. in Hasselblad’s part of the market. Such a pattern is largely incompatible with 
Christensen’s framework and thus calls for an improvement of it. 
The paper provides a detailed empirical illustration of how and why a technology with 
disruptive characteristics may emerge in an established value network, despite its lower 
traditional performance. This pattern is largely inconsistent with Christensen’s framework 
and it indicates that the challenges were more related to the established business model and 
the value proposition Hasselblad had historically brought to the market, which in turn 
implied that less resources were allocated to digital imaging in the 1990s. 
 
4.3 Paper III: High-end disruptive technologies with an inferior 
performance 
The third article in this dissertation resembles the second one in being rather empirically 
oriented. It draws upon case studies and aims to further investigate how and why disruptive 
innovations emerge in established value networks, as well as pointing out some related 
challenges. As stated in the literature review, little attention has been paid to this issue and 
more knowledge is needed in this area. The article aims to fill this gap by presenting and 
analyzing three illustrative case studies. They are all related to a transition from analog to 
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digital technology: calculators, cameras and video surveillance. In the first two cases 
incumbent firms were studied (Hasselblad and Facit) and in the case of video surveillance an 
entrant firm was targeted. These cases also have in common that the new technology 
exhibited disruptive characteristics, but did not prosper in a low-end segment or a new 
market. Rather, they were introduced either in the mainstream or the high-end segments of 
the market where the former technology had existed previously. The main reason for this 
seems to be that the ancillary attributes of the technology could compensate the lower 
traditional performance, for instance by removing certain activities and actors thereby 
creating an increased value for the customer. 
The article argues that the questions of how and for whom value is created need to be further 
addressed in order to fully comprehend the challenges related to disruptive innovation. 
Moreover, diffusion models may be over-simplified and a more nuanced view of customers 
and networks is needed, particularly in a business-to-business setting where there are several 
different actors affecting adoption. 
 
4.4 Paper IV: Value, Actors and Networks – a revised perspective on 
disruptive innovation 
The previous articles identified two main areas of disruptive innovation theory which need to 
be improved. Firstly, it was argued that too much focus has been put on performance 
dimensions rather than value and utility. Secondly, existing literature had maintained a 
somewhat simplistic view of customers and networks. These findings call for a better 
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon of disruptive innovation. The fourth appended 
paper aims to nuance and improve existing literature on this topic by drawing upon several 
bodies of literature that have not been used in this setting before. 
The article seeks to develop theory on disruptive innovation with regard to these two aspects. 
An extended conceptualization of the phenomenon of disruptive innovation is proposed. It is 
argued that these innovations can be understood as a change along two dimensions – actors 
and value. Disruptive innovations create utility in new ways and may imply a new 
distribution of value in a network of actors that control different resources and perform 
different activities. This perspective also makes it more clear in what way a disruptive 
innovation is a business model problem (Christensen, 2006). This issue is dealt with in 
further detail in the following articles and in the coming sections of this covering paper. 
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4.5 Paper V: Managing business model renewal 
Literature on disruptive innovation has stated that disruptive innovation is a business model 
problem, but remained unclear regarding how and why this is the case (Christensen, 2006). 
The fourth article in this dissertation provided additional insight into this issue by drawing 
upon literature on networks, value and utility, but also pointed out that more knowledge is 
needed regarding how firms can renew their business models and why it has often turned out 
to be difficult to do so. The fifth and the sixth articles in this dissertation address these issues. 
While several scholars have pointed out that a competitive advantage can be obtained by 
changing the business model (Teece, 2009; Chesbrough, 2007) and that this may be 
particularly important when introducing disruptive innovations (Doz and Kosonen, 2009), 
more work is needed concerning how firms can actually go about doing so. Furthermore, 
given that established firms seem to be better at introducing products than changing their 
business models, more knowledge is needed both regarding the challenges and managerial 
solutions related to business model renewal.  
In order to fill this gap, the article first reviews existing literature on business models. It gives 
special attention to the interdependent nature of business models and Zott and Amit’s (2009) 
definition of a business model as “a system of interdependent activities that transcends the 
focal firm and spans its boundaries”. The paper moves into further detail regarding 
interdependence by using literature on industrial networks, stating that networks are based 
upon restricted freedom (Ford et al., 2002) and that they can be analyzed in terms of actors, 
resources and activities (Håkansson, 1987). 
The article draws upon an illustrative case study which is particularly interesting in not only 
offering insights into challenges, but also showing how firms can go about renewing their 
existing business models. It is argued that business models are difficult to reconfigure since 
such a change often requires a shift in existing linkages between a firm and its surrounding 
network. Developing a product innovation is in this sense easier since it is much more an 
internal issue than a boundary spanning activity. Bearing this interdependence and restricted 
freedom in mind, the article offers some guidelines regarding how firms can go about trying 
to change a business model when having introduced a disruptive product innovation. 
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4.6 Paper VI: Disruptive innovation as a business model challenge 
This paper draws upon several different case studies, which illustrate both the challenges and 
how firms can proceed when trying to change their business models. It uses data from both 
incumbents and entrant firms, since it is widely believed that they have different abilities to 
succeed with disruptive innovation. As was mentioned in the literature review in section 2, 
several scholars have pointed out the importance of having a customer competence 
(Danneels, 2004) and that disruptive innovation is a business model challenge (Christensen, 
2006). But little is known regarding in what way this is the case and how firms can actually 
implement this advice or what the specific challenges are. 
The article aims to fill this gap in the literature by pointing out how firms work when trying 
to change their business models and what problems they encounter. One challenge concerns 
how the new value creation associated with the innovation is sometimes incompatible with 
the existing competencies and activities of key actors. Disruptive innovations may also create 
a new distribution of value, which in turn can imply that some actors lose power or status. 
Drawing upon Zott and Amit’s (2009) interpretation of business models as interdependent 
and boundary-spanning, it is argued that changing a business model is difficult since such a 
change often involves actors beyond the boundaries of the firm. Attempts at business model 
renewal therefore take place under conditions of interdependence. Clearly, this issue imposes 
constraints upon efforts to change the business model as firms cannot maintain a complete 
control over their network. Nevertheless, the empirical illustrations show that networks can 
be changed and some managerial implications are provided. 
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5 Analysis 
This section reviews key findings from the appended articles in order to answer the 
previously explicated research questions. It serves also as input for the more theoretical 
discussion in section 6 and the managerial implications provided in section 8.  
 
5.1 Disruptive innovations in established value networks 
As already described in the theoretical review in chapter 2, there has been little focus on 
disruptive innovations which emerge in established value networks. Since these innovations 
can emerge in both low-end and high-end segments and in new markets it would be strange if 
they were not sometimes in demand from the mainstream market, despite their lower 
traditional performance. Moreover, given that different firms operate in different segments, a 
disruptive innovation is likely to emerge in the value networks of some firms, unless it 
evolves in a completely new market. The empirical data in the appended papers show that 
this is indeed the case and point out that ancillary performance in some cases may 
compensate for the lower traditional performance associated with a disruptive innovation. 
Both digital imaging and internet-based, digital video surveillance emerged by creating value 
in a new way for the customer’s organization through the removal of labor, simplification of 
the work process and the introduction of new performance dimensions. For instance, IP-
based digital video cameras allow easier installation and lower maintenance costs. These 
attributes compensate for the initially higher price and lower image quality in some 
traditional market segments. The net utility threshold for a disruptive technology (Adner, 
2002) seems sometimes to be lower in high-end or mainstream segments since these 
customers can use the technology in order to lower overall expenses. While the price was 
higher and the technology in many ways inferior, its ancillary performance attributes 
conveyed value at a more systemic level and justified investment. The case of IP video 
suggests also that this threshold may be different depending upon the actor being targeted 
within the customer’s organization. The studied firm chose to approach IT rather than 
security departments since surveillance has increasingly become based on IT. When 
installing cameras in an existing network, the overall cost of owning a surveillance system 
can be reduced and this value creation compensates for the higher price and the lower 
traditional performance in terms of image quality. Moreover, while the popularity of the 
technology has grown among mainstream customers, the other parts of the value network 
have changed to some extent. One such notable difference is that IT companies have become 
increasingly prevalent in the installation phase while traditional installers of analog CCTV 
have been slower to adapt the new technology. 
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Hasselblad, the camera industry and the shift to digital imaging is another interesting 
example of how a technology with initially lower traditional performance emerged in an 
established value network. Digital imaging exhibited disruptive characteristics since it 
offered a lower mainstream performance in terms of image quality and also brought new 
attributes to the market. These include for instance the ability to take a huge number of 
pictures at a low cost, to view photos instantly, and to replicate, send and manipulate them 
more easily. Despite its lower image quality, digital imaging started to prosper in the high-
end segment which Hasselblad had dominated for decades. The technology emerged in the 
shape of digital backs, which are components that could be attached to Hasselblad’s medium 
format cameras instead of a film magazine. A digital back essentially contains an image 
sensor and image processing software. In the 1990s several firms emerged based on the 
business idea to manufacture digital backs and sell them to the large installed base of 
Hasselblad photographers. This add-on was particularly appealing to studio photographers 
who could save days of downtime waiting and finish assignments in much less time. 
Additionally, the fact that the images were digital, enabled the photographers to manipulate 
and edit them, and to produce a relatively better end result, despite the lower image quality. 
This utility was so great that throughout most of the 1990s, photographers were willing to 
pay up to 15 000 USD for a back that offered a lower image quality than film. The first 
digital backs offered 4 megapixels whereas Hasselblad’s analog medium format photos 
corresponded to approximately 36 megapixels.  
The case of industrially coated wooden floors based upon UV technology, which is presented 
in the sixth paper, is another illustration of how a disruptive innovation can prosper in an 
established value network. For a long time, this technology offered poor traditional 
performance in terms of durability. It was therefore often used to complement traditional 
coatings. Nevertheless, UV-based coating was adopted rapidly by the manufacturers of 
wooden floors, mainly because it enabled radically more efficient production. The production 
line could be shortened, and the process was more stable and consumed less energy. In this 
case, the end-user of the floors had to bear the lower durability while the floor manufacturers 
benefited from the ancillary benefits of the disruptive technology. The technology was 
therefore quickly adopted by the industry and, over time, the durability has improved. 
While the literature on disruptive innovation assumes that the properties of these innovations 
imply that they emerge in new value networks, the above findings show that this is not 
necessarily the case. They may also prosper by distorting or modifying existing value 
networks, despite their lower traditional performance. Such innovations seem to do so by 
creating value in new ways, for instance by removing labor or changing established 
activities. The new performance attributes may compensate for lower traditional performance 
to the extent that the technology is demanded by mainstream customers. 
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5.2 Disruptive innovation as a business model challenge 
It was pointed out earlier that the literature on disruptive innovation states that the main 
challenge is related to the business models of established firms (Christensen, 2006). 
However, there are no good explanations for how and why this is the case, apart from those 
related to being “held captive” by existing customers and inability to look for new segments. 
Certainly, the customer and the resources it provides to the firm constitute one key element 
of a business model, but not the only one. Many definitions of business models focus 
explicitly on the creation and appropriation of value (e.g. Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002; Hwang and Christensen, 2007) and others regard the business model as a structural 
template which answers a set of questions (e.g. Chesbrough, 2007; Yip, 2004; Teece, 2009; 
Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005). These questions are often related to the value proposition, 
the revenue model, the customer, how to reach the customer, etc. Hence, although the 
customer is not the only component in a business model, the other parameters have received 
little attention. The empirical evidence provided in this thesis illustrate in what ways a 
disruptive innovation is a business model challenge. 
The case of Facit is described in the third appended paper and provides a description of how 
a disruptive technology becomes more problematic once it starts to distort the established 
business model. Electronic calculators followed a top-down diffusion pattern in parallel with 
the sharp decline in prices during 1960-75. These products initially were very large and 
expensive and primarily used by the military or by larger research facilities. As their price 
went down, the technology entered Facit’s business machines segment. Electronics in many 
ways was competence-destroying for Facit and therefore, the firm began to collaborate with 
the Japanese firm Sharp. Facit bought calculators from Sharp, gave them a different design 
and sold them on under its own brand. The data collected suggests that this collaboration 
worked quite well in the period 1965-1970. Facit was able to get a foothold in the growing 
yet still small market for electronic calculators while Sharp got an opportunity to sell larger 
volumes benefiting from Facit’s global sales organization. At this point, digital technology 
did not distort Facit’s established network – the value proposition was similar to that offered 
by mechanical calculators and it fitted into the company’s vertically integrated business-to-
business sales model. 
In the early 1970s, however, the rapid miniaturization of electronics meant that a new, 
significantly different value proposition entered the market. Portable, pocket calculators were 
introduced and Japanese producers were increasing their volumes and targeting consumer 
markets25. Since Facit’s sales model was based on small volumes and directed to professional 
                                                            
25 The pocket calculator can be regarded as a new market disruptive innovation. It offered lower computing 
performance than the electronic desktop calculator but was smaller, simpler, cheaper and brought a new 
performance dimension to the market, namely portability. However, it should be underlined that the technology 
had prospered in significantly more advanced segments prior to reaching the consumer market, thus following 
more of a top-down diffusion pattern. Moreover, pocket calculators were in demand from both professionals 
and consumers. The case of digital imaging followed a similar, but not identical pattern. 
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users, its established, strong relations with customers had become less important. Calculators 
for both professionals and other users increasingly were being sold via other sales channels, 
e.g. bookstores and discount stores. The declining prices and reduced size of these products 
implied that manufacturers had to sell much larger volumes in order to remain profitable and 
Facit’s sales model was not designed for this purpose. This issue appears to have exacerbated 
the difficulties Facit encountered and can be regarded as an important explanation of why the 
collaboration with Sharp became increasingly problematic over time as new sales channels 
became more important. 
This case provides a compelling description of how the network impact determines the 
performance of a firm under conditions of disruptive change. In 1965-1970, electronic 
calculators fitted into Facit’s existing business model. At this time, the main challenge for the 
company was of a competence-destroying nature. But as the technology improved, the sales 
model shifted from one based upon strong ties with a few customers to one based on mass 
distribution and lower margins. This made Facit’s sales model and its strong relations to 
customers obsolete. 
The Hasselblad case is another good illustration of how a disruptive innovation is a business 
model challenge. The firm struggled to enter digital imaging, despite the fact that their 
customers were demanding the technology from quite an early point. One of the reasons for 
this was that digital imaging was competence-destroying since the company’s capabilities 
were related largely to precise mechanics and not electronics. However, the internal conflicts 
and struggles can also be explained by the fact that digital imaging was in many ways 
incompatible with the value proposition that Hasselblad had offered in the past. In the 1980s, 
the company had built a successful and profitable business around digital technology and 
image transmission. But this business was based on products other than cameras, for instance 
scanners for tele-photo transmission and various software applications. In these applications, 
digital technology could be used to improve the quality of the transmitted images and 
therefore was compatible with Hasselblad’s core values. Moreover, this business was never 
really a threat to existing activities but was rather a complement. This initiative also 
struggled to gain legitimism in the beginning, but it is clear from the case description that 
developing a digital camera was a much more controversial issue. Ever since Hasselblad’s 
cameras had been used on the moon in 1969, the brand had been associated with very high 
image quality. Digital photography created value in a different way and many elements of the 
firm such as the market organization and the mechanical engineers, believed that this offering 
was incompatible with the brand, which was perhaps the firm’s greatest asset. Consequently, 
Hasselblad became increasingly polarized from 1993 and on. Eventually, a new, financially 
oriented owner stopped the digital development project in 1996 and changed the focus to a 
new camera system with modern features such as autofocus that would be compatible with 
the digital backs manufactured by other firms. This camera kept to the traditional values of 
Hasselblad such as superior image quality and became the firm’s main priority in 1998-2003. 
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However, the project was severely delayed and the company struggled during these years 
when the transition to digital imaging came into motion. When the new system was finally 
launched it emerged that many customers had shifted to Canon’s and Nikon’s high-end 
cameras and hence, the new camera could only offset the sharp decline to an extent. 
Eventually, Hasselblad had to acquire a manufacturer of digital backs and could deliver a 
complete digital system in 2005, after being on the brink of bankruptcy for several years. 
It can be seen from the two case descriptions above how the challenges that Hasselblad 
encountered were different from those confronting Facit during the time when the technology 
prospered in the segments in which these firms were operating. While the customers of both 
firms were demanding the technology, it brought a significantly different value proposition to 
Hasselblad’s customers, at an early point. In other words, in the case of Facit, the technology 
was initially compatible with the business model, but this was not the case for Hasselblad. In 
the case of Hasselblad, the value proposition related to digital imaging did not fit the 
historical relations with customers. Digital imaging therefore became a highly controversial 
issue inside the firm – it provoked much conflict which seems to have paralyzed the 
company. Eventually efforts in this direction were stopped in favor of an initiative which was 
more in line with the value proposition Hasselblad had offered in the past. 
These empirical cases suggest that the magnitude of the challenges faced by an incumbent 
not only depends on whether the disruptive innovation prospers in a new value network or 
not. If it prospers by distorting an established value network, it can become problematic if it 
imposes changes to the existing business model. These challenges seem to be different from 
those described in the original disruptive innovation theory which states that that the main 
problem is related to the control that existing customers impose on the resource allocation 
process within a firm. Incumbents essentially struggled to find a financial logic for entering a 
technology that their customers were not demanding, and which offered smaller profit 
margins.  
The Hasselblad case shows that there was in fact demand for digital imaging from 
Hasselblad’s customers, on which basis the company could have obtained profitable 
revenues. Given that several firms were founded and grew based on manufacturing digital 
backs it seems that a sufficiently large market existed and that the opportunity could have 
been financially attractive. Digital imaging emerged in the same segment as analog 
photography and thus the company became reliant upon the established market organization 
and relations to these customers. Hence, the main problem was rather that the new value 
proposition that was associated with digital imaging might distort the relations Hasselblad 
had with its customers in the past. It seems that customers control firms not only by 
supplying them with resources. The relations and value propositions that customers associate 
with a certain firm may hamper its efforts to introduce a disruptive technology. 
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The case of IP video is another example. IP-based video surveillance created value in a new 
way. Initially, it offered worse traditional performance that was accompanied by some new 
performance attributes. As a consequence of this new value creation, the technology distorted 
the established network constellation in several ways. Many integrators and users of video 
surveillance had little knowledge about how IP cameras were installed and used. Hence, the 
technology had an impact on the activities of several actors. Additionally, IP video affected 
the role of security managers in the end customers’ organizations. IP surveillance meant that 
security was increasingly becoming an IT issue, which in turn reduces the power of the 
security manager vis-à-vis the IT manager. This caused security managers to be skeptical 
about the new technology. 
The dominant analog players in the CCTV industry were used to targeting security 
departments with a different value proposition and could therefore be “held captive” by one 
actor in the customer’s organization since security departments did not appreciate or 
understand IP video in the same way as IT departments. Conversely, entrant firms faced a 
challenge since the adoption of their technology depended upon changes often beyond their 
direct control. When value is created on a more systemic level and the disruptive technology 
prospers in another part of the customer’s organization, some actors may gain influence at 
the expense of others. The convergence of IT and security is an ongoing process and entrant 
firms can influence it to some extent, but are nevertheless depending upon it and those 
changes may be complicated due to political barriers inside the adopting organization. 
This case shows that there are many different distortions that can occur in established 
networks. Actors may need to change their activities, some of their resources may lose value, 
they may lose power and the new distribution of value may create resistance. Hence, 
disruptive innovation can be considered to be a business model challenge since it can distort 
the firm’s existing network constellation and may break the established linkage between 
value creation and appropriation. A network is held together by mutual interest but at the 
same time is characterized by converging and diverging incentives (Law, 1992). The 
introduction of a disruptive innovation which in its turn has an impact on the surrounding 
network is therefore likely to be met with resistance from some actors. 
It seems to be difficult for a firm to impose executive power against actors that are beyond its 
boundaries. In this sense, business model initiatives seem to be different from the 
development of new products, which is more an internal, firm-specific challenge. For sure, 
product innovation efforts also depend upon linkages with the external environment, for 
instance when it comes to purchasing critical components, but business models are concerned 
explicitly with value and the linkages between the firm and its surrounding environment. 
Put differently, several of the supply-side related challenges described in the literature on 
discontinuous innovation can also be found beyond the firm’s boundaries. For instance, a 
distortion of an established network constellation can occur when a disruptive innovation is 
54 
 
competence-destroying (Tushman and Anderson, 1986) for certain actors. This was the case 
with IP video surveillance, which rendered obsolete many of the skills of traditional security 
integrators. A similar dilemma can be identified in the fifth paper which concerned an 
incontinence diaper that introduced many disruptive characteristics. In this case, certain key 
actors needed to renew their skills since the new product had to be used in a different way. A 
disruptive innovation can also be architectural and change the linkages between different 
components (Henderson and Clark, 1990) inside the customer’s organization. Here, the case 
of IP video is illustrative. As security becomes increasingly an IT issue, the adoption of IP 
video implies that cameras are installed into an IT infrastructure, which is different to an 
analog environment. These changes create political barriers to adoption. As pointed out by 
Cyert and March (1963), firms compete with other organizations but there is also internal 
competition within a firm. An architectural change may distort the established constellation 
of power and some actors may be hesitant about an innovation. In the case of IP video, 
conflicts between IT managers and security managers can be thought of as an example of this 
argument. 
It would be strange if challenges such as the ones described above could only be found on the 
supply-side of the market. Companies in the vicinity of a focal firm also have an established 
set of structures, resources and capabilities, and disruptive innovations which imply creative 
destruction along any of these dimensions will be inherently problematic, even though the 
customer would benefit from adopting them. Afuah and Bahram (1995) offered similar 
arguments in stating that a discontinuous innovation must be analyzed in terms of its impact 
on the supply chain where the firm is present. The findings in this dissertation indicate that 
such ideas have been largely overlooked by the literature on disruptive innovation which 
would benefit from this approach. Moreover, the findings presented here reveal another 
aspect of these challenges which Afuah and Bahram (1995) paid little attention to, namely 
the interconnectedness that characterizes these networks and the fact that a firm often cannot 
exercise full control over its surrounding network, which it still depends on. 
Disruptive innovations seem to be problematic since a shift in an established business model 
is dependent upon actors that are beyond the boundaries of the firm. At first sight, this 
challenge in many ways is similar to the one originally described by Christensen (1997) 
which emphasized how firms are held captive by established customers. However, 
Christensen focused explicitly on the resource allocation process and argued that firms 
struggle because the disruptive innovation is not demanded by its current customer base. The 
findings in this dissertation suggest that while the power of customers plays an important 
role, disruptive innovations may be problematic even though they may be in demand from 
existing customers and other elements of the network.  
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The disruptive innovation is sometimes not demanded by certain actors in the firm’s existing 
business model. The reasons for this seem to be related not just to the performance of the 
innovation but also to value creation and distribution, as well as the impact on different 
actors, their incentives and their competencies. Hence, rather than being subject to resource 
dependence as described by the existing theory on disruptive innovation, firms seem to 
struggle with disruptive innovation due to interdependence, which can be defined as follows: 
“Any event that depends on more than a single causal agent is an outcome based on 
interdependent agent. (…) Interdependence exists whenever one actor does not entirely 
control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the 
outcome desired from the action” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978. p. 40). 
The empirical findings reviewed in this section show that neither the customer nor the firm 
controls all the means for accomplishing something. Rather, there seems to be an interplay 
between different actors throughout the network which in turn imposes constraints upon the 
focal firm. In this sense the challenges described above differ from those originally 
formulated regarding disruptive innovation. The external environment imposes control over 
firms in other ways than providing them with resources. Actors and their power, as well as 
the established activities and flows of resources in a network make it difficult for firms to 
experiment with their business models. Hence, a disruptive innovation can be regarded as a 
business model challenge since it distorts established network constellations and the 
interdependent nature of business models makes it difficult to change them. 
Historically, much of the work on discontinuous innovation has focused on the supply side 
and the firm’s existing resources and capabilities (e.g. Tushman and Anderson, 1986; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990). Work on disruptive innovation emerged forcibly in the 1990s 
arguing that the previous literature had overlooked the role of the market and how customers 
control the resource allocation process. The results reviewed above suggest that the theory on 
disruptive innovation in its turn missed out other elements in the environment and the 
interconnectedness that characterizes the relations between a focal firm and its surrounding 
network. 
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6. Discussion 
This section synthesizes the findings reviewed above and develops the theory on disruptive 
innovation. It does so first by pointing to two problems with existing theory after which it 
introduces some of the literature on value and networks which contributes to the theoretical 
part of this dissertation. 
 
6.1 Problems with the existing theory on disruptive innovation 
Literature on disruptive innovation states that the properties of these technologies imply that 
they prosper in new value networks, which in turn make them problematic to handle for 
incumbent firms. The empirical findings reviewed above suggest instead that they can also 
emerge by changing established value networks and that these innovations emerge in a less 
binary way than has been suggested. Why has this issue not been highlighted in the existing 
literature? 
One reason could be that existing theory arguably would suggest that such modifications are 
not so problematic for firms and that the subject therefore is worthy of little attention. But the 
empirical data in this dissertation show that they might be quite difficult to deal with due to 
interdependencies and distortions in established network constellations. Another reason could 
be that many definitions of disruptive innovation state that the properties of these innovations 
inevitably make them prosper in new value networks.26 But the brief review of the empirical 
data above indicates that this may not always the case and that disruptive technologies may 
be in demand from mainstream customers at an early point, despite their lower traditional 
performance. 
The reason why these issues have been overlooked could also be that the existing theory was 
unable to handle them properly. The fact that the introduction of a disruptive innovation does 
not seem to be as binary as was previously argued may therefore be a theoretical concern, 
and if so, several managerial challenges and solutions might also have been overlooked. 
Moving back to the theory on disruptive innovation, it can be seen that it does not apply the 
same assumptions to all the issues it seeks to describe. Previous work on the subject 
                                                            
26 For instance, Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006a) define a disruptive innovation as an innovation that 
“introduces a different set of features, performance, and price attributes relative to the existing product, an 
unattractive combination for mainstream customers at the time of product introduction because of inferior 
performance on the attributes these customers value and/or a high price—although a different customer segment 
may value the new attributes. Subsequent developments over time, however, raise the new product’s attributes 
to a level sufficient to satisfy mainstream customers, thus attracting more of the mainstream market” (p. 15). 
Christensen (2006) acknowledged that this definition is better than his original 1997 definition and hence, it is 
clear that previous theory has assumed that the specific properties of a disruptive innovation makes it prosper in 
a new value network. The empirical findings in this dissertation show that this is not always the case. 
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essentially links theories on resource dependence to the firm’s resource allocation process. In 
doing so, it shows that firms tend to allocate resources to those initiatives responding to 
customer demands. The focal firm is assumed to be constituted of a set of actors that may 
have diverging opinions and incentives. Christensen (1997) illustrates how the daily 
competition for resources inside the firm inevitably tends to allocate resources to those actors 
whose projects will result in offers that the firm’s customers have demanded. These forces 
move the incumbent firms in the wrong direction and eventually they are displaced by 
entrants who were not “held captive” by an established customer base. Hence, the existing 
theory assumes heterogeneity in the incentives and competencies inside the focal firm. 
On the other hand, this heterogeneity is quite surprisingly not assumed to exist in the firm’s 
surrounding environment or inside the customer’s organization. Instead, a diffusion-oriented 
perspective on the market is maintained in which different segments of the market are 
analyzed. The customers and the surrounding network are essentially operationalized as one 
actor that exercises power by supplying the firm with resources. The role of different actors, 
and their competencies and incentives have been largely overlooked and attention has 
focused on the resources that firms obtain from their customers. This can be illustrated by the 
following quote from Christensen and Bower (1996): 
“Our findings support many of the conclusions of the resource dependence theorists, who 
contend that a firm's scope for strategic change is strongly bounded by the interests of 
external entities (customers, in this study) who provide the resources the firm needs to 
survive.” (p. 212) 
Within this somewhat narrow interpretation of resource dependence theory, the theory cannot 
address other elements of the business model than whether existing customers initially 
demanded the innovation or not. Moreover, this conceptualization of resource dependence 
actually stands in contrast to the original works on the subject, which took a more nuanced 
view of the surrounding environment than the current theory on disruptive innovation:  
“A variety of interest groups, individuals, and organizations have contact with a given focal 
organization; each of these evaluates the organization and reacts to its output and actions. 
Each has a particular set of criteria of preferences that it uses in this evaluation process, and 
consequently, organizational effectiveness is a multifaceted concept, where the effectiveness 
of the organization depends on which group, with which criteria and preferences is doing the 
assessment.” (Pfeffer and Salancik, p. 32) 27 
The empirical findings reviewed above suggest that the simplified interpretation of resource 
dependency may be misleading and that a network contains many different actors with 
different competencies and incentives as indicated by the quote above. Going back to 
                                                            
27For further illustrations of how resource dependence scholars look at the environment, see e.g. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978), p. 26, p. 36. 
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Christensen and Rosenbloom’s (1995) definition of value networks it can be concluded that 
this “context within which the firm identifies and responds to customer’s needs, procures 
inputs and reacts to competitors” (p. 234) is characterized in fact by more heterogeneity than 
is assumed in the literature. There are many actors that perform different activities, control 
different resources and have their own subjective opinions of whether or not a disruptive 
innovation is valuable. The empirical evidence suggests that these factors play an important 
role in addressing how and why disruptive innovations prosper and what challenges they are 
likely to imply with regard to business models.  
 
6.2 Proposed theoretical improvements 
This section seeks to develop the theory on disruptive innovation by drawing upon literature 
on value and on networks. It is argued here that technological performance needs to be 
translated into value creation and distribution and that a different, more nuanced 
conceptualization of networks is needed in order to capture and explain the empirical 
findings in this dissertation. 
 
6.2.1 From performance to value and utility 
The cases described above suggest that disruptive innovations can evolve in established value 
networks, despite lower traditional performance. Rather than emerging in a completely new 
value network, the disruptive technology prospered by bringing a new value proposition to 
the market, which in its turn modified or distorted existing value networks. A lower 
traditional performance does not necessarily imply therefore that a disruptive innovation 
emerges in a new value network and later takes over the mainstream market. The description 
above suggests that digital imaging created an increased total utility for studio photographers 
at an early point, despite lower photo quality. The observation that disruptive innovations can 
emerge in an established value network despite lower traditional performance implies that 
previous research puts too much emphasis on the technology and its different performance 
dimensions.  
Several scholars in technology management have underlined the importance of translating 
the performance and functionality of a technology into value and utility (e.g. Granstrand, 
1994; Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984). The techno-economic analysis developed and used by 
Oskarsson and Sjöberg (1991) and Lindmark (2006) can be regarded as one such example. 
Wunker (2005) claims that customers do not want a particular product, they want a certain 
result to be accomplished in relation to a specific problem. Interestingly, Christensen and 
Raynor (2003) argued that one part of the solution to the innovator’s dilemma is to focus on 
the job that customers want to get done. This statement is consistent with the findings 
presented in this dissertation. However, its implications go against much of Christensen’s 
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earlier work which defines and analyzes disruptive innovations along certain performance 
dimensions, rather than looking at how value actually is created.  
The literature review in chapter 2 shows that economists usually think about value as 
inherently subjective. A good can be perceived as valuable by one individual and less 
valuable by another (von Mises, 1963). Menger (1950) suggests that there is a difference 
between exchange value and use value. The exchange value is the price paid for acquiring a 
good whereas the use value is the utility that the buyer receives from using the product. A 
positive difference between use value and exchange value can be defined as a consumer 
surplus. The empirical findings in this dissertation suggest that consumer surplus can be 
created in mainstream markets despite the lower traditional performance of a disruptive 
innovation. 
Value can be thought of as a perceived tradeoff between benefits and sacrifices (Christopher 
et al., 1991). Hence, different actors obtain different benefits and make different sacrifices. 
The sacrifices can include the costs related to transaction, installation and maintenance 
(Walters and Lancaster, 1999). The value of a good therefore is dependent on its context. In 
several of the empirical cases reviewed above, the lower traditional performance was 
compensated for by ancillary performance attributes which created increased utility for the 
customer, for instance by simplifying their work, removing labor and changing activities in 
the specific context in which they were introduced. This context does not necessarily have to 
be a low-end segment or a new market as the previous literature would suggest, disruptive 
innovations can also emerge in mainstream markets. When shifting attention from 
performance dimensions towards value and utility, it becomes easier to understand how and 
why a disruptive innovation prospers in established networks among mainstream customers. 
 
6.2.2 A more comprehensive view of networks 
As stated earlier, the literature on disruptive innovation largely maintains a diffusion-oriented 
perspective. It essentially looks at the impact of the market in terms of different segments, 
but the network itself has been rather understudied. Partly as a consequence of this, the 
disruptive innovation framework has maintained a somewhat binary perspective on adoption. 
If an innovation is demanded by the firm’s customers it would make sense to develop it since 
the customers supply the firm with important resources and such an innovation would be 
referred to as sustaining. On the other hand, if there is no existing customer demand, the 
forces of resource dependency will prevent the firm from launching the product and the 
innovation will be classed as disruptive. This theory suffers from a somewhat simplistic 
interpretation of organizations and networks.  
It would be misleading to regard customers as homogenous entities in a business-to-business 
setting in which several actors with sometimes diverging utility functions are involved. In 
60 
 
these circumstances the adoption of an innovation is rarely a discrete action, there may be 
many different perceptions of a product both along the supply chain and inside the 
customer’s organization. Different actors are likely to be affected in different ways and these 
effects need to be studied in order to understand the adoption of a disruptive innovation. Ford 
et al. (2002) argue that a network can be analyzed on many different levels. First, it can be 
the single actor, i.e. the company, organization, team or individual. Whether it is the 
individual, firms or firm unit that is considered to be the actor depends on the context and 
objective of a study (Håkansson and Snehota, 1995). The next level is the relationship 
between certain actors and the third level is the whole network. The authors underline the 
importance of investigating changes at all these levels in order to understand how networks 
evolve. Network scholars often claim that markets are characterized by interrelatedness 
between firms and their surrounding environment (e.g. Håkansson, 1989). This interaction 
can be studied by looking at the actors, their resources and their activities or actions. This 
fractal perspective of networks, along with the empirical observations, suggest that a more 
heterogeneous view of networks is needed. The empirical findings above indicate that the 
interconnectedness of networks and the fact that actors exist at many different levels need to 
be taken into consideration. 
If actors can be found at many different levels, both in the network and inside the customer’s 
organization, it is important to look at how each would be affected by the introduction of a 
disruptive innovation since value is both perceived and contextual. Actors may be affected in 
different ways since they may possess different resources and perform different activities. 
Hence, they will arguably have different opinions and these diverging preferences may in 
turn impact on the adoption or not of a disruptive innovation. Moreover, value can be 
realized for an actor inside the customer’s organization other than the acquirer. The buying 
organization has an aggregated utility from obtaining the good, but this is more difficult to 
measure, and it may be distributed over many different functions or individuals. 
Consequently, the distribution of value throughout the network requires further study than 
previous literature has suggested. Though the adopting organization may benefit from the 
adoption of a disruptive innovation, this value can be distributed in different ways across the 
affected actors, which can create barriers to its adoption.  
The literature on disruptive innovation takes a somewhat simplistic view of customers, 
classifying them as either low-end, high-end or non-consumers. The main focus is on the 
market and its different segments, rather than actual customers and the various actors inside 
and beyond the boundaries of the customer’s organization. There may be some discrepancy 
between the different perceptions of use value and actual use value for these different actors. 
Developing a more nuanced perspective on customers and networks makes it possible to 
explain in a more detailed manner in what ways a disruptive innovation is a business model 
challenge. A disruptive innovation will sometimes not be demanded by certain actors 
because of its incompatibility with their established activities. The new distribution of value 
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may create clear incentives for some actors to block the innovation. In some cases the value 
proposition associated with the disruptive innovation may not fit with the firm’s relations 
with its network making its introduction problematic. Resources are only valuable in certain 
contexts and an innovation that is incompatible with existing resources and activities will be 
inherently difficult to commercialize. Hence, disruptive innovations can be considered to be a 
business model challenge since they distort the firm’s network constellation and may break 
the established linkages between value creation and appropriation. 
Changing the business model is difficult since the actors embedded in an industrial network 
depend upon relationships with others. As stated in the literature review, business models can 
be defined as “a system of interdependent activities that transcends the focal firm and spans 
its boundaries” (Zott and Amit, 2009, p.1). Other scholars provide similar 
conceptualizations, stating that a business model can be thought of as a set of participants, 
their relationships and the flows between them (Weill and Vitale, 2001). A network involves 
both actors and their relations (Dubois, 1998). Firms that try to change their network 
therefore are to an extent reliant upon actors beyond the boundaries of the firm (Håkansson 
and Ford, 2002; Ford et al., 2003). 
A more heterogeneous conceptualization of networks makes it possible to understand in what 
ways a disruptive innovation is a business model challenge. Clearly, it will be difficult to 
manage under these circumstances of interdependence but the fact that firms are subject to 
interdependence rather than resource dependence as Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) 
describe arguably would suggest that firms can exercise some control over their networks. 
Furthermore, the key challenges will be related more to how firms handle their relationships 
in the network than how the internal resource allocation process is managed. Scholars in the 
field of industrial network theory have argued before that this is the key challenge 
(Håkansson and Snehota, 1989) and the findings in this dissertation suggest that this is also 
largely the case with disruptive innovations. The disruptive innovation can be regarded as an 
actor as it impacts its surrounding network both financially and in a more sociological sense. 
Changing a network to suit one’s own objectives can be thought of as an uncertain process 
involving overcoming resistance. Power struggles and conflicts are likely to prevail and firms 
will be forced to engage in a continuous process of negotiation (Law, 1992).  
Summing up, two important changes to existing theory on disruptive innovation have been 
proposed in these sub-sections. Firstly, the focus should be shifted from different 
performance parameters towards how value is actually created and distributed. Secondly, 
customers and the surrounding value network can be conceptualized as a set of actors that 
perform activities and control resources. Hence, customers cannot be regarded as 
homogenous units with one specific utility function, but rather as a collection of actors with 
different capabilities sometimes governed by different incentives.  
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6.2.3 Towards a more symmetric theory on disruptive innovation 
It has been shown that the existing theory does not explain how a disruptive innovation 
prospers in an established value network since it assumes heterogeneity within the firm, but 
not in its surrounding network in terms of the diverging incentives among actors. Put 
differently, the existing theory lacks symmetry. A theory can be regarded as symmetric if it 
applies the same basic assumptions regardless of the domain it describes (Foss and Hallberg, 
2010)28. Foss and Hallberg argue that a good theory ideally should fulfill the symmetry 
criterion, for several reasons. For instance, a theory that applies different assumptions to the 
subjects concerned may be concealing some important aspects of the reality. A change 
towards a more symmetric theory may therefore reveal new insights and improve the 
predictive power of a theory. 
The proposed theoretical development along the value and network dimensions arguably 
would result in a more symmetric theory on disruptive innovation as it would assume similar 
degrees of heterogeneity inside the firm and in the surrounding environment. This revised 
theory also is capable of describing and explaining phenomena that the previous literature 
has overlooked. The two research questions investigated in this thesis have not previously 
been carefully explored and one reason for this may be that existing theory was asymmetric. 
Current theory assumes that the lower traditional performance of a disruptive innovation 
implies that it will not emerge in the mainstream market. If we shift focus towards value and 
away from technological performance, it becomes possible to explain the empirical 
observations that show that disruptive innovations can emerge in the mainstream market of 
an incumbent firm. The literature states that disruptive innovation is a business model 
challenge but does not explain in what ways, apart from whether existing customers have 
demanded the innovation or not. A more nuanced view of networks makes it clearer how a 
disruptive innovation affects an established business model and why it is difficult to handle 
this issue. The more symmetric theory outlined above makes it possible to investigate issues 
that the previous theory has not dealt with sufficiently.  
 
6.2.4 A symmetric theory opens up for new managerial solutions 
According to Foss and Hallberg (2010), development towards more symmetric theories can 
enable new insights. It was concluded above that disruptive innovations are problematic to 
handle since established business models are characterized by interdependence and that this 
issue is different from the original focus on the resources that customers supply to the focal 
firm. This conclusion is based on the development of a more symmetric theory on disruptive 
                                                            
28 The development of public choice theory can be thought of as an example of a shift towards a more 
symmetric theory. For a long time, economists assumed that firms and individuals on the market were rational 
and sought to maximize their own utilities, and that the political sphere was protected from such behavior. In 
politics, human action was regarded as altruistic. Public choice scholars (e.g. Downs, 1957; Tullock, 1989) 
highlighted this asymmetry and argued that political decision-making also was governed by self-interest.  
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innovation, which assumes similar degrees of heterogeneity inside the focal firm and the 
surrounding network. A more symmetric theory also reveals some new managerial solutions. 
Existing literature has argued that disruptive innovations need to be developed in a separate 
organization that shelters them from the forces of resource dependency that would starve 
them of resources (Christensen, 1997). Recommendations regarding actual 
commercialization have received less attention and need to be more specific. The importance 
of thoroughly understanding the customer is often pointed to as crucial (e.g. Govindarajan 
and Kopalle, 2004; Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Danneels, 2004), but few guidelines are 
provided regarding how firms can actually achieve this.  
The key challenge in disruptive innovation has been identified as related to the firm’s 
surrounding environment, but few managerial solutions have been suggested regarding how 
the environment can actually be managed. This is interesting given that resource dependency 
scholars (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) state that there are two ways to manage the external 
control of organizations. One is to adapt the organization to the environment and the other 
option is to try to change the environment. However, this latter alternative has received 
surprisingly little attention thus far which might be one reason why practitioners have 
sometimes been disappointed by the managerial prescriptions that are available. 
One of the reasons why this option has been largely ignored might be down to the rather 
simplistic conceptualization of the environment. It has been assumed that the lower 
traditional performance of a disruptive technology renders it undesirable by mainstream 
customers and that therefore incumbents will not invest in it and then will encounter 
problems once the technology matures. This simplification results in a somewhat pessimistic 
description of the dilemma that incumbents face. Being trapped in their established value 
network where the lower performing product is not desired the main solution is to break free 
from this external control by establishing an independent organization. 
This rather fatalistic view of disruptive innovation originates from the assumptions that the 
traditional technological performance of an innovation determines whether or not it will be 
adopted, and that customers control firms by supplying them with resources. Shifting to a 
more symmetric theory in line with the above arguably would result in a different, more 
optimistic perspective on how firms can succeed with disruptive innovations. While it is clear 
that firms are subject to influences from their networks, which in turn restrict their freedom, 
it is still possible to influence these networks to an extent (Håkansson and Ford, 2002). 
If we assume that the surrounding network includes a wide range of actors with different 
incentives, different resources and that undertake different activities, it becomes clear that 
firms can exercise some, limited, control over their networks. For instance, the firm can 
decide which actors to target and how to do this. Moreover, a focus on value instead of on 
performance trajectories would suggest that firms can influence whether customers demand 
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an innovation or not. As already stated, value can be thought of as a subjective, perceived, 
and context dependent trade-off between benefits and sacrifices. Hence, firms arguably 
should be able to influence the adoption of a disruptive technology, for instance by changing 
perceptions through its marketing or by influencing the context in which it is introduced. 
When assuming interdependence instead of a somewhat narrow interpretation of resource 
dependence, a range of managerial solutions can be developed. Clearly, trying to change the 
network in one’s own favor is a non-trivial issue since firms can impose only limited control 
over their surrounding networks. Acting with restricted freedom is difficult, but nevertheless, 
it is possible. Some guidelines for how this can be done are provided in section 8 on 
managerial implications. 
 
6.3 Reflections on proposed changes towards symmetry 
One way to frame the work described in this dissertation vis-à-vis previous work on 
disruptive innovation, would be to regard theories in social science as a balance between 
generality, simplicity, and accuracy (Weick, 1979). Weick argues that a theory cannot be 
general, simple and accurate at the same time and that it is possible to pursue only two of 
these qualities. Scholars are consequently forced to make tradeoffs between these three 
factors. Previous work on disruptive innovation has generated a theoretical framework which 
performs very well in terms of simplicity. It highlights a very important issue, namely the 
role of a firm’s surrounding network for trying to understand the impact of discontinuities. 
But this simplicity has been achieved at the expense of generality and accuracy. 
The present contribution should be seen not as an attempt to dismiss earlier work on the 
subject, but as an attempt to revise and extend it by increasing its symmetry. The work in this 
dissertation suggests a different tradeoff among simplicity, accuracy and generality. 
Consequently, its conclusions are less simple and more difficult to develop into an analytical 
framework.  
On the other hand, the theoretical developments above make it possible to describe and 
understand several previously overlooked issues. Therefore, the findings in this dissertation 
have implications for the limitations of applications of the existing theory on disruptive 
innovation. Previous work focuses explicitly on how the resources provided by customers 
makes it problematic to develop disruptive innovations since this flow of money imposes 
great control over the firm. In linking resource dependency to the process of resource 
allocation, the previous theory is limited. It cannot address how disruptive innovations 
emerge by modifying or distorting existing value networks or in what ways they present a 
business model challenge. Based on the modifications suggested, these issues can be 
addressed and it becomes possible to develop new managerial solutions. 
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Whether the theory on disruptive innovation should retain its shape or adapt to the directions 
outlined in this dissertation will largely be a matter of preference. If the researcher or 
practitioner is looking for a theory that is simple and deals with completely new value 
networks and the power of customers, the existing theory will be preferred. However, many 
disruptive innovations arguably evolve by modifying existing value networks which would 
limit application of existing theory to a few empirical settings. In particular, current theory 
might be more useful for studying consumer products and other innovations that have little 
impact on their surrounding networks. However, the fact that current research increasingly 
tries to deal with the relations between disruptive innovations and business models calls for a 
more symmetric theory since this would make it possible to look beyond how existing 
customers control the resource allocation process of firms. 
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7. Conclusions 
The purpose of the research described in this thesis was to develop the theory of disruptive 
innovation with a focus on business models and value networks. The by now extant literature 
on disruptive innovation has created an increased understanding of the challenges related to 
discontinuities. It brought a different perspective upon the issue by shifting attention from 
supply-side factors towards the environment and the role of customers. The findings in this 
thesis provide further illustrations of the importance of addressing firms’ surrounding 
networks. This dissertation has also pointed out and addressed a couple of issues that need to 
be better understood. Two research questions have been derived and answered, both in this 
covering paper and in the appended articles. The next subsections outline the answers to the 
research questions and propose some directions for future research. 
 
7.1 Disruptive innovations in established value networks 
The literature review in section 2 of this covering paper suggests that disruptive innovations 
in established value networks have received little attention. The first research question was 
therefore formulated as follows: 
1. Can a disruptive innovation emerge in an established value network and if so, how 
can this be explained? 
The empirical evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that disruptive innovations can 
prosper in existing value networks, despite their lower traditional performance. They seem to 
do so by bringing a new value proposition to the market. The ancillary performance attributes 
that accompany the lower mainstream performance may create increased value for the 
customer, for instance by simplifying work, removing labor and changing the activities inside 
the customer’s organization. Hence, disruptive innovations may emerge by imposing changes 
in established value networks rather than in completely new ones. 
In order to explain this, a revised perspective on disruptive innovation has been proposed. It 
has been argued that it may be better to look at how disruptive innovations create value and 
utility, rather than to focus on the various performance dimensions. The empirical findings 
indicate that a more nuanced conceptualization of customers and networks is required. The 
focal firm has been seen as a set of actors which compete for resources – but the customers 
and the surrounding network have been essentially operationalized as one distinct actor that 
exercises power by supplying resources to the firm. There may be several actors in the 
customer’s organization and beyond it that have direct impacts on the adoption of these 
innovations.  
In other words, it is argued that a more symmetric theory is needed to explain these issues 
and that such a theory would assume similar degrees of heterogeneity inside the focal firm as 
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in the surrounding environment. An expanded view of disruptive innovation has been 
presented. It is suggested that a disruptive innovation can be thought of as a shift along two 
dimensions: actors and value. 
 
7.2 Challenges related to disruptive innovation and business models 
The literature has stated that disruptive innovation is a business model problem (Christensen, 
2006), but is essentially focused on one aspect of the business model, namely whether or not 
the firm’s existing customers demand it. This led to the second research question: 
2. How and why is a disruptive innovation a business model challenge? 
In part due to an explicit focus on customers and the resource allocation process inside firms, 
the existing theory does not really address how disruptive innovation is a business model 
challenge. The more symmetric theory proposed in this dissertation makes it clearer in what 
ways this is the case.  
It has been argued that not only customers, but also important actors in the firm’s established 
business model constellation, hamper the development of disruptive innovations. These 
actors are found both inside the customer’s organization and in the surrounding environment. 
The established network constellation of actors, resources, and activities makes it difficult to 
introduce disruptive innovations since a different creation and distribution of value may be 
incompatible with existing competencies and incentives. Moreover, business models in many 
ways are interdependent as they concern the relationship between the firm and its network. 
The limited degree of freedom imposed by networks implies that firms can get stuck in their 
existing business models since they can only exercise a limited control over their 
environments. Firms seem to encounter problems when developing disruptive innovations, 
even when there is customer demand. A disruptive innovation exerts force and creates 
conflict in a network and therefore, incumbent firms, who are operating in an established 
network, struggle to introduce them. The challenges identified are in many ways different 
from those described in the literature. Rather than being controlled by the resources that 
customers supply, firms seem to be controlled by the established relations and 
interdependencies in their existing business model. 
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7.3 Directions for future research 
This dissertation has sought to expand and improve the existing theory on disruptive 
innovation. From this work, a couple of directions for future research can be pointed out. One 
of the limitations of the empirical evidence presented here is that it looks primarily at 
relationships between the innovating firm and its customers. While this is done in a more 
nuanced way than in the previous literature, a network or supply chain is still very broad and 
it would be interesting to see more studies of entire networks in industries undergoing 
disruptive change. Arguably, this would provide a better understanding of the challenges and 
their magnitude. As supply chains extend across several firms and functions, the nature of the 
aforementioned problems can be further addressed by performing such studies. 
The work described in this thesis makes a systemic and interdependent interpretation of 
business models. The fifth appended article combines the literature on industrial networks 
with the literature on business models and suggested that the challenges related to business 
model renewal are related largely to interconnectedness and the conservative nature of 
networks. This same article argues also that many of the barriers to and enablers of business 
model innovation are quite general and are similar to those previously described in the field 
of new product development29. Given that established firms seem to be good at generating 
new products but struggle to develop new business models, there are opportunities to add to 
this literature. A deeper look into business models from an industrial network perspective 
might reveal more about how business models can be renewed. 
Empirical evidence on these issues could be obtained by studying the ongoing transition to 
digital, IP-based video surveillance. It has been investigated in some detail within the scope 
of this dissertation and although only some 30 percent30 of the market has adopted this 
technology until now, it is becoming increasingly clear that incumbent firms have lost market 
shares in the transition to IP video. Given that this technological shift seems to imply 
challenges that are different from those described in the previous literature, it should provide 
a fertile ground for future research. The studies in this dissertation would seem to indicate 
that entrant firms will continue to dominate the transition to IP surveillance. They have 
entered a positive feedback loop where growing revenues have been invested in new, more 
competitive products. Conversely, analog incumbents encountered problems during the 
2008-09 recession and have been forced to lay off employees. But more importantly, the 
sales model and the ways to reach customers have changed with the shift to IP and incumbent 
firms are struggling to change their business models. As the third appended paper shows, this 
shift has several implications for the actors, resources, power structures, and activities related 
to established firms. It will be very interesting to see how this industry transforms in the 
coming years. 
                                                            
29 See e.g. Chesbrough (2009) and Teece (2009). 
30 This figure was obtained in September 2010 from a firm that is operating in the IP video surveillance 
industry. 
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The more symmetric perspective that is proposed in this dissertation opens up new 
opportunities to develop recommendations that go beyond handling the resource allocation 
process. Although some implications for management are suggested in this dissertation, more 
work can be done in this area. Further research is needed on how firms actually go about 
when trying to change their business models and introducing disruptive innovations. 
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8. Managerial implications 
A more symmetric theory has some implications for why entrants under some circumstances 
displace incumbent firms. It is argued in this thesis that the management of disruptive 
innovation is largely about understanding value creation and distribution in a network 
characterized by interdependencies. The decline of established firms and the dominance of 
entrants should be related therefore to different abilities to undertake such changes. The 
empirical data presented in this dissertation suggests that established firms struggle to 
develop disruptive innovations even though their customers may demand them. Hasselblad’s 
problems in the shift to digital imaging can be thought of as a good illustration. During the 
1990s, several entrant firms started to manufacture digital backs which could be attached to 
Hasselblad cameras. Developing a Hasselblad product that offered lower image quality 
turned out to be very problematic. This is partly in line with Tripsas’s (1997) argument that 
technological discontinuities need to be analyzed in terms of their compatibility with a firm’s 
complementary assets. The Hasselblad brand can be thought of as such an asset, which in 
some ways hampered its entry into digital imaging. However, this event is not only related to 
complementary assets, also it illustrates that established firms struggle to change their 
relations to existing customers.  
Lack of a network may be advantageous for entrants, since it means they will not be subject 
to the same core rigidities as established firms (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Incumbents often 
develop stronger relations to their networks over time, which provides them with a 
competitive advantage in the old technological paradigm, but seems to prevent them from 
experimenting with new value propositions. Previous research in strategic management has 
shown that start-ups are more willing to change their business models over time and that this 
flexibility is a key determinant of success (Boccardelli and Magnusson, 2006). Entrant firms 
by definition are more loosely coupled, therefore their business model is more adaptable 
since there are fewer constraints and interdependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Entrants should be more able to adopt a probe-and-learn approach and to eventually succeed 
in finding the right business model. The ongoing shift from analog to IP-based video 
surveillance is a good illustration of this argument. It seems that entrant firms in this industry 
have done better in terms of targeting new actors inside the customer’s organization and 
approaching them with a different value proposition. The opportunity cost seems to be higher 
for established firms since it appears to be riskier to experiment within the scope of an 
established network. How then can firms proceed when trying to renew their business models 
in order to succeed with a disruptive innovation? 
One advantage of a more symmetric theory on disruptive innovation is that it enables new 
managerial solutions. As noted in the theoretical review, the existing theory on disruptive 
innovation states that the main problem are on the demand-side, but that the managerial 
solutions have up until now largely focused on the supply-side. The main reason for this 
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appears to be that the literature focused explicitly on how customers control the resource 
allocation process inside firms by supplying them with resources. Within this perspective, the 
focal firm can manage disruptive innovation by re-designing its way of allocating resources, 
but the network cannot be addressed in more detail. Consequently, previous work looks at the 
market’s impact on firms, but pays only limited attention to how firms can actually manage 
their networks. When instead assuming heterogeneity inside the customer’s organization and 
in the surrounding network, it becomes easier to find new managerial solutions. 
As already noted, managing in a network is very different from handling issues that are 
internal to the firm since no individual actor can be in complete control of a network. Firms 
depend upon other actors and can impose only limited control over them. Thus, while a 
firm’s relations are the basis of its current work and development, these relations may also 
inhibit further development activities. Actors embedded in an industrial network have limited 
freedom of action since they depend upon relationships with others. A network perspective 
would suggest that it is difficult to manage under conditions of limited freedom and that the 
risks are higher (Adner, 2006). Clearly, management is a different issue under these 
circumstances since firms cannot exercise hierarchical power over their networks. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to influence the network to ones’ own benefit (Knight and 
Harland, 2005). For instance, previous research shows how firms that develop open source 
software have successfully motivated user communities to take part in the development of 
software by using subtler control mechanisms than executive power (Dahlander and 
Magnusson, 2008). 
Given that business models are interdependent and systemic, finding the right business model 
for a disruptive innovation becomes a matter of altering, modifying, or aligning the existing 
network to favor the innovation. This can be done by targeting new actors, helping actors to 
change their activities, altering the revenue model, or changing the value proposition. 
Business models transcend the boundaries of a firm (Zott and Amit, 2009) and therefore, 
finding the right business model for a disruptive innovation is ultimately a process of 
negotiation and alignment of the surrounding network. Below, some guidelines for how this 
can be done are proposed. Some brief empirical illustrations from the appended papers are 
provided, along with some references to tools and frameworks that could be useful. 
Eventually, some reflections on these guidelines are given. 
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8.1 Map and analyze networks and value 
By mapping and analyzing the key actors in a network, potential enablers and inhibiting 
actors can be identified. The empirical findings in this dissertation suggest that the attitude of 
an actor towards an innovation can be regarded as a function of its incentives and its 
competencies. Starting with competencies, previous research points out that an innovation 
can be discontinuous for different actors and in different ways (Afuah and Bahram, 1995), 
for instance, it can be competence-destroying. Some actors may be willing to support an 
innovation, but lack the competencies to do so. As all actors are bound to act within their 
area of competence, this criterion can be regarded as a prerequisite for adopting an 
innovation. 
Secondly, the incentives that govern each actor need to be understood. This includes how 
economic value is created and distributed. There are several existing techniques for doing so, 
for instance customer utility mapping (Kim and Mauborgne, 2000) and techno-economic 
analysis (Lindmark, 2006). A techno-economic analysis essentially concerns the mapping of 
how technical attributes interplay and create economic value. Different methods for assessing 
the job to be done instead of looking at different performance dimensions may also be 
helpful (Wunker, 2005). As an innovation may create increased economic value by 
destroying value elsewhere, the distribution of value needs to be analyzed. Clearly, the 
economic dimension of value is important, but the impact upon established power structures 
and the surrounding context also needs to be analyzed. Some actors may have good reasons 
to block an innovation if it reduces their power or creates a distribution of value that is 
undesirable for them.  
The motivation of an actor thus may depend upon whether it will benefit or not from it, and 
whether or not it is capable of using the innovation. The empirical data in the dissertation 
provide some illustrations of how firms map and understand their surrounding networks 
along these two dimensions. For instance, in the case of IP video the firm managed to 
identify several actors in the downstream network and inside the customer’s organization that 
had diverging incentives and competencies. Integrators of traditional CCTV did not 
command IP video and security managers were largely hostile towards the new technology. 
One reason for this would seem to be that when security becomes more an IT issue, security 
managers lose some of their status and power vis-à-vis other actors inside the customer’s 
organization. Hence, some actors had an incentive to be skeptical while others were 
disinterested since the innovation was incompatible with established competencies. 
It should be pointed out that these actors can be found both inside the different firms in the 
network and beyond them. Hence, in mapping a network, it needs to be analyzed in a 
systemic way since there are many different actors that are intertwined in the exchange of 
goods and services. This approach differs from those postulated previously which essentially 
regard the customer as a single actor, with one specific utility function. 
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As emerged from the literature review in the chapter 2 of this dissertation, it is not clear how 
and why a disruptive innovation prospers in an established value network. Going back to the 
case of Hasselblad and digital imaging, it can be seen that the guidelines offer some guidance 
on this. When translating the different performance attributes associated with the technology 
into how it actually creates value, it becomes clear why this technology prospered in 
Hasselblad’s high-end segment in the 1990s, despite its lower performance and higher price. 
Digital imaging removed the studio photographer’s activity of film finishing and waiting. 
Additionally, an infinite number of images could be captured, sent, replicated, and 
manipulated at a very low cost. In this case, the technology had little impact on the 
established network constellation. Nevertheless, it created considerable difficulties for an 
incumbent firm such as Hasselblad, which had a business model that was largely related to its 
strong brand and superior image quality. The established relationship between the company 
and its customers was deemed to be incompatible with this new way of creating value. 
Consequently, it became problematic for the firm to develop the technology since the market 
organization and many mechanical engineers argued that it was not worthy of Hasselblad’s 
brand. A mapping of the network and a focus on value creation rather than performance 
would have highlighted the main challenges and explained how and why firms encounter 
difficulties when a disruptive technology is introduced in an established value network. This 
is an improvement to existing theory, which does not really deal with the issue since it has 
been assumed that the properties of a disruptive innovation imply that they emerge in 
completely new value networks. 
The case in the fifth appended paper provides another compelling illustration of the 
importance of mapping and understanding the surrounding network. The studied 
incontinence diaper created a new distribution of value which was incompatible with the 
existing network constellation inside the customer’s organization. Some key actors such as 
the caregivers did not have the competencies required to use the product. Consequently, sales 
did not take off despite the fact that the product created more value than its predecessors. 
When a disruptive innovation is introduced, it needs to be understood in terms of whether it 
is compatible with the incentives and the competencies of each actor in the network. 
 
8.2 Adapt and align the network and the business model 
Once the surrounding value network is properly understood, firms need to adapt this 
constellation, i.e. figure out which actors should be targeted and which should be avoided. As 
already pointed out, some actors have a direct interest in adopting the innovation while others 
may have an equally large interest in blocking it. 
Actors do not differ only in terms of their incentives and competencies, they also differ in 
terms of the importance for the adoption of an innovation. Some may be critical for the 
adoption; others may have little impact on the success or failure of it. Reconfiguring the 
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established network constellation therefore becomes an issue of finding allies and negotiating 
with or avoiding enemies. 
Revisiting the incontinence diaper case, it can be seen that the firm started to target new 
actors. Given that the purchasers were not able to take account of the new, more systemic 
value creation, the firm turned instead to management. Additionally, it realized that the 
product could not be used without involving the caregivers, even though they did not know 
how to use the product correctly. 
The previously described case of IP video is another example here. It is clear from this case 
that the disruptive technology had different impacts on different actors. The traditional 
security integrators and managers did not have the necessary knowledge and some of them 
had few incentives to favor adoption, since they would lose status in relation to IT managers. 
Targeting IT people more directly and others who were not threatened by the technology was 
the right way forward. 
Firms also need to figure out how the actors should be approached. Under conditions of 
interdependence, changing the network in favor of the innovation becomes a matter of 
aligning incentives and renewing competencies. As pointed out earlier, some innovations can 
destroy the competence of established actors. If these actors are crucial for the adoption, the 
firm needs to influence and encourage them to change their activities. In several of the cases 
studied in this dissertation, firms sought to do so by providing training and educational 
activities, thereby facilitating the process of creative destruction31. These activities also 
contribute to changing the motivations of some actors.  
Delving more deeply into the issue of incentive alignment, a couple of measures for doing so 
have been identified. Several of the studied firms were engaged in a wide range of marketing 
activities explicitly aimed to build networks with opinion leaders which could persuade 
others of the benefits of the innovation. In the IP video case, the studied firm tried to interact 
with both IT and security managers and get them to agree on the benefits of IP video. 
Other cases illustrate how firms explained their value proposition in different ways in order 
to reflect the new value creation and to make it more appealing to certain actors, thereby 
aligning incentives. When introducing technologies that create value in new ways, this value 
often needs to be communicated differently (Björkdahl, 2007). In the case of the 
incontinence diaper, the value proposition was changed from the sale of incontinence 
products to providing better incontinence care at lower total cost. The management of 
retirement homes and hospitals were more concerned with the total cost of incontinence care 
                                                            
31 Several of the firms studied in the fifth and the sixth appended papers engaged in training activities and tried 
to renew the competencies of key actors. In the early 1990s, Hasselblad engaged in similar efforts. The 
company launched something called Hasselblad University, an initiative which aimed to educate photographers 
regarding how digital imaging works.  
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than were the purchasers and therefore, this type of communication turned out to be more 
effective32. 
Finding the right business model is ultimately about identifying which actors to target, how 
incentives can be aligned, and how resources and activities can be modified in order to match 
the new value created. The brief empirical illustrations provide some examples of how these 
guidelines can be applied in order to map and understand the firm’s surrounding network. 
This input is vital for developing a new business model that fits with the creation and 
distribution of value associated with a disruptive innovation. 
 
8.3 Reflections on the guidelines 
The guidelines provided above can help firms to identify and handle challenges related to 
disruptive innovation. They may initially appear rather broad and not necessarily relevant 
only to disruptive innovations. It should be underlined here that the guidelines deal with how 
the firm can manage its surrounding networks, not its own resources and capabilities. 
Therefore, these guidelines do not address the challenges related for instance to competence 
destruction, architectural innovation, or the role of complementary assets. Rather they focus 
explicitly on identifying and managing the challenges that lie beyond the firm’s boundaries. 
In this sense, the guidelines provide a more detailed understanding of how a business model 
can be impacted by a disruptive innovation and the ways in which it needs to be changed. 
These guidelines address the factors that ought to influence the design of a new business 
model. As stated previously, the underlying perspective is similar to the ‘hypercube of 
innovation’ (Afuah and Bahram, 1995) which points out that an innovation needs to be 
mapped in terms of its impact on different firms throughout the supply chain. However, the 
guidelines presented here differ in offering a more fine grained description of these actors in 
terms of resources, activities, power, and incentives. They differ also in assuming that an 
established network constellation is built on interdependence, which in turn suggests that 
finding the right business model is ultimately an issue of understanding the incentives that 
govern different actors and how these incentives can be aligned. 
Although the proposed guidelines may be different from what has been suggested previously 
with regard to disruptive innovation, they share some features with previous work in other 
areas such as supply chain management and strategic management. Supply chain 
management has for a long time dealt with how actors, resources and activities can be linked 
together (Johnsen et al, 2000). It has been argued that the challenges related to 
interdependencies can be managed by understanding the incentives, exchanging information, 
and trying to find solutions that are mutually beneficial (e.g. Lee, 2004). When introducing 
                                                            
32 The firm in the IP video industry also sought to communicate its value creation differently. It focused on the 
total cost of owning a surveillance system rather than the price of single products. 
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disruptive innovations, firms can learn by adopting a similar way of thinking. It is important 
to be aware of an innovation’s impact on the surrounding network and to find ways to 
motivate actors to work in the same direction. Under conditions of interdependence, firms 
that seek to maximize only their own value at the expense of their networks may be worse off 
as this behavior may dissolve the networks. However, it should be noted that the introduction 
of innovations differs from management of a supply network in an important way. Innovation 
activities are different from more operational issues in the sense that the degree of 
uncertainty is often higher and that it is initially more difficult to quantify the precise value of 
adoption. To compromise and find ways to share both risk and profit may be even more 
important when aligning a network in favor of an innovation33. 
Scholars in strategic management have frequently pointed out that strategy is ultimately 
about finding a fit between the resources and capabilities of a firm and its surrounding 
environment (e.g. Grant, 2008). Earlier recommendations regarding disruptive innovation 
differ in regarding the environment as something that cannot be influenced. The guidelines 
proposed in this dissertation have a lot in common with for instance the work by Normann 
and Ramirez (1993; 1994) who regard strategy as the management of a value-creating system 
where the firm and its network work jointly towards value creation. In this perspective, the 
main strategic task is reconfiguration of the roles and relationships in the value chain. In 
some respects the guidelines also resemble Network Value Analysis, as developed by 
Peppard and Rylander (2006). This approach aims to describe how value is created and 
distributed in a network, how a firm’s activities impact on it, and how other actors will 
behave. These views differ for instance from the positioning school (e.g. Porter, 1985) which 
maintains a more adversarial perspective on the environment. 
Having offered some guidelines and described some cases of firms that encountered 
problems, it is interesting to revisit some of these cases and discuss whether things could 
have turned out differently with this perspective. The guidelines provide a better 
understanding of the main challenges and point to some ways to handle these issues. In this 
sense, they help firms to identify appropriate measures. However, this is not to imply that 
some of the firms would have survived or prospered by doing so. The challenges faced by 
individual firms are often more complex and difficult to address. 
To return to the Hasselblad case, it can be seen that several firm- and technology-specific 
issues made it problematic for Hasselblad to handle the transition to digital imaging. For 
instance, digital technology is often associated with a very fast pace of development, which 
exacerbates the difficulties. When the technological shift was underway in the late 1990s, 
better and cheaper cameras rapidly penetrated the market, which increased the problems for 
Hasselblad. A similar pattern applies to the transition from mechanical to electronic 
                                                            
33 See e.g. Holmström and Stalder (2001) for an illustration of how important it is to share risks and benefits 
when adoption depends upon many different actors. 
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calculators. Once the calculators were based upon integrated circuits, prices declined quickly 
while computing performance continuously increased. Hence, there are several issues related 
to technological improvement which are important, yet difficult to deal with theoretically. 
In these cases, there were also several firm-specific factors which augmented the problems. 
Hasselblad suffered from several changes in ownership which created strategic inconsistency 
over time. Additionally, the short term scope of ownership which the Union Bank of 
Switzerland declared in 1996, along with its intention to make leveraged buyout seems to 
have increased these difficulties. Clearly, such factors are hard to incorporate into a 
managerial framework but nevertheless they have a considerable impact on the eventual 
performance of a firm. It should therefore be pointed out that the guidelines presented above 
assume that individuals are both able and willing to handle disruptive innovation in a rational 
way that maximizes the long term value of their company. Management needs to attend to 
these issues, but the dominant logic of established firms may sometimes prevent this from 
happening (Prahalad and Bettis, 1986). The empirical data in this dissertation would suggest 
that management attention is sometimes lacking but that it is still an important prerequisite 
for succeeding with disruptive innovation. 
The Facit case also includes some specific factors that are hard to address managerially. For 
example, in the 1950s, the firm recruited some of Sweden’s top electronics researchers and 
set up the subsidiary Facit Electronics. There was little knowledge about electronics in 
Sweden at the time and Facit identified and recruited the key people in the country. Hence, 
both Facit and the labor market in which it was located lacked a sufficient competence base 
in electronics. These macro-economic conditions are difficult to integrate into the proposed 
guidelines but they do play an important role and should not be overlooked. 
Having underlined the heterogeneity in the challenges faced by specific firms, the proposed 
guidelines still mark an improvement to what existing theory on disruptive innovation has 
offered. The aim is to propose a more detailed approach that makes it possible to understand 
where and how a disruptive innovation prospers, to understand the enablers and disablers of 
its growth and how firms can develop new business models when introducing these 
innovations. 
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Exploring Factors Inﬂuencing
Incumbents’ Response to
Disruptive Innovation
Christian Sandström, Mats Magnusson and
Jan Jörnmark
This paper explores how certain incumbent characteristics inﬂuence an established ﬁrm’s
response to disruptive innovation. More speciﬁcally, it looks at the challenges a middle size,
top segment company faced and how this affected its reaction to the disruptive threat. This is
done by conducting an in-depth case study of Hasselblad, a manufacturer of professional
cameras. It can be seen in this case study that Hasselblad’s limited resources and its niche
strategy affected how it managed the transition from analogue to digital camera technology.
These characteristics made it difﬁcult to allow experimentation with digital imaging in the
main business since the available resources were severely limited and this initially inferior
technology could harm the brand image. Instead, Hasselblad pursued collaborations and
eventually launched a hybrid camera, which was compatible both with ﬁlm and digital backs
but did not become the expected success. Being close to bankruptcy, the digital resources
needed were acquired and the company eventually survived the disruption. In conclusion, this
paper argues that the managerial challenges and solutions to the innovator’s dilemma depend
upon the particular characteristics of incumbents and that this heterogeneity has not been
sufﬁciently captured by previous literature. It also suggests that medium size, top segment
ﬁrms can survive disruptive innovation through collaboration and acquisitions.
Introduction
The concept of disruptive innovation (Chris-tensen, 1997) has received much attention
from both academics and practitioners. Never-
theless, there are several areas that have not so
far received sufﬁcient attention. One such
aspect is the heterogeneity of incumbents.
While the literature on disruptive innovation
has proved that incumbents frequently fail
in the transition from a sustaining to a disrup-
tive technology, it has so far shown limited
interest in the differences between established
ﬁrms. In the discourse regarding disruptive
innovation, incumbents are often treated as
one population vis-à-vis entrants rather than
as many populations with different resources,
market positions and strategies. Contrary to
this, it appears reasonable that the capacity to
respond to disruptive innovations depends
largely on the characteristics of the incumbent
and consequently that the managerial solu-
tions proposed need to take these differences
into consideration.
This paper investigates how certain incum-
bent characteristics inﬂuence the response to
disruptive innovation. In particular, using an
in-depth case study approach, it explores the
challenges and managerial solutions for a
medium size established ﬁrm in the high-end
segment of its industry. The ﬁrm in question is
Hasselblad, a manufacturer of professional
cameras. Based on the observations made, it is
argued that the managerial challenges and
solutions to the innovator’s dilemma depend
upon the particular characteristics of an
incumbent and that this term needs to be
nuanced further. Moreover, the article sug-
gests that a medium size company in a high
market segment can survive disruptive inno-
vation through collaboration and acquisitions.
This paper is organized as follows. The next
section reviews the literature on disruptive
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innovation and entrant-incumbent dynamics.
The subsequent section contains a description
of the methods used in this paper. Then the
case study about Hasselblad is presented
in order to illustrate how a particular incum-
bent ﬁrm encountered severe problems,
but eventually survived the disruption. The
ﬁrm provides a particularly compelling
example in that, despite early investment and
recognition of the disruptiveness of digital
imaging, it encountered problems in the tran-
sition to the new technology. The ﬁnal section
contains an analysis of the case study and a
discussion about its theoretical and manage-
rial implications.
Theoretical Exposition
It is well documented that many established
ﬁrms ﬁnd it hard to adapt to changes in the
technologies they employ. Frequently, incum-
bent ﬁrms do not manage the shift to the new
technology, they lose market share and the
successful ﬁrms are found among the new
entrants (Cooper & Schendel, 1976; Tushman
& Anderson, 1986; Utterback, 1994). Chris-
tensen (1997) brought a new perspective to
this issue by drawing upon resource depen-
dency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This
theory suggests that a ﬁrm’s freedom of action
is in fact controlled by actors outside the
boundaries of the company, e.g., customers
and investors. Hence, resource dependency
theory posits that a ﬁrm’s freedom of action is
in fact limited to satisfying the demands of
those actors that provide the resources it needs
in order to survive.
By making a distinction between sustaining
and disruptive technologies, Christensen
explained the recurrent pattern of incumbent
failure in technological shifts. Sustaining tech-
nologies have in common that they improve
the performance of established products
along the dimensions that mainstream cus-
tomers demand. Disruptive technologies, on
the other hand, initially underperform along
these dimensions. The lower traditional per-
formance and the ancillary performance
attributes create a large market uncertainty
around the disruptive innovation. At the same
time established ﬁrms ﬁnd it irrational to
abandon their current, proﬁtable customers
in order to aim for a new, initially small
market and an inferior technology. As the
performance of the disruptive innovation
increases it begins to attract customers from
the sustaining technology and eventually dis-
places the old technology. Through his studies
of the disk drive industry, Christensen showed
that incumbents usually win sustaining battles
whereas entrants succeed in disruptive battles.
Hence, a key determinant of the probability of
success for an innovation is the extent to which
it addresses the needs of actors in an incum-
bent’s current value network.
Christensen also derives a number of mana-
gerial solutions which have been further
developed (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). It is
argued that managers in incumbent ﬁrms basi-
cally have three options, they can change the
processes and values of the current organization,
create an independent organization, or acquire a
different organization.
Firms that try to change the current organiza-
tion in order to adapt to the disruptive innova-
tion have a weak track record (Christensen,
1997). The main reasons for this are related to
the resource dependence that the innovator’s
dilemma originates from.
An independent organization can be regarded
as a structure in which an organization devel-
ops new resources that are different and sepa-
rate from the rest of the ﬁrm. It has objectives
that are largely independent from and outside
the current operations of the ﬁrm. As the new
technology evolves within the organization,
the required processes and values are also
developed (Macher & Richman, 2004). This is
one of Christensen’s most inﬂuential recom-
mendations for how to manage disruptive
innovations.
When ﬁrms are not able to develop disrup-
tive innovations, they can adapt by acquiring
companies that possess the resources that are
needed for developing the new technology.
By doing so, the competencies needed for
developing disruptive innovations can be
incorporated into the organization rather than
developed.
Though the problems and solutions
described above are well elaborated, they
suffer from some drawbacks mainly due to a
lack of clarity in the terminology used. In the
discourse regarding disruptive innovation,
incumbents are treated as one population
vis-à-vis entrants, rather than as many popu-
lations with different resources, market posi-
tions and strategies. However, the forces of
resource dependency should arguably vary
depending upon the speciﬁc characteristics of
an incumbent ﬁrm. For instance, ﬁrms operat-
ing in a high-end segment are likely to face
different challenges from those faced by a
company in the low-end of the market. This
implies that there could also be a substantial
amount of heterogeneity among the solutions
to the innovator’s dilemma or that the most
suitable means of action actually depend upon
the characteristics of the incumbent. Conse-
quently, the managerial solutions can poten-
tially be improved further by exploring how
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the properties of an incumbent affect its
response to a disruptive threat.
Moreover, given that disruption is a process
and not a discrete event (Christensen &
Raynor, 2003), it should strike at different
points for different ﬁrms depending on the
segment in which the ﬁrm is operating. Adner
(2002) pointed out that the structure of
demand needs to be addressed in order to
clarify the nature and effect of disruptive inno-
vations. Using the notion of thresholds, Adner
also deﬁned critical performance levels that
must be met. The functional threshold of a
product is the minimum performance that the
customer can accept whereas the net utility
threshold also takes price into consideration.
The point in time when the net utility thresh-
old is met by the disruptive technology should
arguably depend upon which customer
segment the incumbent operates in.
Furthermore, Danneels (2004) suggested
that future research should investigate alterna-
tive routes for incumbents to access disruptive
technologies, looking into the possibilities
for using alliances, acquisitions and internal
development in more detail. This paper will
address some of these issues by exploring how
certain incumbent characteristics inﬂuence its
response to disruptive innovation. More spe-
ciﬁcally, it will look at the particular challenges
encountered by a medium size established
ﬁrm operating in the high-end of the camera
market.
Methods Used
The case study below illustrates how Hassel-
blad failed to develop capabilities in digital
imaging on its own and then survived through
collaborations and an acquisition. This ﬁrm
was targeted since it does not possess the char-
acteristics of most incumbents that are studied
in the ﬁeld of disruptive innovation. The ﬁrm is
operating in the high-end segment of the
camera market, targeting professional photog-
raphers with a high demand on performance.
An additional reason for studying Hasselblad
is that it was possible to conduct interviews
with current and former high-level managers
of the company.
Though the authors have no past experience
of working with Hasselblad, extensive
amounts of information have been accessed.
Since this paper focuses on corporate strategy
and the implementation challenges that
confront managers, senior managers who
played a substantial role in forming the strat-
egy were primarily interviewed. Managers
of R&D have also been accessed in order to
understand the speciﬁc challenges they
faced when shifting from analogue to digital
imaging. In total, more than 50 hours of inter-
views were performed and recorded with 11
people. Follow-up interviews were also con-
ducted in order to ensure an accurate interpre-
tation of the information. All ﬁeld research
interviews began with general open-ended
questions, asking managers how they per-
ceived the challenges posed by the disruptive
technology and how they tried to deal with
them. The same questions were asked to at
least two senior managers from one era. In
order to ensure the accuracy of this informa-
tion, it was compared with a large amount of
secondary data such as annual reports, media
articles, old mail conversations between man-
agers and book chapters written by former
managers. In addition to this, all minutes from
the board meetings during the period 1989–94
were accessed.
The description of this case emerged when
all these sources of data had been analysed. In
those cases when the written material that was
accessed diverged from the interview data,
follow-up interviews were performed. The
gathered data has thus been triangulated by
looking at several independent sources and
making sure that these sources were mutually
consistent. Moreover, the most important
material has been read, accessed or discussed
by several researchers in order to ensure an
accurate interpretation.
Case Description
Hasselblad is a small niche player in the
camera industry. The ﬁrm had for a long time
about 500 employees in total and annual rev-
enues of around SEK600 million. It has for
decades been one of the leading camera manu-
facturers and has sometimes been referred to
as the ‘Rolls Royce’ of the camera industry. The
company received global recognition in 1969
when the ﬁrst photos of NeilArmstrong on the
moon were taken with a Hasselblad camera.
During the following decades, a series of high-
performing cameras for professional photog-
raphers were developed. This case study will
focus on the late 1980s to 2005, which is the era
when Hasselblad’s analogue cameras were
disrupted by digital imaging.
In 1981, the camera industry was shaken
when Sony introduced the ﬁrst camera that
was not using ﬁlm, the Sony Mavica. Given the
poor picture quality of the Mavica, the CEO of
Hasselblad at that time, Jerry Öster, concluded
that the ﬁrm should wait and instead learn
more about digital imaging by developing
other applications. Öster thought that Hassel-
blad was too small to make the investments in
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R&D required in order to overcome the weak-
nesses of the new technology and that it would
take time before the technology would disrupt
Hasselblad.
Attempts to Develop a New Camera System
During the late 1980s, Hasselblad became
increasingly aware of the drawbacks of its ana-
logue camera system. Cameras are not only
about electronics or precise mechanics. There
are many features which are related to optics
and Hasselblad lagged behind in those areas.
Therefore some R&D managers thought that
the company needed to develop a completely
new camera system with modern functions
such as autofocus. Some proposals were made
to the board but the project, which was called
Nova, was never launched on a full scale. The
main reason for this was that management
thought Hasselblad was too small to afford
such a project.
The Development of a Digital Studio Camera
The ﬁrm instead moved further into digital
imaging in the early 1990s. A new CEO was
recruited who had a background in electrical
engineering and believed in the potential of
digital imaging. In 1994, the company started
the development of a digital camera. During
this time digital and analogue photography
were competing for the same resources. One
member of the product board recalls that ‘we
had one budget in the product board and
money had to go to either the digital camera
system or the mechanical camera system’. It
was eventually decided to move further into
digital imaging.
When the development of a digital camera
had started, it soon became apparent that this
technology had some properties that made it
fundamentally different from an analogue
camera. The photo quality was lower at this
point than with an analogue Hasselblad
camera. Along other performance dimensions,
digital photography had many attributes that
made it attractive. Photos could be replicated,
manipulated and sent at a much lower cost
and much more conveniently than with ana-
logue imaging. Thus, the business utility of
digital technology was in fact very large at this
point, yet different from what Hasselblad had
offered previously.
With these properties in mind, the manager
in charge of digital development, Lennart Stål-
fors, thought that the best thing to do was to
develop a camera for studio photography. This
customer segment would hopefully be willing
to trade off some photo quality for the oppor-
tunity to take many photos, make copies and
sending the photos in an easier way.
The development of the digital camera took
place both in-house and in various collabora-
tions. One of the largest projects was under-
taken together with Philips. Among other
things, this resulted in a sensor for digital
cameras. ‘Many large companies were willing
to co-operate with us despite the fact that we
were so small, our strong brand helped us a
lot’, Lennart Stålfors recalls.
A Change in Strategy
Partly as a consequence of having focused on
digital imaging, Hasselblad lagged behind
with its mainstream products. This was one of
the reasons why the new owner, the Union
Bank of Switzerland (UBS), in 1996 decided to
cut off digital development. Moreover, UBS
had a short-term scope of ownership and did
not want to make investments that would be
beneﬁcial in the more distant future. An addi-
tional reason was that some managers, prima-
rily in the marketing department, thought that
the inferior quality of digital imaging would
damage Hasselblad’s brand. Others argued
that the ﬁrm was too small to develop a digital
camera on its own. Stefan Arvidsson, member
of the board, says: ‘In the long run we would
not have been able to keep up with the others.
Compare us to what the huge Japanese com-
panies spend on development. I still think
stopping the project was the right thing to
do.’ However, many people thought that this
decision was a disaster. For instance, the Chief
Finance Ofﬁcer (CFO) at that time, Bengt
Ahlgren said: ‘Hasselblad did not have to
develop everything on its own. Throughout
the years our reputation had made us an
attractive partner for collaborations.’
Instead of continuing with digital imaging,
the new owner decided to develop a com-
pletely new camera system. As was mentioned
before, this project had been considered in the
late 1980s but had never been realized since
it would have been very expensive for a small
ﬁrm like Hasselblad. The new strategy was
to pursue some collaboration and thereby
follow the digital development, while focusing
Hasselblad’s own resources on analogue
technology.
The development of Hasselblad’s new
camera system, the H1, was initiated in 1998.
The camera was developed in collaboration
with Fuji, who actually funded almost 50 per
cent of the camera. The idea was to create a
camera which was analogue but also compat-
ible with digital backs, thereby facilitating the
transition from analogue to digital imaging.
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However, this project was heavily delayed
and the product was not launched until late
2002, many years after what had been planned
originally. Moreover, it had run SEK150
million over budget and did not have all the
features that were originally intended. This
delay turned out to be critical since the tech-
nological shift started to affect the company
during those years. One member of the devel-
opment team notes that: ‘if the H1 would have
been launched in 1998, we would have had
four good years of revenue from it. When the
H1 was ﬁnally launched it was a fantastic
product, but that did not matter since most
cameras were completely digital then.’
The H1 system was a hybrid, which could
use both digital backs and conventional ﬁlm.
The digital backs were initially delivered by
Kodak and PhaseOne. Since Hasselblad did
not manufacture their own digital backs this
meant that they could not deliver a complete
digital camera themselves. At the same time,
the performance of digital cameras had
increased to the extent that Hasselblad’s posi-
tion was threatened by actors that had not
even been their competitors before. One
of Hasselblad’s most proﬁtable segments,
wedding photography, had for decades been a
market that was protected from competition.
But within a few years, Hasselblad lost this
market to Canon due to the shift from ana-
logue to digital technology. Digital backs
are very expensive and thus, a fully digital
Hasselblad camera cost SEK100,000 more
than Canon’s similar products. The ﬁrm now
experienced a severe drop in revenues. As the
market for digital cameras expanded rapidly,
Hasselblad encountered further problems
being caught with a technology that was essen-
tially analogue.
In early 2003, the company was bought by
the Shriro Group, a Chinese ﬁrm which had
been Hasselblad’s distributor for more than 40
years. The new owner sold off all subsidiaries
of Hasselblad, downsized the ﬁrm and had to
bring more money into the company several
times in order to avoid bankruptcy. Hasselblad
now had to develop a complete digital camera
system, which included digital backs. Given
that the ﬁrm was close to bankruptcy, had suf-
fered severe layoffs and had cut off all digital
capabilities in the mid 1990s, the situation was
desperate.
Shriro thought that it would be impossible
under these conditions to develop a digital
back and therefore started to look for potential
acquisitions. Given that the new Hasselblad
camera was compatible with digital backs, the
synergies from buying a manufacturer of those
backs seemed obvious. In order to avoid bank-
ruptcy, Shriro had to invest extensively in the
acquisition of Imacon, a Danish ﬁrm manufac-
turing digital backs. Imacon and Hasselblad
were merged together and Hasselblad could
now sell a complete digital camera system.
After having been close to bankruptcy in
2003–4, the company recovered ﬁnancially and
since then it has been proﬁtable in manufactur-
ing digital cameras for professional photo-
graphers. However, Hasselblad is still paying
back a lot of debt to the owner for whom the
acquisition of Hasselblad turned out to be far
more expensive than anticipated. A long and
dramatic journey for Hasselblad had been
made, or as the CEO Lars Papilla expressed it
in May 2004, ‘the shift to digital technology
was much more dramatic than we had
expected.’
Analysis and Discussion
The case study of Hasselblad can indeed be
regarded as an illustrative example of the
innovator’s dilemma. It clearly shows that the
digital cameras were disruptive. While ini-
tially having a lower performance along tradi-
tional measures such as photo quality, it had
other attributes such as the possibility to store,
replicate, send and manipulate photos more
easily and at a lower cost.
Despite recognizing the future importance
of digital technology at an early point, Hassel-
blad encountered great difﬁculties in this tech-
nological shift. Resource dependency theory
seems to provide one explanation for why this
happened, as suggested by Christensen (1997).
The continuous demand from investors to
focus on proﬁtability and therefore downsiz-
ing disruptive initiatives can be regarded as
one example of this. Moreover, the particular
characteristics of Hasselblad affected how the
ﬁrm handled the disruptive threat from digital
imaging. The company was relatively small
and had a limited and demanding customer
base. These properties imposed constraints on
how Hasselblad could handle the innovator’s
dilemma.
Focus on the High-End Segment – An
Obstacle for Experimentation?
It can be seen in the case study above that
Hasselblad’s niche strategy affected how the
ﬁrm managed the transition to digital imaging.
Digital cameras could not initially provide the
superior performance that was demanded in
the high-end segment where Hasselblad had
established a unique position. The net utility
threshold (Adner, 2002) was much higher for
a ﬁrm like Hasselblad than for a company
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operating in the amateur segment. In addition
to this, Hasselblad’s customers associated the
brand with quality and superior performance
and this image could have been damaged by
experimenting with an initially inferior tech-
nology. The strong brand was one of Hassel-
blad’s greatest assets and this seems to have
created a large hostility against digital technol-
ogy, particularly in the marketing department.
The protected market position and the brand
were probably two of the main reasons why
the new owner decided in 1996 to cut off
digital development and focus more on ana-
logue imaging.
In this respect, companies in the lower seg-
ments had better possibilities for early experi-
mentation and learning since they could sell
digital cameras to amateurs with low demands
on photo quality. The values associated with
the Hasselblad brand implied that a transition
to a lower performing technology was deemed
to be very risky and, thus, the forces of
resource dependency seem to have worked
strongly in favour of the sustaining technology.
Based upon a history of landmark events such
as the photos taken on the moon, a dominant
logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) emphasizing
extreme performance had emerged within the
ﬁrm and this further implied that moving
into digital technology was difﬁcult. Clearly,
the ﬁrm’s core capabilities in the mechanical
technology in this sense turned into core
rigidities when facing the disruptive technol-
ogy (Leonard-Barton, 1992).
Firm Size Limiting the Possibilities to Keep
Options Open
The case study also illustrates how being a
medium size company affected Hasselblad’s
response to the disruptive technology. When
management decided not to develop a new
camera system in the late 1980s it was largely
a consequence of the limited resources of
the ﬁrm. Moreover, the fact that much of
the digital development in the early 1990s
occurred in various collaborations such as the
one with Philips illustrates how ﬁrm size
affected the way Hasselblad handled the dis-
ruptive threat.
During the mid 1990s the ﬁrm continuously
moved away from digital imaging and instead
embraced the sustaining technology that had
proven to be successful for so many decades.
When the new owner decided to focus solely
upon conventional camera technology and
pursue only minor collaborations in the digital
technology area, another step in this direction
was taken. It appears that this decision was
also affected by the ﬁrm’s size and its available
resources. It can be argued that the limited size
of Hasselblad accentuated the difﬁculties
involved in meeting the disruptive innovation
as the company ended up in an either-or situ-
ation, due to its ﬁnancial constraints.
Hence, the forces of resource dependency
were very strong for a ﬁrm like Hasselblad. It
would have been expensive for the company
to pursue development in both the new and
the established technology ﬁelds simulta-
neously. Hasselblad tried to keep the option of
developing a digital camera open through col-
laborations and instead focus on a hybrid
camera, but lost valuable time and resources in
doing so. The fact that the new camera system
launched in 2002 was to a large extent ﬁnanced
by Fuji also illustrates how the size of the ﬁrm
affected its way of managing the technological
shift. During this long and costly project, Has-
selblad never had the resources or strategic
focus needed to develop digital backs. When
Shriro acquired Hasselblad and the ﬁrm
was close to bankruptcy, it could eventually
survive through an acquisition of Imacon,
thereby providing a fully digital camera
system.
Whether the outcome of this strategy should
be regarded as a success or not is a subject that
is open to interpretation. If the new owner
hadn’t brought additional funding to the
company it would most likely not have sur-
vived, and it is still paying off debts to Shriro.
On the other hand, empirical evidence from
both other industries and the camera industry
(e.g., Christensen, 1997; Tripsas & Gavetti,
2000) suggest that few companies survive dis-
ruptive innovation and therefore survival may
here be regarded as some form of modest
success.
An additional factor that seems to have
affected how Hasselblad handled the disrup-
tive threat seems to be ownership and the
willingness to make long-term investments.
An owner such as UBS who had a short-term
scope of ownership was hostile towards
investing in digital imaging and instead devel-
oped a hybrid camera. The takeover by Shriro
seems to have enabled the kind of investment
that was needed. Therefore, it appears that the
various ownership changes created a strategic
inconsistency over time that augmented
the problems Hasselblad encountered, but the
accessed data does not enable us to draw
further conclusions about this.
Summarizing the above, it is seen that
Hasselblad’s size and strategy affected its
response to the disruptive technology. For a
ﬁrm like Hasselblad, the relative cost of pur-
suing digital technology was higher than for a
larger incumbent and, hence, the inertia seems
to be very strong in this setting. It can be seen
in the case study how this forced Hasselblad to
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handle the disruptive innovation through
various collaborations and through an acquisi-
tion of digital capabilities.
Moreover, digital cameras could initially
not satisfy the demands that Hasselblad’s
high-end segment required. In contrast to this,
larger camera manufacturers such as Canon
and Nikon could develop capabilities in
digital photography while they were still pro-
ducing conventional cameras. These ﬁrms had
the sizeable resources that were needed in
order to undertake these kinds of ventures.
Furthermore, they were operating in the
amateur segment for cameras, which could
tolerate the lower performance that the dis-
ruptive technology initially provided.
However, it should be emphasized here that
there are several examples of large incum-
bents in the low-end segment of the camera
industry that encountered problems despite
having larger R&D budgets. One such
example is Polaroid (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000)
which initially sought to develop digital
cameras and complementary assets but failed
and after that focused on conventional
cameras. Since this pattern is to some extent
similar to what happened to Hasselblad,
incumbent size and strategy can clearly not be
the only factors that affect how established
ﬁrms handle disruptive threats. This paper
does not argue that these are the only, nor the
most important determinants; rather, it claims
that the particular characteristics of an incum-
bent affect the challenges in a disruptive shift
and that they consequently also need to be
considered when looking for managerial solu-
tions to the innovator’s dilemma.
Conclusions and Managerial
Implications
This paper has explored how certain incum-
bent characteristics inﬂuence the way an estab-
lished ﬁrm responds to disruptive innovation.
In particular, it has looked at the challenges a
medium size, top segment company faces, and
possible ways of handling them. It can be seen
in this case study that Hasselblad’s limited size
and its niche strategy made the ﬁrm highly
vulnerable to the innovator’s dilemma despite
the fact that the disruptive effects of digital
imaging were recognized and dealt with at an
early point. Having a small and demanding
customer base implied that Hasselblad became
highly dependent on these customers and also
lacked the resources to pursue extensive inter-
nal development projects.
Moreover, the case illustrates how the
managerial solutions to the innovator’s
dilemma are affected by the particular charac-
teristics of an incumbent. A relatively small
niche player like Hasselblad could eventually
survive the disruption through collaborations
and an acquisition. This ﬁnding suggests that
the heterogeneity of incumbents has been
downplayed by the previous literature and it
calls for further investigations to allow for the
development of a more nuanced view of how
established ﬁrms can respond to disruptive
innovations.
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Abstract 
Hasselblad, a Swedish high-end camera manufacturer, started in the early 1980s to 
explore how digital technology could be used in their industry. Throughout this decade, 
the company sought to learn more about digital imaging by developing applications such 
as the telephoto transmitter Dixel. However, increased competition forced Hasselblad to 
leave this segment in the early 1990s. Instead the company started to work on a new 
digital camera system. Among other things, this project resulted in a 6 Megapixel sensor 
in 1996, but the project was eventually terminated when a new owner changed the 
strategy of the firm. Being close to bankruptcy in 2003, Hasselblad was sold to a new 
owner which merged it with Imacon, a Danish manufacturer of digital backs. In 2005, the 
company could finally deliver a fully digital camera system on its own and survived the 
shift to digital imaging. 
 
Keywords: Hasselblad, digital imaging, photography, disruptive innovation, 
microelectronics, technology, management 
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Introduction 
Already in 1977, Intel’s co-founder Robert C. Noyce called attention to the rapidly 
increasing use of digital technology in many industries. While he argued that this trend 
would create a lot of entrepreneurial opportunities, Noyce also suggested that established 
firms will encounter major difficulties once their products are replaced by the new 
technology: 
 
“Time and time again the rapid growth of the market has found existing companies too 
busy expanding markets or product lines to which they were already committed to 
explore some of the more speculative new markets or technologies.”1 
 
Noyce referred to the fact that mechanical calculators and watches had been removed 
from the market in the 1970s and argued that more such displacements would happen in 
the future as digital technology would provide better performance at lower costs over 
time. 
 
In retrospect, it is striking how accurate Noyce’s prediction turned out to be. In industry 
after industry, digital technology has disrupted the former technology and created 
countless problems for established and highly profitable firms. Since Noyce’s article was 
written, many products such as telephones, music players, television screens, movie 
cameras and gaming machines have become digital. With few exceptions, these shifts 
have implied major difficulties for incumbent firms.2 Over the last decade, the camera 
industry has been subject to precisely this kind of turmoil due to the shift from silver-
halide photography to digital imaging. Several established firms have either encountered 
severe problems or gone out of business completely.3  
 
This article will describe how a small Swedish manufacturer of high-end cameras called 
Hasselblad tried to nurture and develop digital photography from the early 1980s onward. 
It provides a good illustration of how digital technology emerges in various high-end 
niche applications and how it later enters the mainstream markets and displaces 
incumbents. In doing so, the presented work contributes to the literature on disruptive 
innovation and to our understanding of how industries are digitized. The rest of the article 
is organized as follows. The next section provides some theoretical background regarding 
technological discontinuities, which is followed by a detailed chronological description of 
how Hasselblad sought to manage the shift to digital imaging. Subsequently, a more 
theoretical and historical discussion is given along with some conclusions. 
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Technological discontinuities and digital technology 
It is well documented today that established, successful firms often get into trouble under 
conditions of discontinuous technological change. 4  Several scholars have sought to 
explain what is sometimes referred to as “the incumbent’s curse” by looking at the 
supply-side and firm capabilities.5 For instance, Tushman and Anderson wrote about 
competence-enhancing and competence-destroying technologies. They argued that those 
technologies which render the technological skills of established firms obsolete tend to 
create major difficulties.6 Drawing upon a case study of how Polaroid sought to handle 
the shift to digital imaging, Tripsas and Gavetti pointed out that cognitive barriers among 
managers prevented the firm from commercializing the new technology.7  In another 
article, Tripsas studied the typesetter industry and argued that not only a firm’s 
technological competences matter. The impact on firm-specific complementary assets, i.e. 
assets which were not directly related to the technology but helped the firm to sustain its 
competitive advantage, also played a key role in a technological shift. 
 
In a series of articles from the mid-1990s, Clayton Christensen shifted the focus away 
from supply-side related factors towards looking at the impact a new technology has on 
the market. Drawing upon evidence from the disk drive industry, he argued that those 
technologies which were not initially demanded by a firm’s existing customers were 
particularly difficult to handle.8 Each new generation of smaller disk drives offered lower 
performance in terms of storage capacity and therefore started to prosper in lower 
segments or in new markets. The incumbents struggled to find a financial logic in 
entering an inferior technology which grew in a small, low-end niche of the market. As 
the performance improved, it eventually displaced the former disk drives and the 
established firms who were misled by existing customers. Christensen labeled those 
technologies which were cheaper, with initially lower traditional performance and some 
new attributes, as disruptive. Those technologies which kept satisfying a firm’s existing 
customers were referred to as sustaining. In his book, The innovator’s dilemma, it was 
shown that incumbents tend to win sustaining battles whereas entrant firms are better at 
introducing disruptive technologies since they are not held captive by an established 
customer base. 
 
Digital technology has often turned out to exhibit disruptive characteristics. It has often 
started off with inferior traditional performance while bringing new attributes to the 
market. The rapid pace of development associated with digital technology has made it 
attractive for mainstream customers later on and then displaced the former technology. 
For instance, Christensen and Raynor used the transistor radio as an illustrative example 
of this pattern.9 Compared to analog radios, it had a worse sound quality, but brought 
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some new attributes to the market, such as a lower price and portability. Therefore, it 
prospered among teenagers who could not afford a radio previously. This customer 
segment appreciated the portability and did not bother about the lower sound quality. In 
the 1950s, entrant firms like Sony created a mass market for transistor radios and, as the 
sound quality improved over time, this technology eventually displaced analog radios and 
established firms like RCA. 
 
Clearly, Christensen’s notions of sustaining and disruptive technologies have shed new 
light on how discontinuities happen. However, it is still a bit unclear how this framework 
fits with the nature of digital technology. The dynamics of digitization have often been 
described in terms of a rapid increase in performance along with declining prices. For 
instance, Intel’s other co-founder, Gordon Moore, predicted in 1965 that the amount of 
transistors that could be crammed onto an integrated circuit would double during every 
18-month period.10 This prediction has often been referred to as Moore’s law and can be 
thought of as a description of the rapid development of digital technology. While it is 
clear that digital technology has often brought some ancillary attributes to the market, it 
has usually, as Moore’s law would suggest, started off with poor performance and a high 
price. Consequently, it has in many cases initially prospered in very advanced segments 
which are not sensitive to prices, e.g. in military or scientific applications.11 Therefore, it 
is not obvious in what way Christensen’s framework, which focused on low-end 
applications, is compatible with the economics of digital technology. Christensen showed 
how the disk drive manufacturers were displaced when entrants introduced smaller drives, 
targeted low-end segments, moved up market and removed incumbents. Thus, it is not 
apparent whether this pattern is compatible with the growth of digital technology. By 
studying how and why digital imaging emerged in Hasselblad’s segment, this article will 
argue that digital technology is substantially consistent with the notion of disruptive 
technology, albeit in a way that is different from what has been suggested previously. 
 
Hasselblad and the early versions of digital cameras 
Hasselblad became a dominant player in the medium-format segment of the camera 
industry during the time after the Second World War. This small segment of the camera 
market used larger film than the normal 24*36mm format and was aimed for professional 
photographers with high demands on image quality. One reason for Hasselblad’s 
dominance was that its cameras were compatible with a wide range of lenses which were 
manufactured by Carl Zeiss, film magazines and other accessories that were used by 
photographers. Hence, a photographer who used a Hasselblad camera had great flexibility, 
but Hasselblad did not develop these products itself. The company became world-famous 
in 1969 when Neil Armstrong took the first photos on the moon with a Hasselblad camera. 
During the 1980s, the firm had about 500 employees in total and an annual turnover of 
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approximately 600 MSEK. The company showed relatively high profitability in these 
years, delivering annual profits of 50-60 MSEK. However, the medium-format segment 
decreased by about 40 percent from 1981 to 1985, mainly since small-format cameras 
became better and better.12 Despite this reduction, Hasselblad managed to sustain its 
revenues and profits in these years, mainly thanks to its strong brand. 
 
The camera industry had reached a mature phase towards the late 1970s. By that point, 
Japanese firms like Canon, Nikon, Olympus and Fujifilm had entered the scene and 
captured market shares primarily from European companies like Leica and Rollei. 
Technologically speaking, the industry had reached a point of saturation. Rolls of silver-
halide film in various formats were used in cameras that were essentially based upon 
precise mechanics. Though the first digital camera which used a Charge Coupled Device 
(CCD) had been exhibited in 1975 by Kodak, it had not caused any panic among the 
established firms. 
 
The entire camera industry was instead shaken in 1981 when Sony introduced its Mavica, 
the first fully electronic, non-film-based camera. The camera stored images on floppy 
disks instead of on film. It was presented as a still-video camera; images were captured 
by a CCD chip, transformed into electric signals which were handled by processors inside 
the camera, and thereafter stored on a floppy disk. 50 photos could be taken and viewed 
on a TV screen later. 
 
Many Japanese companies became concerned that this new technology would eventually 
replace their current products. A few years later, Canon, Fuji, and several other firms had 
developed their own versions of the Mavica which they exhibited at the annual Photokina 
fair. Photo journalists argued by that time that the camera industry would become 
computerized at the same pace as the calculator and watch industries had been during the 
preceding decade. 
 
At Hasselblad, the company’s CEO Jerry Öster tried to figure out how this potential 
threat should be handled: 
 
“I met with Sony’s CEO and the person behind the Mavica project. It soon became clear 
to me that the technology had so many drawbacks and limitations that it would not 
become a commercial success.” 
 
After having consulted Hasselblad’s R&D manager, Lennart Stålfors, Öster concluded 
that several technological breakthroughs were needed before the Mavica concept could 
threaten analog photography. Öster and Stålfors also agreed that digital imaging would 
have a future and that the company ought to learn more about the new technology.13 
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Hasselblad’s attitude toward digital imaging in the early 1980s is well captured by the 
following quote from Jerry Öster: 
 
“Even though I did not believe in the Mavica concept, I was convinced that the photo 
chemical film would in the future be subject to serious competition from electronic 
photography and would eventually be replaced by this technology.”14 
 
Hasselblad Electronic Imaging 
Instead of trying to develop a digital camera, Hasselblad started to explore the new 
technology through various applications. Lennart Stålfors had a background in electrical 
engineering and had previously been working on adding electronic features to the 
Hasselblad system. Among other things, he had been involved in a development project 
together with SAAB and a professor at the Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm, 
which concerned a machine for image analysis. The final product was named OSIRIS, 
and was primarily intended for digital analysis of images taken by aircraft and satellites. 
In the end, the project became a commercial failure – the price was too high and the 
image quality too low. After two years, Hasselblad therefore left the project in 1982.  
 
The insights Stålfors gained from this project made him realize that the technology for 
telephoto transmission, i.e. the sending of images over the phone line, was 
underdeveloped. Images lost considerable amounts of quality when being sent over the 
phone line. Consequently, photographers had to bring with them darkrooms in order to 
finish photos and send them. The equipment weighed 10-12 kilos, which in combination 
with the darkroom became a heavy burden for photographers. The analog technology also 
implied that small amounts of noise over the phone line would generate significant 
distortions of the images. Could Hasselblad perhaps use digital technology in order to 
create a telephoto sender that was faster and offered superior image quality? Such a 
product would clearly make the everyday life of the photographer much easier.15 
 
Jerry Öster thought that this was a good idea and Hasselblad now started to look for a 
potential partner. Lars Falén at Expressen – one of Sweden’s dominant newspapers by 
that time – was contacted. Hasselblad wanted someone to start using their coming 
product and thereby create attention around it. Falén thought that such a telephoto 
transmitter would be interesting to use during the Olympic Games in Los Angeles 1984. 
He explained that the newspaper only had 30 minutes until press stop after the last finals 
and he needed a product which would enable the last photos to be included. 
 
The development work started towards the end of 1982 and about five persons were 
involved at Hasselblad. With these scarce resources and a sharp deadline 18 months away, 
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the team worked very hard and eventually two functioning prototypes of the Digiscan 
joined when Expressen went to Los Angeles in July 1984. The name was an abbreviation 
of the Digital Scanner which could digitize film and offer 1-megapixel resolution of the 
scanned film. The images were sent via modem, directly from the Olympic stadium to 
Stockholm, Sweden. By doing so, the photographer gained about 40 minutes and 
obtained much better image quality.16 
 
The Digiscan became a great success for Expressen since the newspaper could get 
pictures in print faster than its competitors. The news agency Agence France Presse (AFP) 
became interested in the product and offered Hasselblad a visit to Paris in order to discuss 
a potential collaboration. The two parties agreed that Hasselblad would develop Digiscan 
further provided that AFP bought 40 of them, for 120,000 SEK each. AFP signed and 
paid one third of the sum up front, and this led to the development of the Dixel. 
 
Hasselblad’s work had initially started off as an ambition to learn more about digital 
technology and turned quickly into a business opportunity. The company now had to 
decide how the digital development should be organized. Digiscan had been developed 
by Hasselblad’s R&D department. It had taken some of the key staff into account and 
moreover, this project had been fundamentally different from the daily development work 
at Hasselblad. Jerry Öster thought that digital development should be put outside the 
parent company and therefore started the subsidiary Hasselblad Electronic Imaging AB 
(HEIAB) in 1985. The former R&D manager, Lennart Stålfors, became the CEO of the 
new company. Jerry Öster and Hasselblad’s CFO Bengt Ahlgren were also members of 
the board. In the annual report from 1985, Öster wrote: “The Dixel 2000 is a natural link 
for Hasselblad between the traditional chemical photography and tomorrow’s electronic 
image technology”.17  
 
Initially three employees worked at HEIAB. The ambitions were not very high in the 
beginning and the subsidiary was often regarded as an attempt to create knowledge rather 
than profits. The subsidiary had only six employees in 1986, but grew rapidly over the 
coming years. The Dixel was launched on a much bigger scale than the Digiscan and the 
demand for it grew quickly. During 1987, it was used at many large sports events, for 
instance the global athletics championships in Rome. As sales grew, HEIAB became 
increasingly profitable. The subsidiary had only cost 3.5 MSEK before it reached break-
even in 1988. 
 
Over time, several other products related to digital transmission and handling of images 
were developed. By the early 1990s, HEIAB’s turnover had grown to about 50 MSEK 
and showed good profitability. In 1990-91, 20-25 percent of the company’s total profits 
came from an organization that had only existed for a couple of years.18 
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Turnover 
(MSEK) 
Profit 
(MSEK) 
Profit Margin 
(%) 
1985 0 0 0 
1986 4 0 0 
1987 11 0 0 
1988 20 2,5 12,5 
1989 30 5,6 18,7 
1990 48,6 11,6 23,9 
1991 60 11 18,3 
1992 48 3,5 7,3 
The table above contains financial data about Hasselblad’s subsidiary, Hasselblad 
Electronic Imaging, during the years 1985-92.19 
 
The work at HEIAB generated valuable knowledge and created a new source of profit for 
the company.20 In the 1980s, the medium-format segment of the camera industry became 
increasingly saturated and was even subject to negative growth. Hence, the profits that 
came from HEIAB were needed in the mother company since it was hard to find new 
sources of growth within the core business. 
 
By the late 1980s, the uncertainty regarding digital imaging was still very high. Both 
Canon and Fujifilm had tried to launch their own versions of digital cameras without any 
success. Many electronic still-video cameras had been shown on camera exhibitions 
during those years. They all had two things in common: poor image quality and a high 
price. Since the early 1980s, photo journalists had claimed that analog photography 
would become history within the coming 2-3 years. Parallels were often drawn to the 
instant digitization of calculators and watches during the 1970s and early 1980s. By the 
end of the 1980s it was obvious that the same thing had not happened yet in the camera 
industry. 
 
The parallel to watches and calculators was in fact not entirely accurate. The most notable 
difference is that the digital technology in a calculator or a watch does not have to be 
light-sensitive. In the cases of watches and calculators, electronics displaced discrete 
mechanical parts inside the products. Cameras, however, were different. Both analog and 
digital cameras contain large amounts of optics, chemistry, precise mechanics and 
electronics. Moreover, the fact that an image sensor has to be light-sensitive implied that 
the demands upon digital technology were significantly higher within the camera industry. 
For instance, by the late 1980s, Nikon launched a still-video camera with 0.6 megapixels. 
A photo taken with an analog Hasselblad camera would correspond to about 36 
megapixels whereas a photo with small-format film would be similar to 10 megapixels. 
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Summing up, Hasselblad changed during the 1980s from having been a manufacturer of 
mechanical cameras to a company that also works with various elements of imaging. The 
scope of Hasselblad’s business had been extended and digital technology was the main 
ingredient in this change. 
 
“We should not become a new Facit!” 
”Hasselblad’s long-term survival may depend upon how much resources we invest in the 
development of a new digital camera.” 
CEO Jerry Öster at a board meeting, 10 February 199421 
 
As was concluded above, HEIAB became a great success. At its peak, the subsidiary had 
43 employees in 1992, but the times were about to change. Much of HEIAB’s success 
could be attributed to the telephoto transmitter Dixel. However, in 1992, Nikon launched 
a telephoto scanner which revolutionized the industry. It was better than the Dixel in all 
respects and consequently, sales diminished rapidly for Hasselblad. Responding to such 
formidable competition was not an option for a small niche player like Hasselblad, and 
therefore HEIAB instead focused on software over the coming years. Nikon’s hardware 
and HEIAB’s software came to dominate the market for a few years, but nevertheless, 
HEIAB had reached a dead end around 1993-94.22 
 
Another important change was also taking place in these years. After 16 years as CEO, 
Jerry Öster now left the company. Before leaving Hasselblad, he pointed out that the 
long-term survival of the firm would to a large extent depend upon how much resources 
the company spent on digital imaging. Incentive, the owner of Hasselblad, listened to this 
advice and started to look for a CEO who could take Hasselblad into the digital era.23 
Eventually they recruited Staffan Junel. He had a background as an engineer in computer 
science, with many years of experience from the telecommunications company Ericsson, 
and had long experience of working with digital technology. One of the first things he did 
as CEO was to gather the top management and all expert engineers in order to discuss the 
long-term prospects for the company. Junel recalls: 
 
“We tried to look into the future and understand where the company would be in 2010. 
This question inevitably drew us to the issue of the substitution of film by digital imaging. 
We agreed that 50 percent of our market would be digital somewhere around 2005.”24 
 
While some of the electronic engineers thought that this would happen even earlier, 
others argued that it would take more time. But they all agreed that digital technology in 
the long run posed a serious threat to the established camera industry. Junel thought that 
it was important for Hasselblad to develop its own digital products in order to obtain 
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knowledge that would be needed in the future. The board agreed that it was time to invest 
more in digital imaging. Therefore, a new division called digital photography was started 
inside the parent company in autumn 1993.25 The initial purpose was not to develop a 
digital camera, but rather to learn more and follow the development, especially in the area 
of image sensors. 
 
Junel recalls how top management kept repeating that “Hasselblad will not become a new 
Facit”. Facit was a Swedish manufacturer of mechanical calculators that collapsed in 
1971-72 due to the rapid shift to electronics. Ever since, Facit had been regarded as an 
infamous example in Sweden of what happens to firms when they oversleep 
technological shifts. 
 
The new division was headed by the former CEO of HEIAB, Lennart Stålfors. Since 
HEIAB was now in sharp decline, many engineers from the subsidiary moved to the 
digital photography division. After some time of knowledge development, Stålfors 
argued that the improvements in the area of image sensors had been so rapid that it was 
now time for the company to start developing a new camera system. Junel explained this 
to the owner and asked for more resources. Incentive wondered whether Junel was 
willing to terminate the analog development activities at this point. Junel argued that 
development of the analog system was still needed, but that it did not have to take place 
with the same intensity as before. The conflict between analog and digital development 
would become much stronger over the next years. However, Incentive agreed with Junel 
at this point and provided some more resources. Even though the company spent about 
twice as much on analog development, this should still be regarded as a major step into 
digital imaging for a small company like Hasselblad. After all, digital imaging would in 
many ways render the existing skills in precise mechanics obsolete. The company 
therefore sought to renew its competence base at an early point. Additionally, from 1992 
and on, Hasselblad sought to make their cameras compatible with digital backs. In 1994, 
several cameras could use digital backs, which enabled the photographer to see the 
images directly after they had been captured.26 
 
’Crystal Ball’ – development of a digital camera 
It soon became clear that digital imaging had properties which made it significantly 
different from analog photography. For instance, at this point it was virtually impossible 
to photograph moving objects when using a digital camera. Even though the image 
quality was surprisingly good at this early point, it did not correspond to what 
Hasselblad’s film-based images could offer. For decades, Hasselblad had relied upon 
superior image quality in their marketing activities. Additionally, image sensors were 
very expensive. However, digital imaging had other characteristics that could make it 
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attractive.  For example, images could be viewed instantly, and could be copied, sent and 
manipulated in a more convenient way. Moreover, an infinite amount of images could be 
captured at virtually no cost. In photography segments such as photo journalism, many 
images were digitized sooner or later, and digital imaging could remove one step in this 
process. 
 
These properties implied that the company had to look for niche applications where 
digital imaging could create more value than analog technology, despite its lower image 
quality and higher price. After having performed some market research, Stålfors and his 
colleagues thought that studio photography would be such a niche.27 In this segment, 
customers could be willing to trade off some image quality in order to capture, duplicate, 
manipulate and send images at a much lower cost. The fact that such a camera had to be 
big and stand on a tripod would not be a problem for this customer segment. The idea 
was to start off with small volumes, charge a lot of money (about 50,000 USD for a 
camera), then make incremental developments of the system and lower the price over 
time. It would initially be targeted at large studios, catalogue and product photography, 
and later on enter Hasselblad’s mainstream segment of wedding and portrait 
photography.28 The project was pursued under the name ‘Crystal Ball’, for two reasons. 
Firstly, the product would in the end look like a crystal, and secondly, one hoped that it 
would guide the company into the future just like a crystal ball. 
 
The engineers made sure to create a modular system in order to enable future 
improvements of each component. While the ambition was to create a commercial 
product, the main purpose was not to dominate the market with it. Rather it was an 
attempt to establish Hasselblad as a digital actor and have a system to start with for 
further development of different cameras. At its peak in 1996, the project involved more 
than 20 people at the company. 
 
As mentioned above, the image quality was relatively poor for a long time. However, in 
1993-94 one could obtain up to 16 megapixels by using several sensors or letting it slide 
over the object. But in order to launch a commercially viable product it was necessary to 
develop a sensor that had the right size and price. Therefore Hasselblad initiated a 
collaboration with Philips which resulted in a 6-megapixel sensor at a reasonable price. 
By that time, most image sensors had the shape of a square and were 2000*2000 pixels 
big. A 2000*3000 sensor would thus give a 50 percent better image quality, but since 
most images are cropped into a rectangular shape, the difference was in reality around 
100 percent, or more.29 For several years, Hasselblad was the only company that had 
access to this sensor, which of course gave them a competitive advantage around 1995-97. 
Several firms were interested in using the sensor – for instance, discussions were initiated 
with Agfa who wanted to buy the rights to use it.30 Moreover, this sensor offered perhaps 
12 
 
the best price/performance ratio on the market in those days.31  Philips was keen to 
collaborate with Hasselblad due to its strong brand and, in total, Hasselblad only had to 
spend about 2 MSEK on this project. This figure is about 60 percent lower than what 
Philips would have demanded from other actors. From this work, it would also have been 
possible to develop a 3*4 sensor of 12 megapixels later on. Hence, while being a 
collaboration where both parties contributed to the technical development, the project 
was very favorable on Hasselblad’s behalf. 
 
In parallel with the development of a digital studio camera, some minor changes were 
made to the analog system. A couple of models were developed and Hasselblad sought to 
diversify its system a bit. By offering a couple of models at a lower price, more 
photographers could use the Hasselblad system. But no major changes were made in the 
camera system during these years. At this point, Hasselblad had essentially sustained the 
same system for more than 40 years. Consequently, it had become very complex due to 
all small improvements over time. Competitors like Mamiya, Pentax and Contax were 
now introducing autofocus in their cameras, something that Hasselblad lacked and could 
not integrate into their current system. Hence, the need for a new camera system became 
more important over time and the analog development team grew increasingly frustrated 
over this fact. The development of a completely new camera system was considered in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, but management hesitated and eventually decided not to 
do so at this point. One reason for postponing this work was that they believed it would 
become too expensive for a small player like Hasselblad. 
 
Consequently, the company became more polarized in the mid-1990s. Digital technology 
had been controversial when HEIAB was founded in the 1980s, but it became even more 
sensitive when it came to developing cameras. Hasselblad had been split into two camps 
– one analog and one digital. They competed for the same pool of resources within the 
company and had fundamentally different ideas about what Hasselblad was, and what it 
was going to be.32 Under these circumstances, the company was bound to be a place with 
a lot of conflicts and fierce arguments. The project manager for Crystal Ball, Lennart 
Stålfors, thought that “I had to spend a disproportional amount of time defending the 
project instead of working with development activities.”33 But this was just the beginning. 
 
The ‘Big Berta’ camera and private equity 
”By the year 2000 digital cameras may replace film photography for most uses” 
MacWEEK 13th of May, 199434 
 
Towards the end of 1995, Incentive changed its scope of ownership and decided that it 
was time to sell Hasselblad. During the years that the company had owned Hasselblad, 
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large amounts of resources had been spent on digital technology. In that respect Incentive 
had maintained a long-term scope of ownership. However, once it had been decided that 
Hasselblad should be sold, the owner made sure to get as much as possible of the cash 
that had been accumulated in the company over the last decades. The firm had been very 
well capitalized, partly in order to be able to pursue one analog and one digital 
development project in parallel. This opportunity was lost through the dividends that 
were taken by Incentive before selling the firm.35 
 
Incentive sold its shares in Hasselblad to UBS Capital, the private equity branch of the 
Union Bank of Switzerland, to the British private equity firm Cinven and to Hasselblad’s 
management. Since UBS controlled 55 percent of the shares, the fate of Hasselblad was 
now in the hands of a Swiss bank. At Hasselblad and in the local media, people were 
concerned that the new owner lacked a long-term scope of ownership. UBS had declared 
from the beginning that they did not intend to own the company for more than 3-7 years. 
Moreover, UBS intended to do a leveraged buyout, i.e. to buy an asset with borrowed 
money, increase its value, sell it and thereby obtain a high return on equity. Hasselblad 
was therefore acquired partly by borrowed money, which was brought into the company 
that now had to pay off those interest rates. Hence, within only a few years the company 
went from being very well capitalized into being severely under-capitalized. Needless to 
say, this had a large impact on how Hasselblad could handle the shift from analog to 
digital photography.  
 
The new owner now had to make up its mind regarding the Crystal Ball project. Towards 
the end of 1995, a prototype was almost ready and the board was keen to see what 
progress had been made. As mentioned earlier, the camera had been developed in order to 
suit studio photographers. It was a very odd product and did not look like anything 
Hasselblad had offered previously. The camera could not be carried to the boardroom; 
instead, the board had to come to the room where it was standing in order to see it. The 
product looked more like a computer than a camera, stood on a tripod and was connected 
with wires to a computer where the images could be displayed. Afterwards, people at 
Hasselblad referred to the camera as ‘Big Berta’ since it was clumsy and had the same 
shape as the golf club with that name.36 
 
The new board became skeptical when they saw the prototype. One person who attended 
the meeting recalled that the product “was gigantic and did not even look like a 
camera.”37 Other people had a different point of view: 
 
“Those who understood the niche for digital technology saw its advantages and realized 
that the camera had a potential. But the board related it to the analog technology and 
therefore dismissed the camera.”38 
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All in all, it was not an easy task to convince a financially oriented investor that this 
camera was the right way to a successful leveraged buyout. The digital development team 
tried to underline that this was just a prototype and that it would only require an 
additional 13 MSEK or so before it could reach the market. Moreover, they tried to 
explain that a camera aimed for studio photography and catalog production did not have 
to be light and portable or offer stunning image quality. It was enough that plenty of 
images could be captured rapidly at a low cost and then be handled in a much more 
convenient way. Furthermore, the image quality was relatively high and pictures could be 
enlarged up to 0.5 square meters without any problems. Hence, the customer utility was 
in fact large, yet different from what Hasselblad had offered their customers previously. 
However, it should be underlined that the studio photographers at IKEA who saw the first 
prototype thought that it was too big and clumsy for them. Even within this segment it 
was after all important to move the camera, if only just slightly. 
 
Despite the above-mentioned advantages, the board remained very concerned after 
having seen ’Big Berta’. The new owner thought that such a product could harm 
Hasselblad’s brand and its image of being a high-end camera. Another issue that was 
raised at this point was the fact that digital technology had started to prosper in 
Hasselblad’s market segment in the shape of digital backs. A digital back was a 
component that could be added to an analog camera by removing the film magazine. The 
back contained an image sensor that captured the pictures electronically. Those backs 
were primarily manufactured by entrant firms such as Leaf Systems, Imacon and Phase 
One, but Kodak had also developed some products in this area. UBS appointed Andersen 
Consulting to perform an investigation into these issues during the end of 1996. They 
concluded that the industry would be subject to fierce competition once it became digital, 
and recommended Hasselblad to develop a solution based upon digital backs.39 
 
After having received more resources for many years, Stålfors and the digital 
development team were now suddenly in a lot of trouble. Questions were raised regarding 
why so much money was spent on things that were outside the company’s core 
competence. Moreover, the board had become increasingly frustrated over all deadlines 
that had not been met. Staffan Junel was a firm believer in digital imaging and kept trying 
to persuade the new owner that it was worth pursuing the initiated project. He failed, and 
eventually left the company since he could not enact a strategy he did not believe in. 
 
The division for digital photography made one last attempt. Since the board had 
concluded that the digital back solution was preferable to ‘Big Berta’, the electronic 
engineers sought to develop a digital back in a very short period of time. The 6-
megapixel image sensor was now built into a digital back, which had circuits pointing out 
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on both sides and was nicknamed ‘Mickey Mouse’ since it looked like the head of the 
same Disney character. The digital back was brought to the board meeting where it was 
going to be decided what should be done with digital photography. Stålfors and his 
colleague Carl Henrikson attached ‘Mickey Mouse’ to a Hasselblad camera, took photos 
of the board and showed it to them on a computer screen during the meeting. This little 
prank was not appreciated by the members, who remained firm in their decision to stop 
all internal development of a digital camera. The new board motivated their decision by 
saying that Hasselblad’s customers did not demand a digital camera.40 These turbulent 
events were very briefly summarized in Hasselblad’s annual report from 1996: 
 
"The board also decided that the digital activities should be changed towards a focus on 
marketing and sales”.41 
 
After this decision had been made, almost the entire digital development team had to 
leave the company. Only 3 persons were invited to stay in order to keep the company 
updated and pursue collaborations instead of developing products and technologies. 
Needless to say, the electronic engineers were very disappointed about this decision. In 
one internal discussion, the following statement was made on an overhead slide: 
 
“If the chemical waste from film processing could be turned into beer – film would have 
a bright future!”42  
 
Hasselblad had basically laid off all its digital capabilities, an asset that had been 
developed for almost 15 years in different ways. The company also lost its exclusive 
access to the image sensor that was co-developed with Philips. Contax tried to use the 
same sensor when developing a digital single reflex camera in the early 2000s, but 
eventually failed to launch a viable product. The decision to stop all digital development 
was made public in early 1997. A press release to Dagens Industri contained the 
following text: 
 
“The costly development of a new digital camera has been sold…the optimal digital 
camera will thereby have to be developed by someone else. By doing so, the company 
saves 15-18 MSEK…that can be invested in development of conventional cameras as 
well as adapting them to digital technology.”43 
 
Göran Diedrichs, UBS’ representative, defended the decision: 
 
“Digital technology is still in its infancy. When it has been developed further we will of 
course enter and then we need to have a strong financial position.” 
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In the same article, Diedrichs stated: 
 
“We have been a technology driven company up until now. We have to develop products 
that are interesting for the market.”44 
 
The description of the company’s history above suggests that Hasselblad had been a very 
market-oriented company over a long period of time. Over decades, the firm had 
succeeded in charging premium prices by relying upon clever marketing and sustaining 
its legendary brand. With the exceptions of HEIAB and the digital photography division, 
Hasselblad had not really pursued any development activities for many decades. Its 
analog camera system was essentially the same as it was in the late 1950s. The problems 
that Hasselblad would encounter over the coming years were largely related to the fact 
that the company had been too “market-oriented” over a long period of time. 
 
 
The shift to digital imaging 
The fact that Hasselblad had postponed all analog development activities and never 
created a new camera system in the early 1990s meant that the firm now started to lose 
market shares to its competitors. While the brand helped the company to keep its market 
in the short term, inferior products eventually resulted in lower volumes. Hasselblad 
therefore lost market shares to its competitors in 1997-1999.  
 
Consequently, it became more and more urgent to develop a new camera system. 
Therefore, the H1 project was initiated in 1998 with the purpose of generating a 
completely new system. The idea was to create a hybrid camera, one which would be 
compatible both with film and with digital backs. Moreover, the system would 
incorporate many new features such as autofocus. The company had not done anything of 
this magnitude since the 1950s, and this was one of the reasons why the project was 
severely delayed and in the end cost 320 MSEK. However, 50 percent of it was in fact 
funded by Fujifilm who, among other things, developed the lenses that were specified by 
Hasselblad and in return got the opportunity to launch the same camera in Japan under its 
own brand.45 The new system was not launched at full scale until late in 2002. During the 
period 2000-2003, Hasselblad suffered severely from a sharp decline in their analog sales. 
Professional photographers were rapidly changing to digital camera systems, primarily 
from Canon and Nikon. For decades, Hasselblad had dominated the segment of wedding 
and portrait photography. This part of the market was now lost within only a few years, to 
companies which had not been Hasselblad’s competitors previously. 
 
When the H1 finally arrived, it was not really a digital camera. While compatible with 
digital backs, it was delivered with a film magazine and therefore never really perceived 
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as a digital system. The freedom to shoot either analog or digital turned out to be of little 
use for photographers, who were instead frustrated by the fact that they had to buy digital 
backs separately. Moreover, such a system would cost about 100.000 SEK more than 
Canon’s or Nikon’s high-end cameras and, in the end, many photographers were not 
willing to pay that much for a Hasselblad system. Advanced Digital Single Reflex 
cameras which were smaller and cheaper, and offered sufficient performance, started to 
displace Hasselblad’s high-end products. Therefore, the H1 did not become the expected 
success and it could not really compensate for the rapidly declining analog revenues.46  
 
In November 2004, Hasselblad laid off 50 percent of its work force and balanced at the 
brink of bankruptcy. By that time, the company had gone from having about 500 
employees to around 75 in less than ten years. After having invested in digital imaging 
more than two decades earlier, Hasselblad was now about to repeat the infamous “Facit 
story”, even though its former managers had sworn that this would not happen. 
 
The company eventually survived through yet another ownership change and a merger 
with Imacon, a Danish manufacturer of digital backs. In 2005, Hasselblad could for the 
first time deliver a complete digital camera system on its own and became even more of a 
high-end company than before. The H system was very expensive and offered such 
extreme performance that it is primarily used today in very special applications. In the 
following years, the company made some upgrades to its new system and kept delivering 
profits until the recession in 2008. Since then, a couple more layoffs have taken place. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The story of Hasselblad’s long and troubled journey from analog photography to digital 
imaging provides some interesting evidence regarding how industries are digitized, and 
what challenges companies face in such shifts. One main challenge seems to have been 
that Hasselblad’s skills related to precise mechanics were to some extent rendered 
obsolete. In this sense, the shift to digital imaging was competence-destroying. 
 
Digital imaging also possessed some disruptive characteristics. It initially offered worse 
image quality, as well as some new performance attributes such as the ability to take an 
infinite amount of photos at a very low cost. However, it did not prosper in a low-end 
segment or in a new market as Christensen’s disruptive innovation framework would 
suggest. Instead, it grew in Hasselblad’s high-end segment in the shape of digital backs 
from the early 1990s onward. The main reason for this seems to be that digital technology 
could simplify the daily work for studio photographers. This description is partly 
inconsistent with the disruptive innovation framework, which posits that technologies 
with the above-mentioned attributes prosper in low-end segments or in a completely new 
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market. Hasselblad’s customers did in fact demand the new technology, and thus the 
main managerial challenge was not related to a lack of financial logic as stated by 
Christensen.  
 
The main problem seems rather to have been that digital imaging started to prosper 
around a new way of creating value, and Hasselblad was not used to delivering this kind 
of value to its customers. The market organization and the mechanical engineers thought 
that this technology was incompatible with Hasselblad’s brand, which could be regarded 
as its most important complementary asset. For a financially oriented owner with a short-
term scope of ownership, it was easier to focus on the core business of Hasselblad and 
develop the H1, which was a sustaining innovation in the sense that it resembled what the 
company had offered its customers previously.  
 
The typical “Christensen effect” of attack from below and a displacement of firms which 
listened to customers instead happened when the company lost market shares to Canon 
and Nikon. When combined with a digital back, the H1 offered superior image quality, 
but most photographers still preferred a smaller, cheaper DSLR camera which offered 
sufficient image quality. 
 
This pattern of disruption from below via a continuous miniaturization and decreasing 
prices can be seen in several industries which have been digitized. The first transistor 
radios were primarily targeted at the military and were very expensive. When the price 
levels declined and the performance improved, smaller and simpler versions of the same 
technology could be sold to consumers.47 Electronic calculators followed a similar pattern. 
They were first introduced in price-insensitive segments such as the military and 
scientific laboratories.48 In the mid-1960s, they entered the office machine segment and 
started to displace mechanical calculators. When prices had declined even further, small 
and cheap pocket calculators were introduced to the consumer market, and these products 
eventually turned out to be good enough for many professional applications as well. The 
description of how digital imaging initially prospered in Hasselblad’s high-end segment 
in the early 1990s can be regarded as another illustration of how digital technology grows 
in high-end segments by bringing new performance attributes to the market. As image 
sensors became smaller, cheaper and better, the dominant design for professional digital 
cameras shifted from medium-format cameras with digital back to high-end Digital 
Single Reflex cameras. Hasselblad chose to stay in the medium-format segment and 
consequently experienced declining sales in recent years. Few photographers are willing 
to pay so much more in order to get a camera which is bigger, heavier and offers a great 
image quality. 
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This pattern can be regarded as an effect of Moore’s law, i.e. the rapid decline in prices 
and increasing performance over time. Digital technology starts off as big, expensive and 
often with poor traditional performance such as image quality. However, it often brings a 
new value proposition to the market which still makes it attractive for high-end segments. 
As the performance of digital technology improves, it can eventually be miniaturized and 
enter lower segments, where the smaller versions eventually displace the bigger digital 
calculators, radios, cameras and disk drives. The process of low-end disruption as 
described by Christensen can therefore be thought of as a consequence of Moore’s law 
and the continuing decline in prices and improvement in performance. While the 
technology initially prospers in sophisticated segments, as was illustrated in the 
Hasselblad case, the low-end disruption happens later on. 
 
Summing up, Robert C. Noyce unintentionally managed to make a somewhat accurate 
description of Hasselblad’s fate, about 25 years before the company balanced at the brink 
of bankruptcy. Digital technology has created a lot of industrial turbulence, often by 
displacing precise mechanics, and established firms have struggled to survive those 
technological shifts. Hasselblad and the camera industry were no exception to this pattern. 
In 2004, the CEO of Hasselblad, Lars Pappila, stated that “the shift to digital technology 
was much more dramatic than we had expected”.49 Hasselblad was not the first, nor the 
last, company to end up in this way, despite all its efforts over several decades. 
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Abstract: The literature on disruptive technologies has previously stated that 
those innovations often emerge in low-end segments or in new markets and as 
the performance improves it eventually displaces the old technology. This 
article aims to explain how and why a technology may prosper in high-end or 
mainstream markets despite its initially lower performance and does so through 
three in-depth case studies. The findings suggest that those technologies may 
compensate the inferior performance by simplifying and removing work for 
customers. For instance, digital imaging emerged in high-end segments since 
these customers were willing to trade off the initially lower image quality in 
order to remove the usage of film. Based upon these results, the paper 
concludes that the literature on disruptive technologies needs to maintain a 
more nuanced view of value and how it is created and distributed inside the 
customer’s organisation. 
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1 Introduction 
For many decades, scholars have primarily looked inside the firm (e.g. Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986) in order to explain why established companies tend to encounter 
difficulties in the face of technological shifts. Christensen (1997) brought a different 
perspective upon this issue by looking at the firm’s external environment and argued that 
those technologies which initially underperform according to the demands of mainstream 
customers tend to be problematic for established firms. Christensen and Raynor (2003) 
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claimed that there are two forms of disruptive technologies, namely those which emerge 
in low-end segments and in new markets.  
Other scholars have stated that previous literature has largely overlooked the issue of 
high-end disruptive technologies (e.g. Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006). However, it is 
not entirely clear how and why a technology with lower traditional performance would 
emerge in a high-end application or in a mainstream market and more empirical evidence 
on this phenomenon is needed. 
This article explores how and why disruptive technologies may prosper in high-end or 
mainstream applications despite their inferior performance. It is done by conducting a 
detailed multiple case study of how three such technologies have emerged in high-end or 
mainstream segments in different industries. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section contains a 
theoretical exposition whereas the subsequent section provides a description of the 
methods used in this paper. Then the case studies are presented and analysed. The final 
part contains a discussion and some managerial implications. 
2 Theoretical Exposition 
It is well documented today that established firms may encounter difficulties in the face 
of discontinuous innovation (e.g. Utterback, 1994). A discontinuous innovation can be 
defined as a major change, related to either a technology or a business model (Veryzer, 
1998). Incumbent companies are usually good at innovation under steady, stable 
circumstances, but when technologies shift or new business models are introduced they 
can all of a sudden become vulnerable. Frequently, established firms struggle to survive 
these changes; they lose market shares and are displaced by entrants.  
Answers to this puzzle have often been sought by looking at supply-side factors and 
the firm’s existing resource base (Cooper and Schendel 1976; Henderson and Clark, 
1990). For instance, Tushman and Anderson (1986) wrote about competence-enhancing 
and competence-destroying innovations. They argued that innovations which destroy the 
value of a firm’s existing competencies are very difficult to manage, because established 
firms are bound by traditions, sunk costs and internal political constraints.  
Christensen (1997) rejected previous explanations of incumbent failure which had 
primarily looked inside the firm. Instead, he drew upon resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) in order to explain the decline of established firms. This 
theory suggests that a firm’s freedom of action is in fact controlled by actors outside the 
boundaries of the company. Since customers and owners are the key stakeholders that 
provide a firm with resources, they also impose a great indirect control of the decisions 
that are taken and how resources are allocated. In addition to this, Christensen applied the 
concept of value networks defined as “the context within which the firm identifies and 
responds to customer’s needs, procures inputs and reacts to competitors” (Christensen and 
Rosenbloom, 1995, p. 234) when explaining incumbent failure. 
Bower and Christensen (1995) argued that a key determinant of the probability of 
survival for an incumbent is whether the new technology addresses the preferences of 
actors in the existing value network. From this theoretical base, they explained the pattern 
of incumbent failure by making a distinction between sustaining and disruptive 
technologies. Sustaining technologies have in common that they improve the performance 
of established products along the dimensions that existing customers value. Disruptive 
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technologies on the other hand, initially underperform along these dimensions and at the 
same time bring new, ancillary technological performance attributes to the market. 
According to Christensen (1997) they are typically simpler and cheaper than the 
sustaining technology. The lower traditional performance and the higher ancillary 
performance create a large market uncertainty and make it difficult to find a financial 
logic in entering the new technology. At the same time the established firm finds it 
irrational to abandon its current, profitable customers in order to aim for a new market 
and an initially inferior technology. Incumbent firms are therefore “held captive” by their 
most profitable customers and as the performance of the disruptive technology increases 
it begins to attract customers and eventually displaces the former technology.  
Christensen and Raynor (2003) developed this theory further and suggested that there 
are two forms of disruptive technologies, namely those which emerge in new markets and 
those that prosper in low-end segments. The same authors also extended the theory by 
introducing the concept of disruptive business models, i.e. business models that target 
low-end customers or new markets, can be carried up-market and displace incumbents 
later on. Ryanair and the concept of low cost airlines can be regarded as one illustration 
of this notion. 
While Christensen’s work has shed new light upon the issue of incumbent failure, this 
theory suffers from a lack of clarity in the used terminology and several scholars have 
called for a more precise definition (e.g. Danneels, 2004). Govindarajan and Kopalle 
(2006) provided an expanded conceptualization of this notion when they suggested that a 
disruptive technology is a novelty that introduces a different set of performance and price 
attributes relative to existing products. These characteristics make it unattractive for 
mainstream customers and as the technology improves along certain parameters it 
eventually displaces the former product or technology. This definition is broader and 
could also include disruptive technologies which initially prosper in the high-end or 
mainstream segments of the market. The authors argue that there are several reasons why 
high-end disruptive technologies may create a dilemma for established firms. Mainstream 
customers may not value the new performance attributes, it may have an insufficient 
initial traditional performance, the market niche is too small and therefore it may not 
result in any significant profits. However, given its initially lower traditional performance 
it is not yet entirely clear how and why such a technology would emerge in high-end or 
mainstream segments (Danneels, 2004). There seems to be confusion in the literature 
regarding the seemingly paradoxical issue of high-end and mainstream disruptive 
technologies. The article aims to fill this gap by answering the following research 
question: how and why do disruptive technologies prosper in high-end or mainstream 
segments of the market, despite its lower traditional performance? Before presenting the 
illustrative case studies, some literature on value and business models is presented, along 
with the methodology employed in this paper. 
 
2.1 Value Creation, appropriation and business models 
Economists often refer to utility theory when trying to understand value. Total utility 
refers to the satisfaction that comes from the possession of a good (Bowman and 
Ambrosini, 2000). Several scholars have pointed out the subjectivity of value, i.e. a good 
can be of great value for one individual or firm and be of no use for another one (e.g. von 
Mises, 1963). In line with this, Menger (1950) made a distinction between use value and 
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exchange value. The exchange value is the paid price whereas the use value is the 
economic value that the buyer obtains from using the product. A positive difference 
between these two measures is regarded as a consumer surplus. Given that buyers may 
use a product for different purposes their use value differs and consequently they are 
willing to pay different prices. 
In order to understand why disruptive technologies may prosper in high-end or 
mainstream segments it becomes important to look more precisely at what use value they 
create for customers. Some of the recent work in this area has focused increasingly on the 
role of the market and the customer. Adner (2002) pointed out that the structure of 
demand needs to be addressed in order to clarify the nature and effect of disruptive 
technologies. Furthermore, Adner used the notion of thresholds, defined as critical 
performance levels that must be met. The functional threshold of a product is the 
minimum performance that the customer can accept whereas the net utility threshold also 
takes price into consideration. Slater and Mohr (2006) identified parallels between the 
work by Christensen (1997) and Moore’s book Crossing the chasm (2002) and underlined 
the importance of finding a nursing market for disruptive innovation. 
Though the abovementioned work has contributed to an increased understanding of 
how disruptive technologies create value this issue needs to be further addressed. One 
potential drawback of existing literature is that it has with few exceptions regarded 
customers as single entities in the value network, with one specific interest, rather than as 
organisations which comprise several actors with dispersed utility functions. Many 
technologies are developed for industrial customers rather than individual consumers and 
hence, innovations are often sold to organisations which can be regarded as value 
networks of their own. Therefore, it may be beneficial to look further into the customer’s 
organisation in order to understand how disruptive technologies create value and prosper 
in high-end or mainstream segments. 
Given that a disruptive technology brings new performance attributes to the market 
and that value creation is distinct from value appropriation (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 
2002), the new value may need to be appropriated in a different way. The business model 
can be regarded as a construct which addresses how a firm creates and captures economic 
value (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). Hence, a better understanding of how 
disruptive technologies create value is also needed in order to understand the challenges 
they impose upon incumbent firms and existing business models. 
Summing up, while several important contributions have been made by addressing the 
impact a new technology has on the value network of a firm, more needs to be known 
regarding how and why disruptive technologies may prosper in high-end or mainstream 
segments. This in turn calls for a better understanding of how such technologies create 
economic value. The article addresses this issue by investigating what traditional and new 
performance attributes the studied disruptive technologies brought to the market and how 
this new mix created value for customers. 
 
3 Method and Research setting 
This article is based upon three case studies of technological shifts that have or are 
currently taking place. Given that the presented research is of an exploratory nature 
seeking to understand an issue which has been insufficiently addressed by previous 
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literature, the method is deemed to be suitable. Moreover, the chosen method enables the 
kind of detailed descriptions that are required in order to address an issue which needs to 
be better understood (Yin, 1994). Case studies imply a limited generalisability from the 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, the article does not attempt to provide an 
exhaustive set of answers. Rather, it seeks to explain how and why disruptive 
technologies with a lower traditional performance may still prosper in high-end or 
mainstream market segments. 
The cases come from the calculator, camera and video surveillance industries and 
they are all related to a displacement of analogue or mechanical technology by 
microelectronics, i.e. digital technology. The industries and corresponding companies 
were targeted since they all have in common that the technology had disruptive 
characteristics (see table 2 for further information), but did not prosper in low-end 
segments or in new markets as predicted by the disruptive innovation framework 
(Christensen and Raynor, 2002). The first electronic calculators, as well as the first 
successful applications of digital imaging and IP-based, digital surveillance (IP video) all 
emerged in either the mainstream market or in high-end applications. Additionally, these 
technologies had an inferior performance along those dimensions that have been valued 
historically by mainstream customers. Digital imaging initially offered a lower image 
quality, electronic calculators started off as bigger and more expensive and IP 
surveillance had a lower image resolution and a higher price in the beginning. Hence, 
these shifts offer an opportunity to understand how and why disruptive technologies may 
prosper in high-end or mainstream applications, despite a lower traditional performance. 
Another reason for choosing these cases is that incumbent firms have struggled in these 
transitions, despite the fact that their customers initially demanded the technology. Hence, 
the pattern of displacement is different in these cases from the one described by 
Christensen (1997). Therefore they present an interesting opportunity to address how and 
why a disruptive technology does not initially prosper in low-end or new market 
segments as postulated by previous theory. 
In these three different industries, one corresponding company has been targeted. This 
was done in order to obtain insights into how these technologies have been 
commercialized in their early phases and how those firms tried to overcome the problem 
of offering a product with lower traditional performance. All the targeted firms were 
operating in high-end or mainstream segments. Table 1 below provides a summary of the 
gathered data. 
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Table 1.  An overview of the data used in the different cases 
Company and industry Interviews Secondary data 
Hasselblad and the shift to digital 
imaging. 
30 interviews, follow-up 
questions and discussions of 
in total about 100 hours. 
Minutes from board and top management 
meetings 1989-1995. Internal PMs, strategic 
documents and mail conversations. 
Facit and the displacement of 
mechanical calculators. 
Six interviews, totalling 
about 20 hours. 
All minutes from board and top management 
meetings during 1964-1972. PMs, internal 
investigations and reports from this period. 
An entrant firm that has driven the 
shift to IP VIDEO. 
7 interviews of in total 
about 15 hours. 
None. 
 
Former CEOs, R&D managers and people in charge of commercialization have been 
approached with open ended and semi-structured interview questions. Since these 
companies have been public, CEOs and people with strategic responsibility could be 
identified. A snowballing technique was used in order to find additional respondents.  
Given that two of the cases (digital imaging and electronic calculators) are historical 
studies, it was possible to identify people who had experienced the entire process of 
emergence and eventual dominance of the new technology. The shift to IP-based 
surveillance is currently taking place and hence, the same historical perspective could not 
be adopted. However, as the technology has been adopted by about 20 percent of the 
market and it has been around for more than ten years, it is still possible to study how and 
why it has emerged in the mainstream of the market. A large majority of the interviewees 
can be said to have had direct insight into commercial, technological and strategic issues 
related to the technological transition. The information retrieved from the other 
respondents should rather be regarded as important background knowledge. 
The questions concerned how the technology prospered and how it performed 
compared to the established technology along both the traditional dimension and the new 
attributes that were brought to the market. Additionally, questions were asked regarding 
how these innovations created value for customers and why they adopted it, despite the 
lower traditional performance. The respondents also described the challenges that were 
encountered when trying to develop and launch a technology with the properties 
mentioned above and how those were handled. While all of the collected secondary data 
did not directly concern the disruptive technology, additional information should still be 
regarded as vital since it provides important contextual information. The interviews and 
the collection of data were conducted from mid 2007 until late spring 2009. 
Collecting data by performing interviews may imply a biased interpretation (Yin, 
1994). This potential drawback was taken care of by approaching many respondents. 
Several follow-up interviews were conducted and compared with the written sources that 
have been accessed. In those cases when the sources contradicted each other, further 
interviews were performed. By doing so, the collected data has been triangulated. 
Moreover, the Hasselblad case description has been read by many of the interviewees and 
hence been further validated. 
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4 Results and Analysis 
This section contains a presentation of the results and an analysis of how and why 
disruptive technologies may prosper in high-end or mainstream markets. Table 2 on the 
following page provides an overall description of the studied companies and the 
disruptive technologies, their respective properties and how they created value for 
customers. 
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Table 2  An overview of the investigated companies and how the disruptive technologies created value 
Disruption Studied firm Time 
period 
Traditional 
Performance 
Price Ancillary 
Performance 
Value 
Proposition 
Changes in the value 
network 
The 
displacement of 
analogue video 
surveillance by 
digital, internet 
cameras (IP 
video). 
A European entrant 
firm which has 
driven the shift and 
grown rapidly over 
the studied time 
period. 
1996-
2007 
For a long time, the 
new technology 
offered worse image 
quality in terms of 
resolution and 
displayed images per 
second. 
Network 
cameras have up 
until 2005 with 
few exceptions 
been more 
expensive. 
Easier 
installation since 
fewer wires are 
needed. The 
cameras can be 
made more 
intelligent. 
Improved video 
surveillance at a 
lower total cost 
of ownership. 
IP Video is sold to the 
same customers, but to IT 
departments instead of 
security departments. 
Thus a change inside the 
customer’s organisation 
has taken place. 
From film-
based 
photography to 
digital imaging. 
Hasselblad, a high-
end incumbent firm 
which is famous 
for outstanding 
image quality. 
1990-
2005 
Hasselblad’s 
analogue photos 
corresponded to 
about 36 megapixels, 
the first digital 
versions in the mid 
1990s offered 4-6 
megapixels. 
Digital cameras 
were 
significantly 
more expensive 
up until the late 
1990s. 
Simpler 
production of 
pictures. Images 
could be viewed 
instantly and 
captured at no 
cost. 
A simplified 
workflow 
enabled an 
improved 
handling and 
images that are 
good enough. 
Sold initially to 
Hasselblad’s traditional 
high-end segment of 
studio photography. 
The substitution 
of mechanical 
calculators by 
electronic 
calculators. 
Facit, a Swedish 
manufacturer of 
office furniture, 
typewriters and 
mechanical 
calculators. 
1964-
1973 
Electronic calculators 
offered similar 
computing 
capabilities initially, 
but became better 
towards the mid 
1970s. 
In 1966, 
electronic 
calculators were 
about twice as 
expensive, but 
the price went 
down rapidly 
during the 
studied period. 
From the late 
1960s and on 
pocket 
calculators 
introduced 
portability and 
simplicity as new 
attributes. 
Similar up until 
the rise of pocket 
calculators. Then 
factors like 
simplicity, price 
and portability 
were introduced. 
Electronic calculators 
were sold to the same 
customers up until the rise 
of pocket calculators. 
Those were instead sold 
via bookstores and 
retailers in order to 
generate larger volumes 
and reach mass markets. 
   
  
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   High-end Disruptive Technologies with an inferior performance 9  
 
   Copyright © 200x Inderscience Enterprises Ltd. 
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
     
 
4.1 How high-end and mainstream disruptive technologies prosper 
The case studies presented in this article offer some interesting evidence regarding how 
disruptive technologies create value for high-end or mainstream customers, despite their 
lower traditional performance. Generally speaking, it seems that they emerge in market 
segments where the ancillary performance compensates the lower traditional value to 
such an extent that customers are willing to buy it anyway. In two of the three cases, the 
main reason for this was that the disruptive technology could remove work in the 
customer’s process and thereby lower their total cost. Hence, the technology created 
value on a more systemic level rather than on the level of each individual product. This is 
illustrated by the cases of digital imaging and IP video below. 
 
4.1.1 Hasselblad and digital imaging 
Over the last 15 years the camera industry has undergone a shift from film-based 
photography to digital imaging. The sales of digital cameras grew rapidly from the late 
1990s and on when cheaper and better cameras were launched at a high pace. Prior to this 
remarkable growth and the eventual displacement of film, digital imaging prospered in 
Hasselblad’s medium format segment of professional photography were a digital back 
could be attached to medium format cameras. These digital backs were primarily 
manufactured by entrant firms such as Leaf Systems, Phase One, Imacon and Jenoptik 
and were expensive complements to the dominant analogue technology. The main 
customer segment for these backs was studio photographers. Digital technology enabled 
these customers to view images instantly and removed the costly and time-consuming 
process related to using film. Additionally, those images were often scanned and 
digitized later on anyway and hence, digital imaging made the production of images 
much cheaper and simpler. Studio photographers were willing to trade off some image 
quality and pay a higher price since it could save days of downtime waiting for the 
transparencies to be finished. 
With these attributes in mind, Hasselblad sought to develop a new camera system in 
the mid 1990s which was based upon a 6 megapixel sensor that had been co-developed 
with Philips. The camera was intended for studio photography, a high-end niche which 
would hopefully be willing to pay a high price and trade off some image quality in order 
to remove film. Hasselblad was not used to offering this kind of value proposition and 
thus, the project met a lot of resistance inside the firm. The person in charge of the 
project, Lennart Stålfors, recalls that he “had to spend an un-proportional amount of time 
defending the project instead of working with development activities.” 
The project was eventually stopped in 1996 when a new owner changed strategy and 
decided to develop a new camera system that was compatible with both film and digital 
backs. When the shift to digital imaging came into full motion from 1999 and on, 
Hasselblad’s semi-digital medium format cameras were displaced primarily by Canon 
and Nikon who introduced advanced Digital SLR cameras which were simpler, lighter, 
cheaper and offered an image quality that was sufficient for most applications. 
 
4.1.2 IP-based video surveillance 
IP video surveillance was introduced by the studied firm in the 1990s. CCTV had for a 
long time been film-based and analogue. IP video is instead based upon digital 
technology using sensors, so the material is stored as digital files and not on video tapes. 
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Another difference is that digital cameras have an IP-number and are connected over the 
internet, instead of via cables. While the analogue technology is still dominating the 
market, digital video surveillance is growing rapidly and the studied firm is an entrant 
and one of the actors driving the shift from analogue to digital technology. About 20 
percent of the market is now based upon IP video solutions and this figure continues to 
grow. 
Over the last decade, IP video has improved significantly in terms of image quality 
and with the rise of megapixel cameras it has now outperformed analogue CCTV along 
this dimension. However, the technology was growing rapidly before reaching these 
performance levels. One of the main reasons for this is that they are much easier and 
cheaper to install since the cameras are connected over the internet. This implies a lower 
total cost for owning and maintaining a system. The studied firm seeks to communicate 
the benefits of IP-based surveillance by focusing on the total cost of ownership rather 
than the price of one single camera. 
Additionally, IP video has implied that surveillance has become both an IT and a 
security issue. One person in charge of technology development at the studied company 
states that installations of IP cameras are mainly performed together with the IT 
integrators and departments instead of with security departments. Thus, a shift has 
occurred inside the customer’s organisation and the value proposition has changed with 
the new technology. It has also turned out that IT departments are more easily convinced 
by the total cost of ownership argument and that they are more willing to use IP cameras 
since they understand the technology in a better way.  
So far, the incumbent firms have failed to dominate the new technology in the same 
way as they did with CCTV. Whether the established firms will survive this disruptive 
technological change or not remains to be seen. According to respondents at the studied 
firm, one reason why the incumbents have so far lagged behind in IP video appears to be 
that they do not know how to approach customers with it. The logic of selling to IT 
departments is new to the industry and the analogue players are not used to doing so. 
 
4.1.3 The creation of new value inside the customer’s organisation 
The cases of digital photography and IP video have in common that they created value in 
a new way inside the customer’s organisation, primarily by simplifying the work process 
and removing labour. Hence, it seems that the net utility threshold for a disruptive 
technology (Adner, 2002) can be lower in high-end or mainstream segments since these 
customers can use the technology in order to lower their overall expenses. While the 
price was higher and the technology was inferior in many ways, its ancillary performance 
attributes created a higher consumer surplus that could motivate the investment. The case 
of IP video also suggests that this threshold is different depending upon which actor is 
targeted inside the customer’s organisation. When selling to IT departments, the overall 
cost of owning a surveillance system could be lowered and this value creation 
compensated the higher price as well as the lower traditional performance in terms of 
image quality. 
This explanation of why a disruptive technology prospers in high-end or mainstream 
markets suggests that previous literature on this topic has maintained an over-simplified 
view of the customer and value creation. The framework developed by Christensen 
(1997) draws upon diffusion models such as the one stipulated by Rogers (1995). Those 
models assume a normal distribution of customers and an epidemic diffusion of 
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innovations. The case studies in this paper indicate that while such models highlight 
many important aspects of innovation diffusion, they may hamper the understanding of 
how and why some disruptive technologies succeed since they do not assume any 
heterogeneity inside the customer’s organisation. The IP video case illustrates that the 
forces of resource dependency can be imposed by different actors within the client 
organisation. The dominant analogue players in the CCTV industry are used to targeting 
security departments with another value proposition and they may therefore be “held 
captive” by one actor inside the customer’s organisation since security departments do 
not appreciate or understand IP video in the same way. This finding suggests that 
previous literature on disruptive technologies has not yet addressed the subjectivity of 
value (Menger, 1950) to a sufficient extent. While the use value differs between different 
customers, it can also differ inside the customer’s organisation and this creates a problem 
for incumbent firms. The consumer surplus is higher for clients if IT departments are 
involved in the installation of IP video systems and this is one of the main reasons why 
the technology could prosper in mainstream segments despite its higher price and initially 
inferior traditional performance. Therefore it seems to be suitable to apply more of an 
adopter perspective and look further into how disruptive technologies actually create 
value inside the customer’s organisation. Consequently, the concept of value networks 
needs to be nuanced within the field of disruptive innovation. 
 
4.2 Why Technologies with lower performance emerge in high-end segments 
The case studies presented above suggest there are several reasons why a disruptive 
technology does not prosper in low-end segments or in new markets, but rather in 
mainstream and high-end segments. As was described earlier, it seems that those 
technologies may simplify and remove a lot of labour for the customer and that this can 
compensate the lower traditional performance and the higher price. Customer segments 
which have a more labour intensive business such as studio photographers or installers of 
video surveillance benefited extensively from this. Another important reason seems to be 
the high price that was associated with the technologies initially which made it 
impossible for low-end customers to afford them. The price parameter seemed to be the 
most important determinant of why electronic calculators initially emerged in high-end 
segments and later on entered lower segments as well as created new markets. 
Electronic calculators that are based upon transistors were first introduced in the early 
1960s. Those were mainly used in order to perform advanced calculations in very 
specific military and scientific applications. As the technology became cheaper and 
smaller over time it entered Facit’s office machine segment in 1964-65. Since Facit’s 
competence base was related to mechanics, the company decided to collaborate with 
Sharp and thus bought their calculators and gave them a Facit design. The electronic 
desktop calculators that Facit sold from 1966 and on had similar computing capacity as 
the mechanical calculators. Therefore, they could simply replace the mechanical 
calculators at this point since the product offered similar performance and consequently 
also prospered in the same value network as the former technology. This strategy 
prevented Facit from loosing market shares initially. However, when integrated circuits 
were introduced in calculators from 1968 and on the pace of development was increased 
to such an extent that it wasn’t possible any longer to re-badge calculators from another 
company. Moreover, the rapid development of integrated circuits implied a rapid decline 
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in prices and a miniaturization of the products that later on made them appealing to 
consumers. At this point, Facit’s business to business sales model was rendered obsolete 
since calculators could be bought anywhere. Göran Arvidsson, who was a member of the 
top management group by that time said that the entire office machine industry suffered 
due to these changes. The established firms had built strong relations with their 
customers and had their own sales offices. With the shift to electronics both the 
technological competence and the sales model were rendered obsolete. Consequently, 
Facit suffered from severe losses in 1971-72 and was eventually acquired by another 
company in late 1972. 
This case provides a compelling description of how important the price parameter is 
and it suggests that the literature on disruptive technologies ought to treat this dimension 
more carefully than just stating that a disruptive technology is ‘typically cheaper’ 
(Christensen, 1997). While the diffusion approach to disruptive technologies failed to 
explain how and why digital imaging and IP Video prospered in high-end applications, it 
seems to be valid in the case of electronic calculators. Electronic calculators followed a 
more linear diffusion pattern since it did not create any new value inside the customer’s 
organisation initially and did so in a top-down way due to the rapid decline of prices and 
increased performance over time. 
The case studies above give a further confirmation that disruptive technologies may 
initially prosper in high-end or mainstream segments. These observations also suggest 
that the extended definition provided by Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) is therefore 
more suitable since it includes events that would have been disregarded when using 
Christensen’s (1997) original definition. 
 
5 Discussion and managerial implications 
While Christensen (1997) illustrated how difficult it is for incumbent firms to enter lower 
segments and commercialize an initially inferior technology, it seems to be equally tricky 
to approach existing customers, even though they would benefit from adopting such a 
technology. The case study about Hasselblad provides evidence on how firms struggle 
when bringing a new value proposition to existing customers. It indicates that companies 
need to experiment with new business models in order to succeed with disruptive 
technologies since they bring a new value proposition to the market. Lennart Stålfors, the 
R&D manager in charge of digital imaging at Hasselblad recalls how the issue of digital 
imaging tended to create tension and conflicts inside the company. The market 
organisation was reluctant to bring an initially inferior image quality to their customers 
since it could harm the brand of the company. Given that there was in fact a demand for 
this product, the challenges were not primarily related to resource dependency as stated 
by Christensen (1997). Rather, the disruptive technology was problematic since it was 
not compatible with the value proposition Hasselblad had previously offered. Hence, 
firms seem to struggle when developing disruptive initiatives because they break the 
existing linkages between the technology and the business model. 
Trying to renew an established business model is therefore not only a matter of 
finding a customer which demands the technology. It is also an issue related to political 
power both inside the firm and inside the customer’s organisation. If value is created on a 
different level and the disruptive technology prospers in another part of the organisation, 
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some actors may lose influence at the expense of others. For instance, when IP video is 
sold to IT departments this reduces the status of security departments and a political 
barrier to adoption may occur. The disruptive innovation theory could therefore benefit 
from maintaining a more nuanced conceptualization of value networks. The case of IP 
video indicates that there are several different actors inside the customer’s organisation 
who may block the adoption of a disruptive technology. Given the subjectivity of value 
(Menger, 1950), these actors need to be mapped and understood in terms of their 
incentives and activities. Finding a business model that aligns different incentives within 
the customer’s organisation therefore seems to be a key success factor. 
One of Christensen’s (1997) most influential recommendations is that in order to 
succeed with a disruptive technology it is necessary to launch an independent 
organisation which can prosper in a different value network. However, it is far from 
obvious that this can be done when addressing existing customers like Hasselblad had to 
do. Since the technology emerged in the same segment as analogue photography the 
company became reliant upon the established market organisation and it turned out that 
they were reluctant to bring a technology to the market which did not offer the superior 
image quality that was associated with Hasselblad’s brand. 
The case studies about Hasselblad and Facit also illustrate how the value proposition 
changed over time and how this augmented the difficulties related to surviving the 
technological shift. The early versions of digital imaging prospered in a high-end, niche 
segment by removing work as has been described above. However, from 1999 and on, 
digital Single Lens Reflex cameras started to disrupt Hasselblad’s semi-digital medium 
format cameras for professional photographers. These cameras were simpler, cheaper and 
offered sufficient image quality. Hence, they attacked from below and disrupted 
Hasselblad in exactly the way described by Christensen (1997). The same thing happened 
when the simpler, cheaper and portable pocket calculators disrupted Facit’s mechanical 
and electronic calculators for office use. Thus, the classical low-end disruption occurred 
after the technology had initially prospered in higher segments. This development over a 
short period of time increased the difficulties related to surviving the technological shift 
since the initial value proposition was different from the one that later on came to 
dominate the market. Working with lead-users (von Hippel, 1988) in the early phases like 
Hasselblad did with studio photographers is therefore problematic since these customers 
had preferences that differed largely from the ones in the mainstream market when the 
technology had matured later on. 
 
5.1 Conclusions and future research 
While previous work on disruptive technologies has contributed to an increased 
understanding of how and why established firms may decline when new technologies are 
introduced, this stream of literature has so far not succeeded in explaining how and why 
such initiatives may prosper in high-end or mainstream markets segments. 
The abovementioned issue has been addressed in this article both by providing 
empirical evidence on this issue and by drawing upon literature about value and business 
models. The cases in the paper suggest that disruptive technologies may prosper in high-
end or mainstream segments by introducing ancillary performance attributes that create 
economic value on a more systemic level inside the customer’s organisation, for instance 
by simplifying and removing time consuming work. This value creation seems to 
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compensate the lower traditional performance that was associated with the disruptive 
technology. This finding implies that the literature on disruptive technologies has so far 
suffered from an over-simplified view of customers and that the subjectivity of value 
inside the customer’s organisation has not been sufficiently captured. Moreover, it has 
been argued that it is more relevant to look at how value is created, rather than addressing 
different performance dimensions. 
Additionally, the initially higher price that was associated with the studied 
technologies implied that they could only prosper in such segments and therefore it can 
be concluded that the literature on disruptive technologies needs to treat the price 
parameter more carefully than has been done previously. 
The findings in this paper seem to suggest that the challenges related to disruptive 
innovations which prosper in a firm’s existing customer segment are different from those 
described by Christensen (1997). Previous theory on disruptive innovation has stated that 
the main challenge is related to managing the internal resource allocation process. When 
a disruptive technology prospers in a mainstream or high-end segment, firms seem to 
struggle for other reasons, which are primarily related to the new value proposition and 
its compatibility with the existing network structure in terms of value distribution and 
systemic changes inside the customer’s organization. Therefore, a more nuanced 
conceptualization of the term value network seems to be needed. 
These conclusions indicate that more detailed studies of what effects disruptive 
technologies have inside the customer’s organisation may be one way forward for future 
research into why technological shifts tend to create such problems for incumbent firms. 
Furthermore, the findings above suggest that many of the managerial solutions related to 
disruptive innovation are not necessarily valid when a technology prospers in high-end or 
mainstream market segments. Little is known about how firms can actually work 
proactively in order to renew their business models. This article has offered some 
tentative guidelines for doing so, which are related to mapping, understanding and 
aligning incentives throughout the value network. More research is needed regarding how 
firms can actually succeed in changing their business models to match the new value 
proposition that disruptive technologies tend to create. 
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Abstract 
The concept of disruptive innovation has received increased attention over the last decade. 
This stream of literature has increased our understanding of incumbent failure in the face of 
technological change by looking at the control that profitable customers impose on 
established firms. However, there are several issues which haven’t been sufficiently 
addressed thus far. This article adds to existing theory on the subject by drawing upon 
literature on networks and utility theory. Previous literature on the topic has put an emphasis 
on the different performance characteristics of a disruptive innovation. We shift the focus of 
attention towards the utility that it creates for customers, and how this is done. Moreover, we 
adopt a different notion of networks, arguing that an over-simplified view upon customers 
has been maintained previously. In doing so, we provide an extended and more nuanced 
conceptualization which reveals a couple of challenges and potential managerial solutions. 
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1 Introduction 
It is well known today that firms can become more innovative by interacting with their 
surrounding network (Chesbrough, 2003). However, a strong network may also hamper 
innovation efforts. The theory on disruptive innovation has pointed out that incumbent firms 
struggle under conditions of discontinuous change since they get stuck in their established 
value networks (Christensen, 1997). 
While this literature has contributed to a better understanding of incumbent failure and the 
role of networks, there are several elements of the theory of disruptive innovation that have 
been questioned (Markides, 2006; Danneels, 2004), and these need to be addressed in order 
to provide a more coherent framework that allows us to understand this phenomenon better. 
This article aims to add to existing theory on disruptive innovation and does so by drawing 
upon different literature streams on networks and utility theory. It starts with an exposition of 
existing theory on disruptive innovation and moves on to a discussion of issues that this far 
have been insufficiently attended to. The paper then describes network and utility theory, 
constituting two bodies of literature that can potentially extend and refine the ideas regarding 
management of disruptive innovation. This literature is in the subsequent section used in 
order to address previously identified weaknesses regarding disruptive innovation. Based on 
the theoretical discussion, some conclusions and managerial implications are given. 
 
2 An exposition of disruptive innovation theory 
As mentioned previously, the literature on disruptive innovation has presented new 
explanations of how and why incumbent firms encounter problems under conditions of 
discontinuous change. Previous literature had primarily looked at supply-side factors. A 
prominent example of this literature stream is the work by Tushman and Anderson (1986), 
who wrote about competence-enhancing and competence-destroying innovations. They 
argued that innovations which destroy the value of a firm’s existing competencies are very 
difficult to manage, as established firms are bound by traditions, sunk costs and internal 
political constraints. Henderson and Clark (1990) nuanced those arguments by introducing 
the concept of architectural and component level innovation. Similar explanations have been 
provided by Clark (1985), Tripsas (1997) and Cooper and Schendel (1976). 
In his seminal work, Christensen (1997) proposed an alternative explanation of incumbent 
failure. Instead of looking inside established firms, he focused on the external environment, 
drawing upon resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and the concept of 
value networks (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995). Resource dependency essentially 
posits that organizations are open systems which depend on resources from parties outside 
the organizational boundaries. Hence, a firm’s freedom of action is in fact controlled by 
actors outside the boundaries of the company, e.g. customers and investors. Since the 
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customers and owners are the key stakeholders that provide the firm with resources, they also 
impose a great indirect control on what decisions are taken and how resources are allocated. 
This perspective is manifested in Christensen’s research in the concept of value networks, 
defined as “the context within which the firm identifies and responds to customer’s needs, 
procures inputs and reacts to competitors” (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995, p. 234).  
Based on this reasoning, Christensen explains the pattern of incumbent failure by making a 
distinction between sustaining and disrupting technologies. Sustaining technologies have in 
common that they improve the performance of established products along the dimensions 
that existing customers value. Disruptive technologies, on the other hand, initially 
underperform along these dimensions. They are described as normally being simpler and 
cheaper than the established technologies. Therefore, they are not the demanded initially by 
the incumbent’s customers and thus, the firm fails to invest in disruptive innovations. As the 
performance of the disruptive technology increases it begins to attract customers from the 
sustaining technology, eventually displaces it and puts the incumbent in trouble. Christensen 
referred to this pattern as the innovator’s dilemma, arguing that the same management 
technique which made a firm successful under conditions of disruptive change cause it to 
fail. Christensen and Raynor (2003) further developed the ideas about disruptive innovation, 
utilizing the concept of value networks. One important aspect of their framework is the 
distinction between low-end and new market disruptions. Low-end disruptive innovations 
evolve in the lower segments of the market, typically by having a business model which 
enables the firm to offer cheaper products with a performance that initially is inferior. New-
market disruptive innovations prosper by approaching customers that have not been 
addressed previously. 
 
3 Disruptive Innovation – some areas in need of development 
While the work by Christensen, and then in particular the ideas about value network lock-ins, 
has contributed greatly to an increased awareness and understanding of the challenges related 
to discontinuities, there are still many questions that this far have not been sufficiently dealt 
with. This section will try to point out some of these outstanding issues, which are primarily 
related to how such innovations create value and the impact they have on established 
networks. 
 
3.1 A diffusion approach to innovation 
One potential weakness of Christensen’s framework is that the theory seems to be based 
upon a diffusion perspective on innovation. The graph Christensen (1997) uses to explain the 
pattern of disruption looks at different customer segments. It essentially suggests that a 
disruptive technology prospers in low-end segments or in new markets and later on invade 
the mainstream market. Hence, existing literature has to a large extent maintained a 
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diffusion-oriented perspective on customer attributes such as the one developed by Rogers 
(1995) and later on used by Moore (2002). 
Several contributions to the theory of disruptive innovation indicate that a diffusion approach 
has prevailed. For instance, Slater and Mohr (2006) identified parallels between the work by 
Christensen (1997) and Moore’s book Crossing the chasm (2002) and underlined the 
importance of finding a nursing market for disruptive innovation. Linton (2002) built upon 
diffusion forecasting techniques and integrated it with theory on disruptive innovation. Adner 
(2002) pointed out that the structure of demand needs to be addressed in order to clarify the 
nature and effect of disruptive innovations. Moreover, Adner used the notion of thresholds, 
defined as critical performance levels that must be met. The functional threshold of a product 
is the minimum performance that the customer can accept whereas the net utility threshold 
also takes price into consideration. 
While the diffusion approach has contributed to a better understanding of incumbent failure, 
we would argue that it is overly simplistic in order to explain the specific pattern of adoption. 
An over-simplified view of the customer may conceal some important challenges, 
particularly in business-to-business settings, where the customer is in fact a set of different 
actors who may have diverging utility functions. Seligman (2006) argues that the adopter is 
often treated as a black box and that it needs to be understood in a better way. This criticism 
seems to be valid in the case of the literature on disruptive innovation.  
 
3.2 How do disruptive innovations create value? 
The literature on disruptive innovation is also somewhat unclear regarding how the 
innovations create value for the customer. For instance, Christensen (1997) states that 
disruptive technologies are typically cheaper and bring new performance attributes to the 
market, while having lower performance along the dimensions focused on for the established 
products. But how exactly does a disruptive technology create value and what challenges are 
related to commercializing such an innovation?  
One reason why this question has not been sufficiently understood is that the disruptive 
innovation theory has a strong focus on performance dimensions, rather than economic value 
and total utility. An analysis of the market impact of a technology needs to look at the 
performance of the technology, but should do so in order to identify the value a user obtains 
from acquiring it. Several scholars have pointed out the importance of both looking at 
performance attributes and how these are translated into value for the customer (Oskarsson 
and Sjöberg, 1991; Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984). Value can be created in several different 
ways inside the customer’s organization. Activities may be changed or removed completely. 
Moreover, the utility that a disruptive innovation creates can imply a new distribution of 
value. In a business-to-business setting, these issues would most likely be overlooked when a 
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diffusion-oriented perspective focusing on performance dimensions is maintained. Hence, the 
notions of value and utility need to be nuanced. 
 
3.3 Where do disruptive innovations emerge? 
Lately, the theory of disruptive innovation has been extended, both in terms of its definition 
and its applications. Govindarajan and Kopalle (2006) argued that Christensen’s original 
definition was too narrow since it only took cheaper, simpler and initially lower performance 
products into consideration. They proposed a broader definition, which would also include 
technologies that initially emerge in higher segments. Utterback and Acee (2005) also called 
for an expanded view of disruptive technologies. They noted that many technologies such as 
electronic calculators, fuel injectors and wafer boards were not initially cheaper or simpler 
than the technologies they later on came to replace. Danneels (2004) asked whether 
disruptive innovations are never valued by mainstream customers. Govindarajan and Kopalle 
(2006) provided an extended conceptualization of disruptive innovation when they suggested 
that a disruptive technology is a novelty that introduces a different set of performance and 
price attributes relative to existing products. These characteristics tend to make it unattractive 
for mainstream customers, but as the technology is improved along certain parameters it 
eventually displaces the former product or technology. This definition is broader and could 
also include disruptive technologies which initially prosper in the high-end or mainstream 
segments of the market. The authors argue that there are several reasons why high-end 
disruptive technologies may create a dilemma for established firms. Mainstream customers 
may not value the new performance attributes, it may have an insufficient initial traditional 
performance, the market niche is too small and therefore it may not offer any significant 
profits. 
One consequence of maintaining an insufficiently nuanced view upon customers and the 
value proposition is that it becomes difficult to understand in what market segments a 
disruptive innovation may prosper. The question of where disruptive innovations start has up 
until now not really been adequately answered, and one reason for this may be that a 
mainstream disruptive innovation could be thought of as a contradiction in terms. Given that 
resource dependency and the concept of value networks are the main pillars of Christensen’s 
theory, an innovation which prospers in a mainstream market would by definition not be 
regarded as disruptive. However, given that disruption is a relative phenomenon (Christensen 
and Raynor, 2003), virtually all disruptive innovations should prosper in a mainstream 
market for some firm, unless it creates a completely new market. Would those firms which 
are operating in a segment where the disruptive innovation emerges be better off than others? 
And if not, what challenges would they encounter when trying to bring a new, potentially 
beneficial value proposition to an established customer?  
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3.4 How can incumbents succeed with disruptive innovation? 
Christensen’s most powerful managerial recommendation regarding disruptive innovation is 
that such initiatives must be put into an independent organization. By doing so, he argues that 
these attempts can be protected from the forces of resource dependency, which tend to drain 
those initiatives since there is no obvious financial logic in pursuing those initiatives. 
While this recommendation has turned out to be useful for many companies (Christensen, 
2006), more knowledge is needed regarding how incumbent firms can successfully manage 
disruptive innovations. Danneels (2004) underlined the importance of developing a 
“customer competence” in order to succeed with disruptive innovation, but did not specify 
what constitutes such a competence or how firms can develop it. 
One main difference between Christensen’s notion of disruptive innovation and previous 
work on discontinuities is that he drew upon a different theory stream, highlighting the 
importance of firm-external stakeholders and thereby identifying completely new 
explanatory factors. Having argued that established firms are “held captive” by their most 
profitable customers, the managerial solution inevitably became related to how the firm’s 
resource allocation mechanisms should be changed in order to overcome this barrier. Hence, 
Christensen stresses the impact that customers have on the firm’s internal organization, but 
pays limited attention to how firms can actually manage their networks, to the extent that 
these actually are possible to influence. 
 
3.5 Can business models be disruptive? 
Some scholars (Christensen and Raynor, 2003; Charitou, 2001) have taken this even further 
by addressing the topic of disruptive business model innovation, i.e. innovations which are 
not technological, but instead change the business models used by firms. Even though this 
concept is still not particularly well defined, it provides a useful perspective on how firms 
create and appropriate value. Markides (2006) contested this notion and argued that business 
model innovation was a significantly different phenomena than the one originally described 
by Christensen (1997). Christensen (2006) however provided a nuanced and extended 
argument when he framed the fundamental problem of disruptive innovation as primarily a 
business model problem, and not necessarily a technological problem. While such a 
definition may be broader, it arguably also results in some confusion since it would require a 
more thorough understanding of business models and the related bodies of literature. 
Moreover, such an extension would also imply several new challenges that need to be faced 
by management. 
Summarizing the above, we can conclude that the by now substantial work on disruptive 
innovation has shown the importance of looking at the demand side in order to understand 
the competitive dynamics related to this specific type of innovation. However, we also see 
that as long as the theory regarding disruptive innovation draws narrowly upon resource 
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dependency and the concept of value networks, it will most likely not be able to address 
several of the important shortcomings mentioned above. Consequently, the underlying 
theoretical framework needs to be modified into a more comprehensive one. It has been 
argued above that the raised issues can be understood by looking more carefully at the 
notions of value and networks. Below, a literature review on these topics is provided, which 
will be applied later in the article in order to generate a potentially improved understanding 
of disruptive innovation. 
 
4 The network approach 
Since the early 1980s, the interaction approach to understanding business-to-business 
marketing (Hallén, 1982; Håkansson, 1982) has received increased attention. This 
perspective materialized from a critique of those neo-classical economic models which 
assumed individual action and independence. These thoughts were later on developed into 
what is often referred to as the network approach (Håkansson, 1987; Håkansson and Snehota, 
1989). These scholars argued that existing literature on market practices missed out on the 
interdependence that characterized many relations between customers and suppliers. Instead 
of looking at markets as homogeneous and without any friction, they argued that a market 
consists of actors that are interrelated and depend upon each other and that this aspect was 
not sufficiently captured by other theories of the firm (Håkansson, 1990). Networks can be 
thought of as separated from the more traditional notions of markets and hierarchies.  
In order to study how firms interact, network scholars regard companies as actors which 
employ resources in order to conduct activities. Actors have different objectives, scale and 
scope and are embedded in a network where they depend upon other actors. However, they 
should still have some degree of autonomy in order to be regarded as actors. Activities 
concern the transformation and transaction of resources into interdependent activity cycles 
and webs of transactions. Resources are also thought of as heterogeneous and can be 
comprised of tangible assets like capital and land, but also as intangible assets like 
knowledge, competence and skills (Håkansson & Johanson, 1992; Håkansson & Snehota, 
1995). 
No single actor can control all the required resources or performs all the related activities 
throughout the chain of transactions. Hence, resources and activities are interrelated with 
other resources and activities and therefore, actors also become interdependent and are 
exposed to uncertainty. These networks are held together by mutual interest, however, there 
is always a mixture of intersecting and diverging interests present in these relationships 
(Håkansson, 1989). 
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4.1 Interdependence in industrial networks 
Due to the abovementioned interdependence, network theories of the firm claim that a firm’s 
behavior is largely controlled by other firms and not by internal factors. The main managerial 
challenge in a network is therefore not the internal allocation of resources, but rather how 
relationships with other actors can be handled (Håkanson & Snehota, 1989). Ford et al (2003) 
states: “no company alone has the resources, skills or technologies that are necessary to 
satisfy the requirements or solve the problems of any other”. 
A network approach to innovation would shift the focus of attention from supply-side issues 
towards addressing the firm’s external environment. Thus, the impact an innovation has on 
relationships to customers, suppliers and other actors become more important from this 
perspective (Håkansson (1990). One immediate consequence of such a perspective is that 
innovations are not primarily judged by their absolute performance, but rather in a relational 
way, i.e. to what extent it generates support from its surrounding network. Succeeding with 
innovation therefore becomes a process of adaptation to the network rather than just a matter 
of strong internal development skills. 
Networks tend to be path dependent - they create opportunities but also impose constraints 
upon attempts to innovate outside an existing trajectory. Therefore, the success of an 
innovation ought to be regarded as dependent upon economic, social and political conditions. 
Given that the value of resources exists in a particular context, innovations which are 
incompatible with existing resources, processes and activities in the network will be difficult 
to commercialize. The activities of one firm can be thought of as one element in a chain of 
activities and its resources are elements of a greater context of resources. An innovation will 
therefore not be evaluated primarily with respect to its performance, but to what extent it is 
valued in its particular context. The established links between actors may create a resistance 
to change since the network has evolved over time in order to fulfill certain purposes. 
Innovations in an existing network will therefore be evaluated with regard to how it fits 
existing structures and incentives rather than by pure performance. Moreover, due to the high 
degree of interdependence in an industrial network it may suffice that one actor rejects the 
innovation to block it completely, even though others demand it. 
While the industrial network approach may be very useful when exploring innovation in a 
better way, several scholars have pointed out that better frameworks are needed in order to 
look at the dynamics of a network (e.g. Waluszewski, 2004; Dubois and Araujo, 2004). 
Mattsson (2003) states that this approach could be combined with Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) and thereby create a better understanding of how business networks evolve over time. 
ANT will be reviewed in the following subsection. 
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4.2 Actor Network Theory 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) is an approach to social theory which resembles the industrial 
marketing perspective in many ways. ANT has primarily been developed by Latour (1987, 
1993, 1996), Callon (1986) and Law (1999). The most notable difference between ANT and 
other sociological theories is its insistence upon the agency of non-humans, i.e. technologies, 
products and humans are regarded as the same when performing an analysis. This idea may 
seem a bit odd, especially from an ethical point of view. However, proponents of ANT often 
underline that treating people and objects in a similar way is not an ethical position, only an 
analytical approach. It may be useful to combine this theory with industrial networks since 
ANT is explicitly concerned with how human and non-human elements interact in a network. 
Latour (1993) argued that reality is often thought of and spoken of in a one-dimensional way 
where nature and culture, human and non-human are considered as opposites which are never 
really brought together. Hence, reality tends to be thought of either in terms of social 
constructivism or realism. The essential idea of ANT is to transcend this separation and look 
at how these different forces interplay in a network. This interaction is the unit of analysis 
that ANT explores and by doing so, the proponents of it argue that it is possible to analyze 
the parallel construction of society, culture and nature. Consequently, ANT scholars argue 
that sociology’s task is to describe these networks in their heterogeneity and analyze how 
these actors together result in organizations, power structures and how they evolve over time 
as a consequence of changes among the underlying components.  
This theory has often focused on understanding how social networks and power structures 
emerge, prevail and collapse. The process is thought of as highly unstable and uncertain, 
given that incentives can be changed and that each actor is subject to power from many 
different actors at the same time. Actors continuously seek to mobilize the network, bring in 
new actors and remove others and hence, the network is created and re-created over time. 
Therefore, it is a relational and dynamic approach, which underlines that the world is under 
constant change.  
The ANT perspective can also explain the various challenges that an actor encounters when 
trying to order reality in new ways. As an actor seeks to remove others or form new 
networks, others will have incentives to block or hamper such development. ANT urges 
scholars to look at controversies and conflicts since they indicate that other actors are 
influencing something and that the network may change (Latour, 1987). For instance, Law 
(1992) suggests that building actor networks is primarily an issue of overcoming resistance.  
Summing up, ANT has a lot in common with the industrial network approach in maintaining 
a more relational view upon society. Apart from the obvious difference that ANT is a 
sociological theory and the network approach is more of a management approach, ANT 
seems to be more concerned with power, politics and the dynamics of a network. However, 
these two bodies of literature should still be thought of as similar in many ways. Together 
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with the subsequent section on economic value and utility theory they will be drawn upon in 
order to understand disruptive innovation in a better way later in the article. 
 
5 Economic value and utility theory 
The previous section reviewed two bodies of literature that may contribute to an increased 
understanding of the phenomenon of disruptive innovation. This section describes a third 
body of literature, namely the notions of utility theory and economic value. Economists have 
often referred to utility theory and marginal utility when trying to understand value. Total 
utility refers to the satisfaction that comes from the possession of a good (Bowman and 
Ambrosini, 2000). A basic assumption is that consumers use their income in a way that 
optimizes their utility. Marginal utility is usually defined as the utility someone gets from 
obtaining or losing one unit. 
Several scholars (e.g. von Mises, 1963) have pointed out the subjectivity of value, i.e. the 
notion that a good can be of great value for one individual or firm and be of no use for 
another one. In line with this, Menger (1950) made a distinction between use value and 
exchange value. The exchange value is the paid price whereas the use value is the economic 
value that the buyer obtains from using the product. A positive difference between these two 
measures is regarded as a consumer surplus. Given that buyers may use a product for 
different purposes their use values differ and consequently they are willing to pay different 
prices. Moreover, while the use value is a key variable in any purchasing decision, it does not 
materialize until after the transaction has taken place. Hence, in any transaction there is 
always a degree of uncertainty or speculation.  
Transactions become even more complex and uncertain in a business-to-business setting. 
Firstly, it is more difficult to establish the use value under these conditions since the acquired 
good may be used as an input in the customer’s production process along with several other 
inputs. Secondly, an organization is comprised of many individuals, and these maintain their 
own subjective opinion about the use value. These individuals may also have diverging 
incentives which complicate matters even further. Thirdly, the use value can be realized for 
another actor inside the customer’s organization. The purchasing organization has an 
aggregated utility from buying a good, but it is much more difficult to measure it and it may 
be distributed over many different functions or individuals. Hence, there may be a 
discrepancy between the purchaser’s perception of the use vale and the actual use value. 
Given the agency of humans, the situation described above can result in ‘the principal-agent 
problem’ (Sappington, 1991). In economics, this notion stands for the dilemma of motivating 
one actor to act on behalf of another one. It occurs when a principal assigns an agent to 
perform certain tasks on behalf of the agent and it is difficult to monitor the agent. Under 
conditions of risk and information asymmetry, the agent is sometimes able to act on its own 
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behalf instead of the principal’s. The solution to this problem is to make sure that the 
incentives of the agent are aligned with those of the principal.  
In a business-to-business setting, this and other dilemmas may arise when a purchaser is 
assigned to buy goods on behalf of an organization. It is more difficult to establish the use 
value, the distribution of it is hard to assess and there may be diverging interests inside an 
organization. Therefore, several inefficiencies, uncertainties and power struggles are likely to 
influence the transaction at stake in a way that makes it much more unpredictable and 
difficult to accomplish than when a consumer buys something. It would be difficult to predict 
the success or failure of a potential transaction if the interacting organizations are regarded as 
rational, utility maximizing individuals. 
 
6 Value, actors and networks – towards a revised perspective 
This section contains a discussion of disruptive innovation informed by the theoretical 
exposition above regarding networks and utility, in order to address the identified 
shortcomings of the existing theory on disruptive innovation. We suggest that the existing 
theory needs to be complemented along two dimensions, namely the ones of value and 
networks. 
 
6.1 Towards a more comprehensive view on networks 
Hernes (2007) provided a summary of how ANT can be applied to the study of innovation 
processes. He suggests that networks are created and re-created over time. Moreover, actors 
can be thought of as outcomes of their relations, which means that this perspective would 
underline the importance of looking at the dynamic changes an innovation creates in its 
network. Such an approach would first of all mean that the technology, or the innovation, is 
regarded as an actor (Callon, 1987). This means that it exerts force, and consequently 
influences its surrounding network in various ways. Therefore, the successful 
commercialization of an innovation would be thought of as a relational process, i.e. an 
interplay between social and physical actors. A critical amount of actors must be mobilized 
in order to succeed in this continuous process of negotiation, and aspects like power and 
incentives consequently become important. Value is created in social and economic 
structures through translation and framing. The introduction of an innovation can be thought 
of as something that often creates a rivalry between different actor networks who try to 
expand and invade the other network. 
One direct consequence of applying an ANT perspective on disruptive innovation is that 
focus is shifted from objective performance dimensions towards looking at the political 
effects it has in an established network. An ANT approach would suggest that the perception 
of a technology may actually matter more than its performance characteristics. Whether 
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customers adopt an innovation or not would rather depend on the extent to which different 
actors inside the customer’s organization benefit from doing so. Adoption often involves 
several different actors and interests inside organizations. A large firm can be considered a 
political economy where units and individuals differ in terms of power and interest (Benson, 
1971). Disruptive innovations may thus create value on various levels and in different places. 
Consequently, the adoption process is often much more complex than a straightforward 
diffusion approach would suggest and several challenges related to changes inside the 
customer’s organization need to be better understood. 
While the theory of disruptive innovation certainly looks at power and the role of customers, 
it essentially maintains a financial view upon power. Drawing upon resource dependency 
theory, it is argued that those customers which provide a firm with profitable revenues also 
impose a great indirect control over the incumbent firm. In this sense, ANT differs from 
Christensen’s (1997) notion of value networks since it does not only look at power as a 
financial issue and hence, the unit of analysis becomes different from the one used by 
Christensen. As has been argued previously, the disruptive innovation theory has maintained 
a somewhat simplified view of customers, primarily since it is concerned with flows of 
money rather than power in a sociological sense. An ANT perspective would suggest that 
there are several actors inside the customer’s organization which may be powerful and 
control the incumbent firm. Thus, it would imply that the demand-side is conceptualized as 
something more complicated and multi-dimensional than just one distinct end-user, with one 
specific utility function. 
One potentially fruitful way of looking at customers would be to think of them as comprised 
of actors, resources and activities. Actors in an organization control resources and perform 
activities. Such an approach would explain why existing structures tend to favor minor 
innovations, rather than those of a more significant character (Hernes, 2007). An actor 
network can only prevail by repeated activities over time and a major innovation would by 
necessity have implications for the network, new actors will obtain more power, others are 
removed completely and some linkages would change. In line with this reasoning, Håkansson 
and Waluszewski (2001) claim that innovations must be adapted to existing networks and 
activities in order to be accepted. Therefore, an innovation that calls for a major change in 
these structures will be met by resistance. Disruptive innovations which distort existing 
power structures in terms of resources, actors and activities may thus be blocked from 
adoption even though established customers would benefit from adopting it. 
 
6.2 From performance to value and utility 
The disruptive innovation theory has put a lot of emphasis on the different performance 
dimensions of a technology. Christensen (1997) made a most significant contribution when 
looking at performance trajectories and ancillary attributes of a technology. Other scholars, 
however, have underlined the importance of translating performance attributes into economic 
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value and utility for customers (e.g. Granstrand, 1994; Granstrand, 1999). As mentioned 
previously, total utility can be thought of as the satisfaction that someone obtains from 
acquiring a good or service (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000). Such a view would differ from 
Christensen’s in the sense that disruptive and sustaining innovations are not compared in 
terms of technological parameters, but rather in terms of the utility they create and how this 
is done. A disruptive innovation, i.e. an innovation which has a lower traditional performance 
while at the same time bringing new performance attributes to the market may therefore 
create a higher total utility for some customers, despite its lower traditional performance. 
Moreover, the total utility perspective would also suggest that disruptive innovations do not 
necessarily have to prosper in low-end segments or in new markets as suggested by 
Christensen and Raynor (2003). Rather, they should emerge in those segments where it 
creates an increased total utility for customers and such segments might very well be in the 
high-end or mainstream of the market. In his review and critique of the disruptive innovation 
theory, Danneels (2004) asked whether disruptive innovations are never appreciated by 
mainstream customers. Drawing upon actor network theory and utility theory, we suggest 
that this might very well be the case, however, given the inertia in existing networks outlined 
above, there may be good reasons why this is often not the case. 
If disruptive innovations prosper in a customer segment where an established firm is present, 
the challenges are also likely to be significantly different from the ones described by 
Christensen (1997). Given that the most profitable customers request the innovation, the 
incumbent is in this case not subject to the forces of resource dependency. However, it would 
still be dependent upon decisions made by actors beyond its own boundaries, albeit in a 
different way. 
While an adopting organization may be considered to have one single aggregated utility 
function, decisions are still made by individual actors, who perform activities and control 
resources. Given the lower traditional performance and ancillary attributes of a disruptive 
innovation, it may have a considerable impact upon the adopting organization’s actors, 
resources and activities and these effects can result in considerable resistance. Existing 
networks impose constraints since the value of any resource is defined by its context 
(Håkansson and Ford, 2002). It can be competence-destroying for some actors, utility can be 
created by removing activities or by changing the value of resources for actors in the 
customer’s organization and thereby shifting the distribution of value and power inside the 
customer’s organization. Given the subjectivity of value and the potential divergence of 
incentives, political barriers to adoption are not unlikely to occur. Bearing in mind the 
interdependence in industrial networks (Håkansson, 1990), incumbent firms may indeed be 
“held captive” by their most profitable customers, even though these customers would 
actually benefit from adopting the disruptive innovation. The reason for this paradox is that 
adoption is not merely a rational decision based upon strict performance criteria, it is also a 
political decision where actors maximize their own utility and power rather than the utility of 
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their organization, a dilemma similar to the principal-agent problem described above 
(Sappington, 1991). 
Summarizing the two sections above, we have argued that disruptive innovations can be 
understood in terms of changes along two dimensions - actors and value. A disruptive 
innovation creates utility in new ways and may result in a new distribution of value inside the 
customer’s organization. Here, we have shifted the focus from looking at different 
performance characteristics towards total utility. Secondly, we have argued that this utility 
must be analyzed in terms of its impact upon the customer’s power structures, the actors, 
resources and activities. In that sense, our approach differs from Christensen’s in not only 
looking at new and old customers, but also at the effects inside the existing customer’s 
organization. 
Conceptualizing disruptive innovation along these two dimensions also makes it possible to 
address some of the previously posed questions regarding whether business models can be 
disruptive or not. In the same way as a technological shift may induce a change in value or in 
the network, a business model change may also do so, thereby causing problems for 
incumbent firms. However, the business model can on the other hand be seen as a design 
parameter that can make it possible for firms to manage disruptive innovation in a fruitful 
manner. 
 
6.3 Managing disruptive innovation 
In the previous section, we outlined a couple of challenges related to introducing disruptive 
innovations. It was argued that barriers to adoption may occur even in situations in which 
such an innovation offers an increased utility for customers. When actors, resources or 
activities inside the customer’s organization are changed or even removed by an innovation, 
it may in fact be rational for certain individuals to oppose the adoption of a disruptive 
innovation. How then, can these challenges be managed? 
Many authors have pointed out the importance of a customer competence in order to succeed 
with a disruptive innovation (e.g. Danneels, 2004), but little is known regarding what such a 
competence looks like. Managing disruptive innovations that distort existing customer 
structures may be particularly difficult since an innovating firm can only impose a limited, 
indirect control over matters that take place inside the customer’s organization. 
Veryzer (1998) argued that the evaluation criteria needed for discontinuous innovation 
should be less customer driven and more experimental rather than analytical. Callahan and 
Lasry (2004) found that regarding market newness, customer input was important for new 
products up to a point and then drops off for very new products, whereas customer input was 
becoming increasingly important without any drop for products of technological newness. 
These managerial prescriptions have in common that they essentially underline the 
importance of not regarding the established actor network as constant but rather try to modify 
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it in different ways, in that sense contrasting the view of Håkansson and Waluszewski 
(2001). We therefore argue that a customer competence related to disruptive innovation is 
based upon an ability to identify critical actors and their incentives, as well as finding new 
ways to align them in favor of the disruptive innovation. 
Any existing network constellation contains skeptical actors, which need to be mapped and 
understood in terms of their incentives. Therefore, the ANT approach would suggest that all 
affected actors need to be identified, as well as how they are affected by the innovation and 
which ones that could be brought into the network. Hence, the innovation must have 
stabilized slightly before involving users and other downstream actors, otherwise, those 
actors would resist. Since ANT suggests that a network has to be re-created continuously, 
actors need to be connected and kept loyal to an innovation over time.  
The emergence of an actor network around a new idea therefore becomes a matter of 
connecting actors and aligning incentives. A disruptive innovation would then sometimes 
require the mobilization of other actor networks and the design of a new business model 
which fits this specific network. Firstly, the innovator needs to assess the different incentives 
that govern the different actors. Secondly, the customer utilities should be investigated, both 
on an aggregated level and for each of the affected actors. This can for instance be done with 
existing techniques such as customer utility mapping (Kim and Mauborgne, 2000) and 
looking at the job to be done, rather than the performance attributes (Wunker, 2005). Thirdly, 
based upon this knowledge, firms need to find a business model which aligns the different 
actors’ incentives so that they are in favor of the innovation. This once again underscores the 
necessity to have an adequate understanding of the value created for different actors in the 
network with the existing solution as well as how it will be influenced by the innovation. 
With this insight, changes to different business model parameters, such as e.g. revenue 
model, value chain and value network can be explored.  
If the management of disruptive innovation is a matter of identifying value for different 
actors and aligning incentives throughout a network, then the survival and eventual 
dominance of entrant firms must also be related to having a better capability to do so. The 
lack of an established network may in this sense actually be an advantage for entrants, since 
they would not be subject to the same rigidities as established firms (Leonard-Barton, 1992; 
Dougherty, 1996). Hence, there seems to be a paradox here in that well established 
relationships with customers create a competitive advantage in the established operations, 
while they at the same time hamper experimentation with new value propositions. Given that 
entrant firms are not to the same extent locked into an established actor network, they should 
be more able to allow the kind of trial and error approach and technology drift (Burgelman, 
1983; Ciborra, 1997) that are needed for succeeding with disruptive innovation. 
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7 Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to add to the existing theory on disruptive innovation, and in 
particular propose a few developments of key concepts in order to address some present 
shortcomings and thereby render the theory more comprehensive and useful. Drawing upon 
literature on value and utility theory as well as two different literature streams focusing on 
networks, we argued that a disruptive innovation is an innovation that creates utility in new 
ways and distorts existing networks. 
Our conceptualization of disruptive innovation differs from Christensen’s in two important 
ways. Instead of looking at different performance dimensions we have argued that 
innovations should rather be assessed in terms of the utility that they bring to the customer. 
By doing so, we have been able to explain how innovations with disruptive characteristics 
may prosper in mainstream or high-end segments, despite their lower traditional 
performance. 
Secondly, this utility needs to be analyzed in terms of its impact upon the customer’s power 
structures, the actors, resources and activities. In that sense, our approach differs from 
Christensen’s in not only looking at new and old customers, but also at systemic changes 
inside the customer’s organization. Drawing upon literature on industrial networks and ANT, 
it has been argued that customers do not only control firms by supplying them with 
resources, but that this control can include other types of power as well. Furthermore, while 
there is such a thing as a total utility for an adopting organization, the interpretation of it 
differs among individuals who are in turn governed by different incentives. Based on this, we 
see that adoption is not merely a financial decision, but also a result of political arguments 
and power. 
Even though established customers benefit from adopting a disruptive innovation, they may 
not request it due to the changes that it may imply along the value- and network dimensions. 
Our final contribution is that we have pointed out some ways forward for how incumbents 
firm can attempt to handle disruptive innovations. We claim that the management of 
disruptive innovation concerns how actor networks change over time and how companies can 
find ways of introducing something that is significantly new for several actors. Hence, such 
notions as incentive alignment, power and uncertainty become crucial for the innovating 
entity. Firms that aim to succeed at disruptive innovation need to 1) identify all actors in the 
network 2) map their interests and power and 3) find ways to analyze changes in utility and 
in the network induced by the innovation, and change business models so that all actors’ 
incentives are aligned. How this can be performed on an operative level has until now only 
been partially investigated, and this area consequently calls for further research. There is also 
a need to extend the focus of research on disruptive innovations from a mainly descriptive 
and problem-oriented stance to also include more proactive work. A first logical step in such 
a development would be to pay more attention to how firms actually can manage to introduce 
disruptive innovations successfully, possibly also studying more entrant firms. 
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1 Introduction 
For many decades, scholars have primarily looked inside the firm (e.g. Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986) in order to explain why established companies tend to encounter 
difficulties in the face of technological shifts. Christensen (1997) brought a different 
perspective upon this issue by looking at the firm’s external environment and argued that 
those technologies which initially underperform according to the demands of mainstream 
customers tend to be problematic for established firms. Christensen and Raynor (2003) 
claimed that there are two forms of disruptive technologies, namely those which emerge 
in low-end segments and in new markets. 
Over the last decade, business models have received increased attention, both by 
scholars and practitioners. This construct focuses more explicitly on value creation and 
appropriation than other frameworks in strategic management (Teece, 2009). It is often 
argued that innovations of a more radical or discontinuous nature need a new business 
model in order to succeed in the market (Christensen, 2006). New business models can 
also help firms to appropriate the returns from a new product and to compete in mature 
industries. 
While the concept is clearly of great importance, more work is needed regarding the 
challenges related to business model renewal. Many authors have pointed out that firms 
often fail to change their business models (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002), but these 
difficulties need to be better understood, both theoretically and empirically. 
This paper explores the challenges related to business model innovation. It seeks to 
create a better understanding of why firms struggle to renew their business models, 
despite the increased awareness of the imperative to do so. The article also aims to point 
out some guidelines for how firms can go about when trying to change their business 
models. This is done by drawing upon literature on industrial networks and by presenting 
an illustrative case study. The case is particularly interesting since it shows both what the 
challenges are and how they can be handled. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a critical 
review of existing literature on business models. The subsequent section introduces 
industrial network theory in order to create a better understanding of the challenges 
related to changing existing business models. The following part presents the methods 
used in the paper and then the case description is provided. The next section contains a 
theoretical and managerial discussion and eventually some conclusions are provided. 
  
2 An exposition of the business model literature 
As stated previously, business models have received more attention over the last decade. 
The concept emerged during the dotcom-bubble and consequently lost a lot of credibility 
when the bubble burst (Magretta, 2002). Ever since, business models have become more 
important and last year, Long Range Planning devoted a special issue to the topic. 
There are several definitions of the business model which are similar, albeit not 
identical. It has been described as a concept which focuses on “the architecture of 
revenue” and the notions of value creation and appropriation (Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002). Business models have also been depicted as the value a firm offers 
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to customers, the architecture of the firm, its network of partners, and its way of creating, 
marketing and delivering this value (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2003). Zott and Amit 
(2008) define the business model as “a structural template that describes the organization 
of a focal firm’s transactions with all of its external constituents in factor and product 
markets” (p.1). 
Amit and Zott (2001) explored the theoretical foundations of the business model 
construct by studying value creation in e-businesses. They argued that none of the 
established frameworks in strategic management and entrepreneurship could fully explain 
this phenomenon. The concepts of value chains, Schumpeterian innovation, the resource-
based view of the firm, interfirm strategic networks and transaction cost economics could 
only address different parts of how value is created in e-businesses. Amit and Zott 
therefore claimed that the business model can be regarded as a more holistic perspective 
on strategy and value creation which draws upon these bodies of literature. 
A growing body of literature has explored the area of business model innovation in 
detail (e.g. Markides, 1997, 1998; Charitou, 2001). A business model innovation can be 
defined as a reformulation of what an existing product or service is and how it is 
provided to the customer (Markides, 2006). Several scholars have pointed out the 
importance of renewing the business model, both in order to compete in mature industries 
and to appropriate the returns from a product innovation (e.g. Chesbrough and 
Rosenbloom, 2002; Magretta, 2002; Zott and Amit, 2008). Others have suggested that 
changing the business model is particularly important when launching an innovation of a 
more discontinuous nature. For instance, both Christensen (2006) and Doz and Kosonen 
(2009) argued that succeeding with disruptive innovation is a business model challenge 
rather than a technological problem. 
 
 
2.1 Enablers and disablers of business model renewal 
While the importance of renewing existing business models seems to have become 
increasingly clear to both practitioners and scholars, firms still struggle when trying to do 
so (Chesbrough, 2009). The literature on business models provides some explanations to 
why this is the case. Christensen (2006) stated that the conflict between the established 
business model and new initiatives tend to impede business model innovation. Amit and 
Zott (2001) offered a similar explanation when arguing that several of the key 
components of a business model such as novelty, lock-in and complementarities tend to 
be incompatible with a firm’s existing resources and capabilities. Attempts to reconfigure 
an established business model would therefore be met with a lot of resistance in a firm. 
Other scholars have pointed out cognitive delimitations among senior managers as a 
source of inertia (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002; Tripsas and Gavetti, 2001). 
For sure, the abovementioned work has contributed to an increased understanding of 
the challenges related to changing established business models. However, none of the 
explanations put forward are specific for business models. In fact, similar arguments have 
been put forward in the product innovation and technology management literature for a 
long time. The explanations which focused on incompatibility and tension between old 
and new business models are analogous with for instance the argument that new 
technologies may render existing competencies and organizational structures obsolete 
and therefore cause problems for incumbent firms (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990). Moreover, cognitive barriers are not specific for business 
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models. Rather, they may impede any kind of organizational renewal or product 
development efforts (Prahalad and Bettis, 1995). Hence, existing literature has not really 
identified the specific challenges related to business model renewal. Given that firms 
seem to succeed with product innovation more often than with business model renewal, 
these challenges must either be similar, albeit of a different magnitude, or fundamentally 
different in some way. Such different explanations haven’t really been identified by 
previous literature.  
Partly as a consequence of a lack of identified unique business model challenges, the 
literature on how business models can be renewed is also similar to the solutions offered 
in other fields of management theory. For instance, Chesbrough (2009) suggested that 
experimentation, effectuation and organizational leadership may help firms to change 
their business models. These managerial prescriptions are not specific for business 
models. Veryzer (1998) claimed that the new product development process is more 
experimental and open-ended for initiatives of a more discontinuous or radical nature. 
Effectuation, as opposed to causation, refers to the process of changing the environment 
by taking action without knowing the outcome, instead of analyzing and trying to control 
the future (Sarasvathy, 2001). Sarasvathy argued that a key characteristic of 
entrepreneurial behavior is to pursue effectuation rather than causation. This notion may 
offer some guidelines for how to go about when renewing a business model, but it is not 
specific for business models. The same holds for organizational leadership which has 
been identified previously as crucial in order to succeed with major changes (e.g. 
Rosenbloom, 2001). Doz and Kosenen (2009) provided further insight into how firms can 
change their business models when underlining the importance of strategic agility in 
terms of adapting to the environment and being able to allocate resources to new models. 
Again, these prescriptions are well elaborated and relevant to managers, but not unique 
for business models. 
Summing up, there seems to be a gap in the business model literature. Several 
scholars have pointed out that firms often succeed with product innovations but fail to 
change their business models accordingly. However, the theoretical review above 
suggests that the literature both on barriers and enablers of business model renewal 
resembles previous literature on new product development and organizational change in 
general. Given that it seems to be more difficult to change a business model, we should 
expect the challenges and managerial solutions to be unique in some way. The article 
seeks to identify these business model specific challenges and managerial solutions. The 
next section provides some further elaboration on the business model notion and 
introduces industrial network theory as a way to approach these issues. 
 
2.2 Business models and industrial networks 
Zott and Amit (2009) provide a conceptualization of business models as “a system of 
interdependent activities that transcends the focal firm and spans its boundaries”. This 
definition is particularly interesting because unlike other depictions, it underlines the 
interconnected nature of business models. In this sense, business model initiatives are 
different from the development of new products, which is more of an internal, firm-
specific challenge. For sure, product innovation efforts also depend upon linkages with 
the external environment, for instance when it comes to purchasing critical components. 
But business models are explicitly concerned with how value is created and captured 
from actors beyond the boundaries of the firm. The notion of interdependence has up 
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until now been mentioned in the literature on business models, but not addressed in 
further detail. Pynnonen et al (2008) presents an exception to this pattern by drawing 
upon theory on value networks when analyzing business models. We adopt a similar 
approach but focus more explicitly on the interdependent nature of business models. In 
order to understand this issue, a more detailed description of industrial networks is 
provided below. 
Since the 1980s, the industrial network approach to business-to-business relationships 
has received increased interest (Håkansson, 1982). Proponents of this perspective 
claimed that previous literature missed out on the interdependence that characterizes 
relations between suppliers and customers. This perspective originated from a criticism 
of neo-classical economic theory and the notion of homogeneous customers. These 
scholars argued that a market consists of actors that are interrelated and depend upon 
each other. Therefore, the term ‘network’ is often used instead of ‘markets’, thus 
underlining the mutual dependence among suppliers and customers (Håkansson, 1989). 
In this sense, the network concept differs from the traditional dichotomy of markets and 
hierarchies. 
When studying the interaction between firms, network scholars regard companies as 
actors which employ resources in order to perform certain activities. Firms can be 
regarded as actors, but individuals and groups can also be thought of as actors. They have 
different aims, scale and scope and are embedded in a network. Actors perform activities 
by transforming resources and making transactions with other constituents (Håkansson 
and Snehota, 1995). It is assumed that no single actor can command all resources or 
perform all activities throughout a network and therefore, they are interrelated with other 
resources and activities. Actors therefore depend upon the environment, which is in turn 
regarded as unreliable. In order to remove this uncertainty, they tend to build 
relationships with other actors (Dubois, 1998) and thus become interdependent. Networks 
are held together by mutual benefits, but there’s always a mixture of intersecting and 
diverging interests in these relationships (Håkansson, 1989). Industrial networks are 
therefore based upon restricted freedom (Ford et al, 2003). This approach has a lot in 
common with resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), which states that 
organizations are to a large extent controlled by others since they obtain resources from 
their environment. 
The abovementioned interdependence implies that a firm’s behavior is largely 
governed by actors beyond its own boundaries. This observation has several implications 
for attempts to change existing business models. Given that firms are interdependent the 
main managerial challenge is not a matter of resource allocation, but rather how relations 
with other actors can be handled. In this respect business model renewal is something 
fundamentally different from product innovation since firms depend upon actors that they 
cannot control to the same extent. While a firm’s relations are the basis of its current 
success, these relations may at the same time impede attempts to change its business 
model since networks are conservative to their nature (Håkansson and Ford, 2002). 
Moreover, the industrial network approach suggests that a network needs to be mapped 
and analyzed in order to understand barriers and enablers of business model renewal. We 
discuss how this can be done in the analysis section of the article. 
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3 Method and Research setting 
Along with a more theoretical discussion, this paper is based upon an exploratory single 
case study, which examines how the studied firm developed, launched and eventually 
succeeded with a product innovation that required a new business model. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) a case study is the appropriate research strategy when 
little is known about a phenomenon and current perspectives seem inadequate. As stated 
previously, the business model concept is still relatively new. Furthermore, the 
theoretical review above identified a couple of issues that have not been sufficiently 
understood yet. Therefore, we believe that an exploratory case study is a suitable method 
for addressing specific challenges and managerial solutions related to business model 
renewal. This method generates the kind of detailed description that is needed in order to 
explore an issue that needs to be further addressed (Yin, 1994). 
Single case studies imply a limited generalisability of the findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, as the work presented aims to develop new theory rather than testing existing 
theory, the method is deemed to be suitable. Thus, the article does not attempt to provide 
an exhaustive set of answers, but rather to identify some specific challenges and how they 
can be handled. Moreover, the case study approach enables a rich and nuanced 
description which is often required in order to understand the abovementioned topic. The 
authors decided to base the case study upon interview data since this source of evidence 
generates a nuanced and insightful depiction. According to Yin (1994), interviews may 
result in a biased description and interpretation of events. This potential weakness was 
handled by targeting many interviewees and by performing the interviews by a duo of 
researchers. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and listened to afterwards. 
In total, nine employees were interviewed two times, which may seem to be a low 
number. However, according to Yin (1994) interviews can be quite focused and directly 
address the topic, hence enabling a rich understanding quite rapidly. Moreover, the 
interviewees had different roles and insights into the project - six of them worked in the 
R&D department, either as directors or senior engineers with plenty of experience. The 
other three persons had been in charge of business development activities related to the 
studied innovation. Hence, a relatively small sample of interviews could still cover 
several different aspects of the project. They were targeted with semi-structured 
questionnaires, asking the respondents to describe the development of the product, what 
the main difficulties were, and how the product could eventually be turned into a 
commercial success by renewing the business model. Several interviews were conducted 
with the person who was in charge of changing the business model. Follow-up interviews 
were also performed in order to ensure an accurate interpretation of the gathered 
information. The case study description below emerged from similarities in the responses 
from the interviewees. It was also read and validated by the innovation manager and the 
person who had been in charge of the main business model changes that this product had 
implied. After the termination of the project, a final presentation was given to the 
company where the main findings and conclusions were communicated. During this 
session, the general interpretation of the collected data could be validated one more time. 
Hence, the empirical description in this paper emerged from an iterative approach where 
the findings have been validated at several points in time. 
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The present authors maintained a formal research partnership with the studied firm 
throughout the study and were interacting with it continuously during 2007-2008. This 
relationship enabled extensive access both to databases and to key employees. Within the 
scope of this partnership, scorecards have also been sent out regarding the creative 
climate at the company and the innovative capabilities of the firm. In total, more than 150 
people answered these scorecards, giving a total response rate of more than 70 percent. 
This was done as part of an innovation audit that was performed at the firm. During the 
audit, interviews were conducted with top and middle management. Moreover, detailed 
case studies of nine discontinuous innovation projects at the firm have been done within 
the scope of the research which this paper is based upon. These data should be regarded 
as important background knowledge for the study described in this paper. 
 
4 Results 
The studied product innovation is a diaper for adults, intended to take care of heavy 
incontinence among elderly people. The product was launched by a company which has 
been a global player in the personal care industry for several decades, manufacturing 
diapers, feminine pads and incontinence products. The firm pioneered the incontinence 
market in the 1970s and is a dominant actor in this business today. Over the years, the 
company has sought to sustain its leading position by launching innovative incontinence 
products, whereas it has remained a follower in the diaper and feminine pad markets. 
Incontinence products are both sold to end-consumers and to retirement homes. The 
studied product is only sold to retirement homes. 
The incontinence diaper was first launched in 2001 and then re-launched in 2002. The 
technical development started ten years earlier within a concept development project. 
Initially, the scope was more open, with the purpose of generating new knowledge rather 
than aiming for a new product. This development eventually resulted in an ambition to 
launch a new incontinence product, which would be based upon a belt, instead of having 
a pant diaper or using tape when attaching it. There were several technological challenges 
in the project. A belt had to be developed, and by that time belts were rarely used in 
incontinence products. Moreover, both the absorption core and the shell of the diaper had 
to be improved. 
The first attempt to commercialize the innovation took place in 1994. New machines 
were built and this was done at the same time as the product was developed due to strong 
pressure from management. Eventually this development turned out to be very expensive 
and it increased the complexity of the project significantly. Therefore the project was put 
on hold for some years, but since the firm’s products for heavy incontinence became 
increasingly subject to price competition, the firm decided to re-start the development 
activities in the late 1990s and thereby replace the ‘all-in-one’ diaper the firm had been 
selling previously. “There was a strong commitment from an early point; management 
really believed that new products had to be developed in order to survive in the long 
term”, one project manager recalls. This time the technological ambitions were lowered. 
Instead of using a belt, it was decided that the product should be attached with tape, since 
this would be cheaper. When the product was launched in 2001 it turned out that this tape 
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made the diaper too stiff and very uncomfortable to wear. Therefore it had to be 
withdrawn from the market and the brand was severely damaged. 
 
4.1 Barriers to adoption 
Despite this failure, management still believed in the product and therefore decided to 
improve the belt and re-launch it in 2002. Once the diaper had been put on the market 
again, the sales did not take off, for several reasons. The new design made the product 
appear inferior, though it was in fact much better, both in terms of absorption capacity 
and in terms of convenience for the users. More importantly, the price was higher, and 
thus it was difficult for the sales organisation to justify to the purchasers at retirement 
homes why they should buy the it. Previously, the firm had mainly offered products 
which could last longer, thereby lowering the customer’s expenses. Though the new 
product resulted in an improvement along this performance dimension, the main 
difference was that it enabled cost reductions by decreasing the total cost of incontinence 
care. The “consequence costs” in terms of unnecessary product consumption, extra work, 
laundry and skin treatments could be reduced significantly. Up to 10 percent of the total 
cost could be removed, and since the cost of incontinence products only summed to 1 
percent of the total incontinence care cost, this reduction was indeed remarkable and 
would easily justify a higher price. The main reason for this reduced incontinence care 
cost was that problems with skin irritation and leakages could be decreased. This 
improvement was primarily related to the breathable back sheet which enabled air to 
circulate instead of having the fluid circulating. The back sheet thus helped to maintain a 
healthier skin while at the same time increasing the comfort. 
Hence, the new product resulted in fewer pad changes, less leakage and skin 
breakdowns, and this lead to a significant reduction of the total incontinence care cost. 
But since the purchasers at retirement homes were not assigned to handle the total cost of 
incontinence care but only the costs of incontinence products, they had in fact low 
incentives to buy this innovation, despite its superior performance. Moreover, the sales 
organisation preferred to sell the old products since they did not know how to justify the 
higher price. Thus, the incentives both to buy and to sell the product were initially very 
low. It also proved difficult for the caregivers to understand how the product should be 
used. The innovation was easier and more convenient to put on, but how to do so was not 
obvious, and therefore the product was not really appreciated by the caregivers either, 
despite being more ergonomic when used correctly. 
To sum up, even though the innovation offered increased convenience both for users 
of the product and for the caregivers, while at the same time creating significant cost 
reductions for retirement homes, the product was about to become a failure. “We 
underestimated the barriers to success and therefore the product was initially a 
commercial failure”, one engineer recalls. 
 
4.2 Business model renewal 
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Despite all the difficulties related to this product, the firm still believed in it since the 
diaper clearly created an increased economic value for the customer. Therefore the 
company started to look for new ways of selling it, by focusing on different attributes and 
sales channels. One major step in this direction was the launch of a service organisation 
which aimed to take a broader perspective on sales, focusing on total incontinence care 
rather than just selling products. This can be illustrated by the motto of the organisation, 
which is “better care at a lower total cost”. The new unit sought to communicate these 
values by performing studies together with customers, which showed the superior 
performance of the innovation. In one study together with six Danish municipalities it 
was proven that the customer’s total cost for products could be reduced by 22 percent and 
that leakages could be reduced from 25 percent to 10.6 percent. In another study, they 
focused on the total cost of incontinence management, illustrating that it could be 
reduced by 13 percent. Moreover, by using simulations, the service organisation showed 
to the customers how the “hidden” costs of incontinence in terms of leakages, the 
required time for pad changes, and skin breakdowns could be reduced significantly. 
Apart from focusing on new performance attributes and changing the value 
proposition, the firm started to work actively with educating caregivers regarding how to 
use the product. The innovation manager said that “it was not really intuitive how the 
product should be put on, but once we showed the caregivers how it is done they found it 
to be much more convenient than to use the old products”. 
The service organisation also performed a study together with Linköping University, 
where they could show that the innovation was in fact much more ergonomic for the 
caregivers. This was an entirely new performance dimension for an incontinence product 
that the firm was scarcely aware of when the product was first launched, even though this 
had been a focus area in the development ten years earlier. This attribute implied that the 
costs related to employee absence due to illness could be reduced, thus lowering the total 
cost of incontinence care even further. Once these studies had been performed, the sales 
force felt more confident selling the product. Furthermore, the incentives of the sales 
organisation were changed so that the employees received their annual bonus based upon 
how much they sold of the new product.  
The sales channel was also shifted towards the management of retirement homes, 
since they could focus on total incontinence care costs rather than solely the costs for the 
products. By using advanced statistics and computer simulations, and extending the value 
proposition, it was proven that the innovation decreased the total cost of incontinence 
care significantly, and this argument turned out to be more appealing to the managers 
than to the purchasers. 
After having taken these measures, sales eventually started to take off and have been 
growing in recent years. The innovation manager summarized the story by saying that 
“the product would not have become a commercial success if a service organisation had 
not been created and the sales approach had not been changed.” Moreover, top 
management had been firmly committed and was not reluctant to cannibalize upon 
previous products, primarily because the profitability was much higher on the new 
product. 
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5 Analysis and discussion 
The case description above provides further evidence on the necessity of changing a 
business model when introducing a product that brings new performance attributes to the 
market (Christensen, 2006). The studied incontinence diaper created an increased utility 
for the customer, but did not succeed until the business model was changed. This section 
provides a theoretical and managerial discussion of business model renewal and 
synthesizes the case with the previously described literature on business models and 
industrial networks. 
 
 
5.1 Challenges related to business model renewal 
The literature review in this paper suggested that while several challenges related to 
changing a business model have been identified, they are not really specific for business 
models. Indeed, many of them were of a rather general nature and are familiar to scholars 
in strategic management, entrepreneurship and new product development. The 
development and eventual success of the studied incontinence diaper sheds some new 
light on how the business model innovation challenges differ from those related to 
product innovation. 
Starting with the actual product development, it can be seen in the case study that the 
main challenges were related to patience and being determined to allocate resources to a 
project that turned out to be very problematic. Hence, the issue was a matter of execution 
where top management continued to believe in the project, despite the difficulties. As 
was stated in the case description, this commitment was a key success factor. 
Once the product was launched, the firm faced the challenge of appropriating the 
returns from the created value and changing the business model in order to do so. These 
challenges were of a fundamentally different nature than those related to developing the 
product. The product’s success in the marketplace could not be controlled in the same 
way as the development activities. Zott and Amit (2009) suggested that the business 
model can be regarded as a construct which is based upon interdependence. This 
definition helps us to understand why business model renewal seems to be so difficult. 
The case illustrates how several barriers to adoption occurred due to this 
interconnectedness since the product was incompatible with the existing network 
constellation of actors, resources and activities. The product required a shift in the 
activity of changing the diapers. Moreover, the increased value that the product generated 
was distributed differently. It was spread over the end-users in terms of convenience and 
reduced skin irritation, the caregivers because the product was much more ergonomic, 
and the retirement homes by offering a significant cost reduction for total incontinence 
care. However, the individual purchaser was not assigned to take this value creation into 
consideration, and this in combination with the higher price per unit created an adoption 
barrier. 
Clearly, these challenges are different from the ones related to developing the 
product, which were primarily related to top management commitment and 
experimentation. Drawing upon the industrial network theory outlined previously, we 
therefore suggest that the challenges which are unique to renewing a business model are 
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related to interdependence and systemic changes in the way that value is created and 
distributed among the key actors. A firm’s existing business model is not only controlled 
by the firm itself, but also by the incentive structure of its surrounding stakeholders, 
which are beyond direct managerial control. A product which requires a change in the 
activities, relationships or implies a new distribution of value will meet resistance. As 
stated before, firms build networks and relationships in order to reduce uncertainty, but as 
a consequence, they also become subject to limited freedom (Ford et al, 2002) which 
hampers its attempts to change established business models. 
It should be underlined that the case study above concerned a relatively minor shift in 
a dyadic relationship between a supplier and a customer. A product innovation with some 
new performance attributes was enough to create systemic changes and resistance inside 
the customer’s organisation. Changing a business model which affects several actors 
throughout an entire supply chain is therefore likely to be even more difficult. In such a 
context, an attempt to reconfigure a business model may affect several functions in many 
firms and due to the aforementioned interdependence, it is enough that one actor blocks 
the initiative for it to fail (Adner, 2006). As firms are to a larger extent drawing upon 
external sources in order to innovate and become more interconnected (Chesbrough, 
2003), these difficulties will probably increase over time. Bearing this in mind, it 
becomes easier to understand why many firms struggle to renew their business models. 
 
5.2 Managing business model renewal 
The notion that business models are built upon interdependence also reveals how 
firms can succeed when trying to change their business models. First of all, we observe 
that the managerial prescriptions related to business model renewal seem to be more 
applicable to the product development phase in the case description above. Chesbrough 
(2009) suggested that experimentation, organizational leadership and effectuation were 
some of the determinants in succeeding with changing a business model. When 
developing the product, the firm experimented extensively with new concepts and 
technologies. Moreover, the engineers tried to use their skills in order to reach a goal 
which was not known beforehand as suggested by Sarasvathy’s (2010) notion of 
effectuation. It is also clear that top management demonstrated organizational leadership 
in being committed to a project that turned out to be problematic. 
These three factors seem to have been less important in succeeding with the actual 
reconfiguration of the established business model. Given that the success of the 
incontinence diaper depended upon changes which were beyond the direct control of the 
firm it had to find ways to align incentives in favour of the innovation. Under conditions 
of interdependence, leadership, experimentation and effectuation are important, albeit not 
sufficient criteria for success since the outcome is in fact governed by actors which 
cannot be managed by using executive power. 
The case study provides some evidence regarding how firms can renew their business 
models. When sales did not take off, the firm sought to understand how all the relevant 
actors and activities were affected by the new product. A couple of barriers were found, 
such as the discrepancy between the purchaser’s incentives and the overall utility of the 
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retirement homes and the caregiver’s lack of knowledge regarding how the product 
should be used. 
Once these actors and their incentives had been identified, the firm sought to develop 
a business model that was compatible with this structure. Under conditions of restricted 
freedom (Ford et al, 2002), firms depend upon its surrounding environment and therefore 
need to map and align incentives in order to succeed. The studied firm did so by 
undertaking a couple of measures. Given that the new incontinence diaper created value 
on a more systemic level for the customer by reducing the total cost, the firm targeted the 
management of retirement homes rather than the individual purchaser. When doing so, 
the value proposition was also changed from selling incontinence products towards 
offering “better care at a lower total cost”. Moreover, given that the activity of changing 
diapers had to be altered, the firm started to educate caregivers regarding how the product 
should be used. 
 
Table 1.  Some managerial guidelines for how firms can renew their business 
models. The middle column is on a generic level and the right hand 
column describes how it was accomplished in the studied case. 
 Managerial action What was done in the studied case 
Step 1 Map all relevant actors in terms of their 
incentives, resources and activities. 
The incentives of purchasers were not compatible with the new 
diaper. The product required that the caregivers changed their 
activity of changing diapers. 
Step 2 Find out how value is created and 
distributed among these actors. 
The product created value for the organization on a more systemic 
level – the total cost was lowered while the unit price was higher. 
Step 3 Identify actors which are critical for the 
adoption of the product innovation. 
Management of retirement homes needed to be convinced since 
purchasers rarely took the total cost into consideration. Caregivers 
had to be re-educated. 
Step 4 Design a business model which aligns 
incentives throughout the established 
actor network. 
The value proposition was changed to “better incontinence care at a 
lower total cost” and management was targeted instead of individual 
purchasers. Caregivers were re-educated and a closer relation to 
customers was developed. 
 
Summing up the above, our findings provide some tentative guidelines for how firms can 
go about when trying to renew their business models. As stated in the theoretical review, 
some authors have pointed out the interdependent nature of business models, but little is 
known about how firms can change their business models under conditions of restricted 
freedom. From this theoretical standpoint we have contributed to existing literature by 
pointing out some guidelines as to how firms can renew their business models. 
Companies need first of all to identify all actors, resources and activities which are 
affected or can influence the adoption of a product. It should be pointed out here that 
those actors can be found inside the customer’s organisation as well as in other parts of 
the firm’s network. Secondly, the incentives that govern these actors must be mapped and 
understood. These conditions are more or less fixed and finding the right business model 
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is a matter of figuring out how these incentives can be aligned in favour of the product, 
for instance by helping actors to change their activities or by targeting new actors with a 
new value proposition. 
 
 
6 Conclusion and future research 
We started this article by observing that while many firms are good at introducing new 
products, they often fail to renew their business models. Several scholars have pointed 
out the importance of changing existing business models in order to succeed with product 
innovations, especially those of a more discontinuous nature (Christensen, 2006). 
However, more knowledge is needed regarding why this seems to be so difficult and how 
firms can go about when changing their business models. We have tried to address these 
two issues by drawing upon industrial network theory and by using an illustrative case 
study. Our literature review suggested that most of the literature about business model 
renewal is of a general nature and does not really make a difference between business 
models and new products. Given that it seems to be more difficult to change a business 
model than a product, we have tried to identify in what ways these challenges are 
different, and how they can be handled. 
Having paid special attention to Zott and Amit’s (2009) definition of business models 
as being based upon interdependence we went into further detail using industrial network 
theory. Based upon our case study and theoretical review we conclude that business 
models are difficult to reconfigure since such a change depends upon actors outside the 
firm’s boundaries and thus, only a limited control can be imposed. One reason why it 
seems to be easier to introduce new products than new business models would therefore 
be that a firm has much more control over new product development efforts than business 
models, which to some extent transcend the boundaries of the firm. 
A couple of guidelines regarding how the dilemma of interdependence can be 
handled have also been presented. In order to renew a business model, firms need to 
identify all affected actors and activities as well as their incentives. Based upon this 
input, firms can develop new business models by targeting new actors, encouraging 
changes in existing activities and aligning incentives throughout the network. 
Having drawn upon one single case study and some theory on industrial networks, 
our conclusions need to be further validated. We therefore encourage other scholars to 
explore and test our findings, particularly by looking at business model changes 
throughout entire supply chains. These challenges are likely to be even more complex 
and difficult to handle since more actors are affected in such a setting. 
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Disruptive Innovation as a business model challenge 
 
Mats Magnusson and Christian Sandström 
 
Abstract 
It has often been stated in previous literature that disruptive innovation is a business model 
problem, but few studies have attempted to explain what this problem actually consists of. 
We address this issue through a multiple case study of how firms have tried to introduce 
disruptive innovations and sought to renew their business models. Conceptualizing business 
models as boundary-spanning activity systems, three key challenges are identified. A first 
challenge concerns how the new value creation associated with the innovation is sometimes 
incompatible with the existing competences and activities of key actors. Furthermore, 
disruptive innovations can create a new distribution of value, which in turn may imply that 
some actors lose their power or status. The third key challenge concerns the fact that firms 
can only impose a limited control over their business model as it transcends the boundaries of 
the firm. Subsequently, managerial implications related to disruptive innovation and business 
models are elaborated. 
 
1 Introduction 
Innovation is a fundamental dynamic capability, allowing firms to renew their product and 
service offerings in order to match, and sometimes even create, market changes. In the field 
of innovation management, particular emphasis has lately been put on changes of a 
discontinuous or disruptive nature, as these have been found to generate substantial problems 
for incumbent firms (Christensen, 1997). Existing literature on the subject has underlined the 
importance of finding new business models in order to survive and prosper under conditions 
of disruptive change. Christensen (2006) explicitly pointed out that handling innovations 
which have disruptive characteristics is essentially a business model problem. However, 
more knowledge is needed regarding the way in which a disruptive innovation actually 
constitutes a business model problem. 
We address this matter by exploring what business model challenges a firm encounters when 
trying to introduce disruptive innovations. Five illustrative cases are presented in order to 
show how and why firms struggle with disruptive innovations and how they can succeed by 
attending to a number of business model issues. These ideas are based upon both direct 
empirical observations from case studies and drawing upon an elaboration of complementary 
theory that can inform and improve the ongoing development of management theory and 
practice related to the disruptive innovation and business model change. 
The paper is organized as follows. The following sections provide a theoretical exposition of 
literature on disruptive innovation and business models. Next, the methods used and 
empirical data are presented. Thereafter, a discussion and analysis follow, in which we 
identify key challenges and provide some managerial implications regarding how business 
models can be renewed in a way that enables disruptive innovations. 
 
2 Disruptive innovation 
It has long been known that established firms seem to encounter difficulties under conditions 
of discontinuous change (see e.g. Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Utterback, 1994). A 
discontinuous innovation can be regarded as a step-wise distortion of an established industry 
or market structure (Hamilton and Singh, 1992). Initially, academic work in this area focused 
largely on difficulties related to changing firms’ resources and capabilities when confronted 
with discontinuous innovations. Previous work in this area has for instance pointed out that 
technological shifts which render existing skills obsolete tend to be problematic (Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986). It has also been argued that changes in the product architecture are 
difficult to handle due to organizational inertia (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
Christensen (1997) developed a significantly different perspective upon why established 
firms fail when facing discontinuous changes. Instead of looking at the resource and 
competence base of incumbents, Christensen explored the role of the market and firms’ value 
networks1. He observed that those innovations which are not initially demanded by the 
existing customers of a company tend to be particularly problematic to handle since the 
financial incentives to invest in such initiatives are normally absent in the early phases.  
Based on these observations, Christensen made a distinction between disruptive and 
sustaining innovations. Disruptive innovations have in common that they underperform along 
dimensions which customers have historically valued, while at the same time bringing new 
performance attributes to the market. Sustaining innovations, on the other hand, are those 
which a firm’s established customers demand, and primarily improve performance along the 
dimensions already valued by existing customers. Many disruptive innovations tend to 
prosper in low-end segments or in new markets (Christensen and Raynor, 2003), and as 
performance of the new technology improves it eventually displaces the former technology. 
Disruptive innovations tend to be developed by entrant firms, since these companies can 
more easily create a new value network and grow even in small market segments offering 
lower profit levels. 
                                                            
1 A value network can be defined as the “context within which the firm identifies and responds to customers’ 
needs, procures inputs and reacts to competitors” (Christensen and Rosenbloom’s, 1995, p. 234) 
The theory on disruptive innovation was developed by drawing upon resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). This perspective on organizations contends that the 
environment imposes a great indirect control over the focal firm since it depends upon 
resources from the environment in order to survive. Incumbent firms are in this way “held 
captive” by their most profitable customers and fail to invest in initiatives which are not 
initially demanded by them. 
A key managerial recommendation related to disruptive innovation has been that those 
initiatives need to be developed in an independent organization. By doing so, these potential 
products can be protected from the competition for resources inside the firm, which tends to 
drain the disruptive innovation of funds. 
Clearly, the above-mentioned work has put an increased emphasis on the importance of the 
surrounding network when trying to understand and manage discontinuities. Indeed, 
Christensen (2006) reformulated his earlier work by stating that disruptive innovation is 
fundamentally a business model problem. Nevertheless, the bulk of the existing literature has 
until now largely focused on the focal firm and its internal resource allocation processes. By 
viewing disruptive innovation as a business model problem, a new research area is opened 
up, in terms of identifying both challenges and managerial solutions. A first step in this 
direction would be to clarify the problems. We therefore address the following research 
question in this paper:  
How and why is a disruptive innovation a business model challenge? 
Before addressing this question in further detail, a brief exposition of literature on business 
models is given in the following section. 
 
2.1 Business models 
Generally speaking, business models are concerned with how firms create and capture value 
(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002). The concept initially became popular during the 
dotcom-bubble. Companies could find new ways to make profit by using the Internet, and 
business models thus became increasingly relevant to scholars and practitioners (Magretta, 
2002). Some researchers consider the business model to be the mechanism by which firms 
create and capture value (Shafer et al., 2005), whereas others think of it as a set of business 
components or answers to certain questions (e.g. Yip, 2004; Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2005). 
The latter definitions are problematic for a couple of reasons. First of all, it becomes difficult 
to assess the underlying theoretical concepts. These definitions also seem to be somewhat 
arbitrary as different scholars use a range of different components. Indeed, Shafer et al. 
(2005) found 12 different definitions in 1998-2002, which together contained 42 different 
elements. Clearly, the important concept of business models becomes hard to understand 
when there is such a variety in the way that the term is defined. Another consequence of 
regarding the business model as a broad set of components or answers is that it becomes 
difficult to develop managerial solutions which are specific for business models. 
Some more theoretically grounded works on business models have stated that business 
models deal with how a firm interacts with its surrounding network. Itami and Nishino 
(2009) argued that business models can be thought of as two basic elements, a business 
system and a profit model. They also pointed out that such a system is essentially an 
interplay between the firm and its surrounding network. A similar conceptualization was 
provided by Weill and Vitale (2001), who stated that a business model is comprised of 
participants, relationships and the flows between them. Zott and Amit (2009) developed these 
ideas further, defining a business model as “a system of interdependent activities that 
transcends the focal firm and spans its boundaries”. In their article, the importance of 
regarding business models as activity systems, i.e. interdependent organizational activities 
which are related to the firm as well as its surrounding network, is underlined. Embracing 
such a perspective, it becomes clear that a fundamental part of the business model is the 
design of an activity system that captures which activities should be performed, by whom, 
and how activities and actors are linked together. One advantage of this conceptualization is 
that it clarifies that business models need to be thought of as systemic and holistic (Zott and 
Amit, 2009). In addition to this, an activity system perspective allows us to consider not only 
financial, but also social aspects of a business model. In this article, we will apply the 
outlined interactive perspective to business models. 
 
3 Methods used 
In order to explore the topic explicated above, a multiple case study approach was chosen. 
This method is often used when looking at a phenomenon that has been insufficiently dealt 
with in previous literature. When trying to build new theory rather than testing established 
theory, case studies are often used, since they enable a detailed description which makes it 
possible to comprehend an issue that has only partly been addressed before (Eisenhardt, 
1989). A multiple case study approach was used since the addressed topic can include a wide 
range of different managerial solutions, given that business models are holistic and cover a 
wide range of different business functions and means. By looking at how several firms in 
different industries, both entrants and incumbents, have tried to renew their business models, 
a broad range of insights could be obtained regarding this phenomenon. The companies 
approached all had experience of launching products that required changes along one or 
several dimensions of their business model. Additionally, these companies and their 
corresponding products were targeted since they had developed products which had some 
disruptive characteristics, e.g. new performance attributes or a new way of creating value. By 
necessity, this larger sample implies that the descriptions become more limited in terms of 
detail and richness. The advantages of using interview data in terms of obtaining a nuanced 
account for the different cases are still present, since quotations and illustrative examples are 
highlighted. 
The article presents five illustrative case studies, all of which concern how firms have 
launched a product or technology with disruptive characteristics and sought to refine their 
business model to fit with the new value creation and appropriation in the activity system. In 
order to gather this information, semi-structured interviews were conducted at the different 
firms. The questions concerned how and why a certain discontinuous innovation imposed a 
demand for business model renewal, and how the firms proceeded in order to fulfill it. The 
number of interviews in each firm ranged between two and nine. In the cases where fewer 
interviewees were involved, those interviews were specifically targeting persons who had 
key roles in developing the new product and/or the business model. By doing so, key 
information could be obtained despite a relatively small amount of interviews (Yin, 1994). 
Each interview lasted for about 90 minutes. Notes were taken by the researcher and the 
interviews were also recorded in order to allow for subsequent validation of the notes. 
Several interviewees have read the interview documentation and been asked to confirm the 
interpretation of the data. Table 1 contains further information about the performed 
interviews. 
Firm Number of 
interviews 
Interviewees 
Video surveillance firm 8 Managers of R&D and people who have been in 
charge of business development for a long time. 
Floor coatings firm 4 Manager of one division, the former director of 
sales and marketing, the manager of R&D, and 
one engineer. 
Health care firm 2 Director of marketing, and the engineer who was 
the champion behind the studied product. 
Incontinence diaper 
firm 
9 The person in charge of renewing the business 
model with regard to the studied product, the 
innovation manager, and 7 other persons 
involved, primarily engineers. 
Table 1 Information regarding the respondents that have been interviewed in the study. 
 
4 Results 
This section contains a presentation of the results. A brief summary of the cases is provided 
in Table 2, and the following sub-sections give a more detailed description of relevant 
aspects of each single case, with an emphasis on how the business model was changed and 
the critical activities related to this shift. 
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Case 1 – IP-based video surveillance 
The video surveillance industry is currently experiencing a shift from analogue to digital, IP-
based cameras. For a long time, IP video offered a lower image quality, but lately it has 
surpassed analogue technology along this dimension with the rise of megapixel cameras and 
HDTV quality. At the same time, the technology has brought several new performance 
dimensions to the market. For instance, IP video is easier to integrate with other information 
systems, it is much easier to expand the system, and images can be viewed from any place 
that has access to an Internet connection. This technology has grown rapidly in recent years 
and the analogue incumbents have so far failed to dominate the technology. 
While entrant firms like the one studied in this paper have grown significantly, they have 
encountered several challenges over this time. When installing an IP-based system, 
surveillance becomes more of an IT issue than a traditional security matter. Historically, the 
security industry has been characterized by a business logic that is very different from the 
logic in the IT industry. The security industry used to have limited price transparency 
throughout the supply chain and people who worked in the industry often had a background 
in the military or in the police. These actors have been used to doing business based upon 
strong relations. Integrators and distributors of IT products, on the other hand, are used to 
higher price transparency and weaker ties between the actors. Additionally, security people 
do not command the new technology since the competence related to installing and 
maintaining an IP system is significantly different. Another problematic issue has been the 
fact that security managers lose power vis-à-vis IT managers inside the customer 
organizations and therefore they have been reluctant to adopt the new technology. 
Initially, the studied firm sought to handle this conflict between IT and traditional security by 
building separate channels according to the logic described above. They even sought to 
communicate the different logic by selling black products in the security channel and white 
or light grey products in the IT channel, as these colors are usually associated with the 
different industries. But at that point (1999-2001) the technology was still inferior in many 
respects, and hence the security industry saw little benefit in adopting the new technology. 
The IT industry, on the other hand, had been hit by the dotcom-bubble in 2001-2002 and 
there were plenty of skilled persons who looked for jobs. The studied firm has therefore 
chosen to focus on an IT channel approach, and has grown significantly by doing so. As the 
technology has evolved, the traditional security industry has become more interested in IP 
video and come back to the firm. But when doing so, they had to follow the IT logic, based 
upon weak ties and price transparency. 
The power and knowledge of security managers has continued to be a challenge for the 
studied firm. The firm has undertaken a couple of measures in order to deal with this issue. 
For instance, it has to a large extent targeted IT managers. One company representative said: 
“It was easier to find an IT manager with an increased need of security than a security 
manager with an increasing need of IT”. Additionally, the firm has sought to create a broader 
interest for IP video inside the customers’ organizations by being involved in many different 
marketing activities. It has put advertisements in the security industry press, released white 
papers and approached the managers of the security managers. The studied firm does not 
normally know exactly how and where decisions are taken inside the customer organizations, 
and has therefore chosen to target a wider set of actors, thereby hopefully creating an internal 
pressure to go for an IP-based system. It often tries to get the IT and security managers to 
attend the same meeting and reach an agreement between themselves. Additionally, the firm 
educates installers and customers in how IP video is used, by offering training sessions. 
“They won’t know everything about IP surveillance from a one-day session, but they know 
much more and can learn more”, a company representative recalls. 
The firm’s business model is based upon a couple of common denominators. It doesn’t sell 
directly to end users and works together with many different partners, who integrate systems, 
act as distributors, develop software and sell various services. The business model seems to 
be very flexible – the firm makes money primarily on hardware but also to some extent on 
video management systems. The partners in its network are free to develop their own ways of 
making money using both the company’s products and its competitors’. 
 
Case 2 – Waterborne coatings for wooden floors 
Until the late 1970s, coatings for wooden floors were based upon chemical solvents. These 
smelled substantially, and later on it was also proven that many of the solvents in the 
coatings were carcinogenic. Additionally, it took a long time to coat a floor using this 
technology. The studied firm launched the first waterborne floor coating in the late 1970s. It 
offered several advantages – no smell, no carcinogens and it enabled the craftsman to finish a 
floor in one day instead of three. 
Nevertheless, the firm encountered several problems when trying to commercialize the 
technology. Even though the benefit of shifting to water-based coatings was significant for 
the craftsmen who used them, many craftsmen had used solvent-based coatings for several 
decades and were used to working with these products. Furthermore, putting on a waterborne 
coating was a slightly different activity from using solvent-based products and the users did 
not really know how to use the waterborne finishes. Since the firm sold its products via 
distributors, it had to convince both the end users and the distributors about the benefits of 
using this product. The company sought to do so by offering better margins to its distributors, 
who thereafter started to promote the product more. Additionally, the firm started to inform 
and educate the market about the advantages of its product. The former director of the market 
organization remembers how the firm on average arranged one seminar per day somewhere 
in the world during the 1980s. He wanted people to get to know the company and its products 
by demonstrating and training them regarding how the coating should be used. The company 
had training centers throughout the world. These seminars and trainings were often arranged 
together with a distributor, and the firm regarded this as an activity that was needed in order 
to make profits on its products, even if the seminars and training sessions barely covered 
their costs. 
 
Case 3 – Industrial coatings for wooden floors 
In the late 1960s, industrially produced wooden floors started to enter the market. These 
products were both industrially produced and coated with a solvent-based coating. The 
industrially produced wooden floors were often installed in newly built apartments and 
houses. The process of manufacturing these floors was very sensitive and risky. The 
chemical compounds implied a great risk of fire which in turn resulted in high insurance 
premiums. The production sites smelled, were harmful and dangerous for people working 
there, and generated high levels of pollution. A manufacturing line for industrial coating and 
production was about 100 meters long. The floors needed to be dried in large ovens which 
consumed a lot of energy. 
Since the studied firm was primarily selling floor finishes to craftsmen, its directors realized 
that industrially coated floors could have an impact on the core business. The firm therefore 
sought to develop products which could be sold to these manufacturers. Instead of focusing 
on solvent-based products, the engineers developed a UV-based coating. This product was 
radically better for the manufacturers of wooden floors. The production line did not need to 
be longer than 10 meters, no ovens were needed, and consequently the energy savings were 
huge. The customers could now manufacture 20-25 meters of floor per minute instead of 2-3 
meters. Additionally, all the smell, the great risk of fire and the toxicity were removed. 
The producers benefited extensively from adopting this technology and did not hesitate to do 
so, despite the fact that they had to exchange a large part of their installed machinery. The 
final outcome, however, was in many respects quite poor. UV coating initially offered a 
significantly lower durability, and could even be scratched away from the surface. In many 
cases, it was therefore used as a complement to traditional coatings. The performance of the 
products was increased over time and UV coating now has performance similar to more 
traditional coatings.  
 
Case 4 – A hydrophilic catheter  
In the early 1980s, the studied firm launched a catheter which had a hydrophilic surface. The 
hydrophilic surface enabled people to use these products on their own, without needing any 
help from a nurse or a doctor. The product was safer and easier to use than previous 
catheters, which had high friction.  
The engineer who developed the concept and has worked with the product for the last 25 
years stated that the main challenge associated with commercialization was that another kind 
of treatment was required. The firm basically had to educate the entire market for the first 
decade. It sought to do so by interacting extensively with physicians and nurses who were 
specialized in urology. Seminars were arranged, demonstrations were given and several 
clinical trials were conducted in order to prove the benefits of the product. Since doctors and 
nurses are the ones who teach a patient how a certain treatment should be undertaken, they 
had to be convinced and trained. The firm tried to make explicit the increased value of the 
new product, by estimating to what extent the quality of life was improved for the end user as 
well as pointing out the reduced costs associated with the fact that people did not need a 
nurse to help them when going to the toilet.  
Today, hydrophilic catheter treatment is considered to be the European standard in the 
industry. However, while the firm has enjoyed considerable growth in Europe, it has been 
more difficult to succeed on the American market. The main reason for this appears to be that 
the public reimbursement system for these products has not been as generous. An additional 
reason seems to be that the system is much more complex in the United States where there 
are more different actors, such as insurance companies, hospitals, government programs, 
state and federal governments. It has also turned out to be more difficult to align the many 
different actors in the United States, arguably blocking the adoption of the innovation there. 
 
Case 5 – An incontinence diaper with a belt 
This case concerns an incontinence diaper for adults, which is primarily sold to elderly 
homes and hospitals. Unlike its predecessors, this product used a belt-like solution for 
fastening the diaper, an innovation which had many implications. It resulted in fewer 
leakages and problems for patients, while at the same time being more ergonomic to put on 
for caregivers, resulting in decreased sick-leaves. Hence, the total cost for incontinence was 
reduced significantly with this product. Despite this, sales of the product did not take off 
when it was launched in 2002. First of all, customer purchasers found it hard to justify the 
higher price associated with the product. Secondly, the caregivers did not really know how to 
put on a diaper that had a belt. Thirdly, while the created value by far motivated the increased 
price, it was not very visible, since costs were reduced in a more systemic way. 
The studied firm sought to overcome the mentioned barriers by undertaking a couple of 
measures. It started to train the caregivers in how the product should be used. Moreover, the 
firm performed a couple of studies in which it was shown how much the total cost of 
incontinence was actually reduced when using this product. After having done so, the value 
proposition was changed from selling incontinence products to selling better incontinence 
care at a lower total cost. Since the purchasers were not assigned to take these factors into 
account, the firm started to target the management of hospitals and elderly homes instead. It 
turned out that they were more easily persuaded by this argument. After having made these 
changes, sales eventually started to take off. 
 
5 Analysis and Discussion 
In the literature review above, it was stated that business models concern how a firm creates 
and captures value from its surrounding network. In this section, we will try to explain in 
what way a disruptive innovation is a business model challenge by pointing out a couple of 
key obstacles. After doing so, we discuss how these findings differ from previous literature. 
Subsequently, some managerial implications are offered. 
 
5.1 From performance to value 
Our empirical observations suggest that one key business model challenge with regard to 
disruptive innovation concerns how the innovation creates value. While previous literature on 
the subject has focused largely on how different performance trajectories match the demands 
of existing customers or not, it is perhaps more important to translate this performance into 
value and utility for customers (Lindmark, 2006; Oskarsson and Sjöberg, 1991). Several of 
the case illustrations show that the disruptive innovation could prosper among established 
customers despite a lower traditional performance. The key obstacle was rather related to the 
way that this value was created. 
Economists often consider value to be subjective (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000), i.e. some 
actors may regard specific goods or services as valuable and others may have a different 
opinion. This subjectivity can be explained by the fact that actors have diverse perceptions of 
an offering. Moreover, value can be thought of as a positive difference between the obtained 
benefits and the required sacrifices related to adopting an innovation (Monroe, 1991). 
Whether value is created or not therefore depends upon the context of the concerned actor, 
the sacrifices it has to make and the benefits that it obtains. 
As different actors perform different activities and control different resources (Håkansson, 
1989), they are also subject to different tradeoffs. The empirical data provide some 
illustrations of this issue. In the case of IP video, the studied firm faced several actors with 
diverging incentives, both in the downstream network and inside the customers’ 
organizations. Integrators of traditional CCTV did not command IP video, and security 
managers were largely hostile towards the new technology. While the new technology 
offered an increased performance in many respects, several actors were still hostile towards it 
since they perceived the sacrifices to be bigger than the benefits due to a lack of competence 
related to the technology. Similar issues could be identified in the incontinence diaper case, 
the hydrophilic catheter case and in the case of waterborne floor finishes above. Critical 
actors lacked the competences required for the realization of the potential value associated 
with the innovation.  
 
5.2 The distribution of value 
Another key issue related to business model renewal seems to be how the created value is 
distributed across the actors in the network. As an innovation may generate an increased 
economic value by destroying value elsewhere, the distribution of value needs to be 
analyzed. Actors who are subject to such changes which reduce their importance may have 
clear incentives to block an innovation. On the contrary, others may be in the opposite 
situation and gain from the adoption. 
In some of the cases reviewed above, critical actors felt threatened by the disruptive 
innovation since their power or status could potentially be reduced by the innovation. The 
case of IP video presents an illustrative example here. When security becomes more of an IT 
issue, security managers lose some of their status and power vis-à-vis other actors inside the 
customer organization, and they therefore had clear incentives to block the adoption. Hence, 
a disruptive innovation became problematic to introduce when it had a negative impact upon 
actors with the possibility to influence whether it should be adopted or not. 
In the incontinence diaper case, the product’s ancillary performance characteristics created 
value which was more widely distributed inside the customer’s organization. This in turn 
resulted in a barrier to adoption, as the purchaser was not assigned to take this more systemic 
value creation into account. 
In other cases, adoption was rather quick despite the initially poor performance of the 
innovation, mainly since the key actors benefited extensively from adopting it. In the UV-
based coatings case, manufacturers of wooden floors were willing to trade off some 
performance for the end customer in order to save money in the production process. Hence, 
they were affected positively by the innovation, partly at the expense of the end customer, 
making it possible for the technology to reach the market despite its inferior performance. 
While end customers and users in other cases could influence the network, this was not the 
case in the specific situation. Clearly, this underscores that the relative power of different 
categories varies between different industries and innovations, and that these power 
structures need to be understood to avoid unexpected resistance to change. The case of 
industrially coated wooden floors therefore suggests that one main determinant of success is 
how critical actors are affected by an innovation. 
 
5.3 Interdependences leading to restricted freedom 
While the key adoption barriers seem to be related to how value is created and distributed, 
our observations also suggest that trying to change a business model is difficult since firms 
can only impose a limited control over it. If a business model is something that transcends 
firm boundaries and concerns the established network constellation (Zott and Amit, 2009), 
the concept is fundamentally about interdependences between actors. This would arguably 
imply that firms are only to a limited extent able to change their own business model, since it 
by definition involves other actors, their activities, and preferences. Put briefly, firms which 
operate in a network are bound to act under conditions of restricted freedom (Håkansson and 
Ford, 2002). 
Several of the described cases illustrate the problematic issue of trying to change a network 
constellation. In the IP video case, the studied firm became reliant upon issues beyond its 
direct control, such as the conflict of interest between the IT and security functions inside the 
customer organizations. The incontinence diaper could not be adopted until different actors 
such as the purchasers, caregivers and managers had coordinated themselves differently and 
developed new skills. Similar challenges could be identified with the hydrophilic catheter, 
which could not be realized until several key actors had changed their opinion and altered 
their activities. Whether these required changes will be made or not is an issue that the focal 
firm can only influence to a limited extent. Put differently, firms struggle to renew their 
business models with regard to disruptive innovations since business models span the 
boundaries of the firm and are therefore based upon interdependence, which can be defined 
as follows: 
“Any event that depends on more than a single causal agent is an outcome based on 
interdependent agents. (…) Interdependence exists whenever one actor does not entirely 
control all of the conditions necessary for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the 
outcome desired from the action” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978. p. 40). 
The empirical illustrations suggest that this interdependence exists between the firm and the 
concerned actors as well as between different actors in the network. A disruptive innovation 
seems to distort or modify the network, and some actors may have incentives to block it due 
to the new distribution of economic value, while others may be incapable of realizing this 
potential value due to a lack of relevant competences. 
 
5.4 Disruptive innovation as a business model challenge 
The key obstacles identified above stand in contrast to those that have been identified by 
previous literature on disruptive innovation. This stream of literature argued that the main 
difficulty was related to how existing customers control the resource allocation process of 
firms, by rejecting innovations that did not meet certain performance requirements 
(Christensen, 1997). Our observations rather indicate that different performance levels need 
to be translated into how value is actually created and distributed throughout the network. By 
doing so, a more nuanced view of the incentives of different actors emerges, and thereby also 
a clearer picture of the potential obstacles to adoption. 
Our findings also suggest that it is important to look at the impact an innovation has on 
different actors. It has been shown how actors both inside the customers’ organizations and 
throughout the network may have diverging incentives since they control different resources 
and perform different activities. Instead of arguing that a disruptive innovation is problematic 
since established customers do not demand it, we would claim that these innovations are 
problematic because they are sometimes not demanded by certain actors in the firm’s 
established business model. The main reasons for this appear to be that the creation and 
distribution of value are sometimes incompatible with the incentives and competences of 
certain actors. The interdependences among these actors and the focal firm in turn make it 
difficult to change the network. 
 
5.5 Managerial implications 
While previous work on disruptive innovation has argued that the key challenge is related to 
the environment and how it controls the focal firm, surprisingly little attention has been given 
to how firms can actually manage the environment. Previous work has instead focused 
largely on how firms can manage their own resource allocation process. One reason for this 
could be that existing theory on the subject has conceptualized the environment in a rather 
simplistic way. It has been assumed that customers do not demand an innovation unless it 
offers a certain performance. Our findings rather suggest that disruptive innovations 
sometimes cannot be realized since actors lack the required competences, and that they at 
times may block an innovation as it would bring about a new distribution of value that would 
not be positive for them. 
Having developed this more nuanced conceptualization of value and networks, it also 
becomes possible to identify how firms can actually renew their business models. While it is 
clear that the aforementioned interdependences impose constraints on managerial action, 
several scholars have argued that it is still possible to influence a network in one’s own favor 
(e.g. Knight and Harland, 2005) and our empirical evidence points to some ways of handling 
this dilemma. Doing so seems to be largely related to the alignment of incentives, a matter 
that lately has been emphasized in the abundant literature on supply chain management (Lee, 
2004). As a disruptive innovation changes the way value is distributed throughout an activity 
system, modifying the business model so that it aligns the different actors’ incentives with 
the new value distribution constitutes a significant challenge.  
A resulting key issue concerns which actors the firm should try to target and which ones to 
avoid. As illustrated above, some actors have a direct interest in adopting the innovation 
whereas others may have an interest in blocking it. For instance, IT companies and IT 
managers had incentives and competences which were aligned with IP video, whereas the 
traditional security industry initially had little interest in adopting it. The studied firm 
therefore chose to approach actors who commanded the technology, i.e. developed a sales 
channel based upon IT integrators and IT managers. In the incontinence diaper case, it turned 
out that individual purchasers had no incentives to buy the product, since they were not 
assigned to take the more systemic value creation of it into consideration, but merely the 
purchasing cost of the products. This company therefore decided to shift the target to the 
management of retirement homes, who could easily grasp the benefits in terms of improved 
healthcare quality. 
Given that value is something context-dependent and largely a matter of perception, firms 
can try to influence these factors in order to facilitate the realization of value. This was the 
case with healthcare staff and hydrophilic catheters, caregivers and the incontinence diapers, 
integrators and IP video surveillance, and with craftsmen and waterborne floor finishes. 
These actors were critical for the adoption of the product since they were either the ones 
using it or were influencing the decision to adopt it. The studied firms therefore decided to 
target these actors, and took explicit actions to influence their viewpoints, for instance 
through marketing and training. 
Several of the studied firms engaged in more general, broader marketing activity in order to 
influence and put indirect pressure on the more skeptical actors. This was the case with both 
the hydrophilic catheter and IP video. In the first case, the firm actively sought to influence 
key opinion leaders such as physicians and scientists, who in turn could speak favorably 
about the product and treatment. In the IP video case, the studied company engaged in a 
wider range of different measures, which would make different actors more receptive to the 
technology, thereby putting indirect pressure on more skeptical actors like security managers. 
For instance, they did so by publishing white papers on the technology and by pointing to the 
advantages of IP vis-à-vis traditional CCTV. 
As pointed out previously, some innovations may also destroy the competence of established 
actors. If these actors are anyhow crucial for adoption, the innovating firm needs to influence 
and encourage them to change their activities. Several of the studied firms have undertaken 
such efforts. Training sessions were arranged where these actors were informed about how 
the product or technology should be used and the benefits of it. In many cases, this was not a 
profitable activity, but something seen as necessary in order to build relations and help others 
to renew their competences. These activities could also have a positive effect on the 
incentives of the involved actors, since the value of the innovation could be communicated 
more clearly in these sessions. 
Other cases illustrate how firms explicated their value proposition differently in order to 
mirror the new value creation and distribution, making it more appealing for certain actors 
and thereby reducing resistance to adoption. In the incontinence diaper case, the value 
proposition was changed from selling incontinence products to providing better incontinence 
care at a lower total cost. The managers of retirement homes and hospitals were more 
concerned with the total cost of incontinence care than the purchasers were, and as a result 
this communication turned out to be more effective. 
Summing up, when redesigning a business model with regard to a disruptive innovation, 
firms need to analyze their surrounding network of actors and the innovation’s impact on 
each one of them, in particular in terms of changes to value creation and appropriation of 
value, and the resulting incentive structures. It should here be pointed out that these actors 
should be looked for both inside different firms in the network and in other parts of the value 
network. Of great importance throughout this work is the application of a clear systems 
perspective, since there are many different actors which are intertwined in exchanges of 
goods and services. 
 
6 Conclusions 
More recent literature on disruptive innovation has increasingly argued that this issue is 
fundamentally a business model problem (Christensen, 2006). Our literature review 
suggested that more knowledge is needed concerning in what way this is actually the case.  
We have addressed this topic by drawing upon evidence from several case studies. Our 
findings suggest that disruptive innovations may distort established business models by 
creating and distributing value in new ways. The different creation of value may not be 
compatible with established competences and activities, and thus a barrier to adoption occurs. 
Moreover, a different distribution of value may result in hostility towards the innovation, as 
some actors would lose their power or status.  
With special attention to Zott and Amit’s (2009) definition of business models as 
interdependent and boundary-spanning activity systems, we would like to stress that it is 
sometimes difficult to change a business model as such a change tends to involve actors 
beyond the boundaries of the firm. Attempts at business model renewal therefore often take 
place under conditions of restricted freedom, where solutions based on having direct control 
are simply not feasible. 
Clearly, the interdependences in question impose constraints upon efforts to change the 
business model. Our empirical illustrations nevertheless show that networks can be changed, 
by attending to a few critical tasks. The different actors involved need to work in the same 
direction for the innovation to succeed, but they may be unwilling to do so for several 
reasons. They may simply have no real incentives to do so, or may lack the required 
competences. When analyzing the network it is particularly important to look at the changes 
implied for value creation and distribution by the innovation, as well as capturing the impact 
on existing knowledge and power structures throughout the network. Moreover, as a network 
is comprised of many different and interconnected actors, it is important to maintain a 
systemic view of the network. In those cases when the innovation required a change in the 
established competences of important actors, several firms tried to help these actors to 
change by offering training sessions and information. In other cases, firms have changed 
their value proposition, engaged in broader marketing activities and aligned incentives by 
offering good margins to key actors. 
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